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ABSTRACT 
  
This thesis concerns transference as a social psychological phenomenon, 
where transference has come to mean inferring that further characteristics of a 
significant other are present in a newly encountered target person after some 
observation of shared characteristics between those two figures. This thesis argues 
for the adoption of a social categorisation based approach to transference that is 
heavily informed by the social identity approach, and self-categorisation theory in 
particular. This approach is contrasted with the social cognitive model of 
transference, which is currently the dominant theoretical account of transference 
in social psychology. In terms of the empirical contribution of this thesis, three 
studies are reported that each attempt to test the predictive advantages of a 
proposed social categorisation model of transference. Study 1 leverages the social 
identity approach concept of comparative fit and consequently tests whether the 
characteristics of other people in the perceiver’s frame of reference (i.e., in addition 
to the target of transference) can moderate the extent of transference. Study 2 and 
Study 3 leverage the social identity approach concept of perceiver readiness and 
test whether the current goals of the perceiver can moderate the extent of 
transference. Study 3 also seeks to test whether the current goals of the perceiver 
can moderate the content of transference. Although the results of neither Study 1 
or Study 2 conform to predictions, the results of Study 3 provide initial support for 
the utility of a social identity based understanding of transference. Possible future 
empirical directions for a social categorical account of transference are explored, 
as are the theoretical and practical implications, with particular attention paid to 
the implications for clinical practice. Overall a social categorisation approach to 
vii 
transference is shown to have some predictive advantages, in addition to providing 
advantages in terms of theoretical and metatheoretical coherence.
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CHAPTER 1 
AIMS AND OVERVIEW OF THIS THESIS 
 
 
The way that our relationships with those whom we are close to, or our 
significant others (SOs), influence our interactions with newly encountered people 
has received a steady stream of attention in social psychology. Since the early 
1990s social psychological research has produced an impressive array of findings 
in relation the role of SOs in perception. This research has occurred under the 
banner of “transference”, and it has shed light on the content and structure of SO 
based perception (e.g., Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1995; Andersen, Reznik, 
& Manzella, 1996; Chen, Andersen, & Hinkley, 1999; Glassman & Andersen, 1999; 
Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008; Pierro, Orehek, & Kruglanski, 2009), as well as the 
relationship between SO representations and other psychological phenomena; 
phenomena such as the self-concept (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996), role expectations 
(Baum & Andersen, 1999), parental abuse (Berenson & Andersen, 2006), 
attachment patterns (Brumbaugh & Fraley, 2006), and ingroup favouritism 
(Saribay & Andersen, 2007). This research has largely centred around the social 
cognitive model of transference (Andersen & Glassman, 1996), which defines 
transference as the “activation and use of a SO representation in interpreting and 
responding to a new person” (Andersen & Berenson, 2001, p. 232). 
Andersen and colleagues’ choice of “social cognitive” as the label for their 
model of transference reflects the connection between that particular model and a 
broader movement in social psychology (see also Berk & Andersen, 2000). That 
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highly popular movement is called the social cognition approach, which is an 
approach predominately concerned with the relationship between cognition and 
the perception of stimuli considered to be social (i.e., humans and other stimuli 
considered to have “personhood” in some sense). It is through the insights of the 
social cognition approach that researchers in social psychology have substantially 
advanced our understanding of the transference phenomenon. The social cognition 
approach is not without its limitations, however. In particular, the social cognition 
approach has been subject to persistent criticism from researchers who hail from 
another movement in social psychology, the social identity approach.  
The social identity approach and the social cognition approach have a great 
deal in common. The approaches are concerned with explaining a similar range of 
social phenomena (e.g., impression formation, stereotyping, social influence) 
(Oakes, Haslam, & Reynolds, 1999) and were temporal peers, each with critical 
developments occurring across the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Indeed, both 
approaches emerged as potential antidotes to a crisis of confidence in social 
psychology (Hogg & Williams, 2000; Operario & Fiske, 1999). In many respects 
theorists from both backgrounds were engaged in the same work, using similar 
methodologies, and ostensibly armed with the same access to social psychological 
ideas and developments.  One might expect then to find social identity and social 
cognition researchers working closely with one another, producing complimentary 
explanatory models and collaborating in their empirical efforts. Generally 
speaking, this has not been the case. While some collegiality and collaboration has 
occurred, the shared history of the social identity and social cognition approach 
has also been one of protracted contrast, conflict, and at times acrimony. Really, 
3 
what is shared between the two approaches appears to have set them against each 
other as rivals, rather fostering alliance. 
The conflict between the social identity approach and the social cognition 
approach has meant that the cross fertilisation of ideas across the divide has been 
inhibited. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the relationship between 
the social identity approach and the social cognition approach has been 
unproductive. It may well be the case that the rivalry between the two has been of 
net benefit to social psychology. In fact, it is a tenet of the social identity approach 
that a prerequisite for social competition is the presence of comparison groups 
that are similar, proximal, and situationally salient (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  The 
social cognition approach, with its vast similarities to the social identity approach, 
was perhaps ideally placed to create a competitive environment, spurring theorists 
on to further intellectual achievement and research vigour. At the very least, the 
social cognition approach has been critical as a point of departure from which to 
make social identity arguments. As Billig eloquently puts it: 
No intellectual theory can be properly understood merely in terms of what 
the theorist is proposing, but it also needs to be seen in terms of rival ideas 
which the theorist is opposing. Tafjel’s [an architect of the social identity 
approach] theoretical work is no exception. (Billig, 1996b, p. 341) 
The social cognition approach, with its overlapping areas of interest, intellectual 
heritage, and methodological approach, has acted as an ideal foil for the social 
identity approach. It is often through contrasts with the social cognition approach 
that the unique contributions and implications of the social identity approach have 
been made most clear. 
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 The substantial benefit of the ongoing dialogue between the social identity 
and social cognition approaches is perhaps best observed in the domain of 
stereotyping and intergroup relations. Frequently using the social cognition 
approach as a key contemporary comparison, social identity theorists have been 
able to advance an understanding of stereotyping that rejects the popular position 
that stereotypic perception occurs in conflict with realty and is characterised by 
inaccuracy, exaggeration, and approximation (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae 
& Bodenhausen, 2000; Operario & Fiske, 2001; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 
1978). Instead, it has been shown that stereotyping can be viewed as a process 
that is very much engaged with reality, and indeed is a necessary pathway toward 
veridical perception (Oakes, 2001; Oakes et al., 1999; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 
1994; Oakes & Reynolds, 1997; Reynolds & Oakes, 1999; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & 
McGarty, 1994). This position has been a foundational component of an alternative 
psychology of intergroup relations, with substantial implications for the 
management of intergroup conflict. Rather than viewing intergroup conflict as a 
consequence of individuals’ faulty psychology, or prejudice, social identity theorists 
argue that intergroup conflict can only be properly understood with due respect to 
the very real intergroup circumstances (Turner, 1997, 2001a, 2001b). Further, any 
effort to manage intergroup conflict that places undue emphasis on individual 
psychological processes risks distracting from effective social change and 
entrenching the status quo (Billig, 1976; Dixon & Levine, 2012; Jussim & Eccles, 
1995; Jussim, McCauley, & Lee, 1995). 
 Up until now the social psychological foray into transference has remained 
largely insulated from social identity ideas. Unlike most other areas of social 
psychology, which have benefited from attention from both social identity and 
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social cognition researchers, the consistent research attention that transference 
has received has been saturated by the social cognition approach. Researchers in 
the transference space have all been sympathetic to the social cognition 
perspective, which has meant that over the last two decades no meaningful 
alternatives to, or deviations from, the social cognitive model of transference have 
been proposed. 
 It is our belief that the social psychological study of transference would be 
enriched by the addition of a social identity voice, just as has been the case for the 
social psychology of stereotyping and intergroup conflict, as well as management 
(Haslam, 2001), social power (Turner, 2005), health (Jetten, Haslam, & Haslam, 
2012), education (Smyth, Mavor, Platow, Grace, & Reynolds, 2013), creativity 
(Haslam, Adarves-Yorno, Postmes, & Jans, 2013), etc. Moreover, we believe that the 
addition of a social identity voice to the study of transference is particularly timely. 
Transference researchers are increasingly looking to the practical implications of 
the social cognitive perspective on transference, with interest in the management 
of transference (Liviatan & Andersen, 2008; Przybylinski & Andersen, 2011) 
especially within a therapeutic setting (Andersen & Berk, 1998; Andersen & 
Przybylinski, 2012). These forays into the management of transference bear a 
strong resemblance to the notions of intergroup conflict management that the 
social identity approach cautions against. It may be important, therefore, to insert 
another perspective into that discussion; the hope being to raise awareness of, and 
potentially avoid, some of the pitfalls of managing social interactions through 
social psychology, whether they be intergroup or interpersonal. That importance is 
heightened by the fact that those in clinical settings represent a vulnerable 
population. The clients of therapists are often already under considerable stress 
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and the therapeutic setting commonly involves a substantial power imbalance. It is 
thus all the more critical to ensure that the management of transference in therapy 
is carefully considered, which should entail a diversity of perspectives. 
The overarching goal of this thesis, therefore, is to persuasively introduce a 
social identity approach to the phenomenon of transference. To that end, the 
specific aims of this thesis are to a) introduce a social categorisation based account 
of transference based on the tenets of the social identity approach, and in 
particular self-categorization theory (SCT) (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987)1, b) accompany that theoretical account with some 
empirical support, and c) leverage the proposed account of transference to suggest 
changes to the way in which transference is researched, and how the management 
of transference is approached. 
In the remainder of this chapter we will provide an outline of how this 
thesis will unfold, and how the case for a social categorical account of transference 
will be made. This outline is intended to provide a sense of the logic that has been 
applied to this task.  
The structure of this thesis 
 The structure of this thesis deviates strategically from the structure usually 
adopted in arguments of this nature. Normally, when arguing for one theoretical 
perspective on a social psychological phenomenon over another, the first port of 
call is to provide a review of the literature that draws on existing critiques and 
points to key areas in the empirical work where the incumbent theoretical 
perspective does not account well for observations. 
There are two reasons that such an approach would not work here. First, in 
the social psychological literature on transference there are very few existing 
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critiques. As stated above, there is a degree of homogeneity in the research and, in 
general, researchers have been in agreement with one another as to the 
appropriate theoretical approach. Consequently, the focus up to this point has 
been on extending and applying that dominant theoretical approach, rather than 
subjecting that approach to critique. 
It is also not our position that the incumbent theoretical perspective, the 
social cognitive model of transference, does not account well for existing 
observations. As might be anticipated, a body of research that has revolved entirely 
around a single theoretical perspective has produced empirical findings consistent 
with its expectations. Our position instead is that the proposed social 
categorisation based account is similarly able to account for those observations, 
while also addressing theoretical concerns that have thus far fallen outside of the 
span of interest of transference researchers. This again reflects the limited critique 
thus far applied to this literature. 
 Without existing critiques, or key areas of empirical concern, we must start 
from scratch in building the case for an alternate theoretical perspective. For this 
reason, Chapter 2 begins with a general review of the last 25 years or so of 
concerted social psychological interest in transference. One intent of that review is 
to demonstrate the substantial influence that the social cognition approach has had 
on the study of transference in social psychology, in the form of the social cognitive 
model of transference. Another intent of that review is to detail the key features of 
the social cognition approach to transference that will later become points of 
distinction with the proposed social identity approach. Finally, the third intent of 
that review is to introduce the empirical work that must be accommodated by any 
proposed theoretical account of transference. In other words, here we describe the 
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observations of transference that we will later go on to argue are compatible with 
either a social identity or social cognitive based approach to the phenomenon. 
  It is in Chapter 3 that we start to hone in on some of the present challenges 
of the social cognitive based approach to transference. Again, these are not issues 
previously identified as of concern in the existing literature, but are identified in 
this thesis as areas where the social cognition approach is vulnerable to criticism. 
The three areas of concern are a) the challenge of similarity based cueing as an 
antecedent to transference, b) questions around the storage of SO representations 
as discrete nuggets of information, and c) questions around the mechanism by 
which those SO representations are applied to newly encountered people. 
Identifying these areas of theoretical complexity sets the scene for our own 
proposed account of transference, where the social categorisation approach to 
transference is argued to better face these challenges. In a sense we begin this 
chapter by introducing some motivation for an attempt to advance our 
understanding of transference: what are the limitations of present theory that we 
would want to face more effectively? We then use the remainder of this chapter to 
introduce the theoretical foundation for our approach to transference. That 
foundation is the social identity approach, which is a theoretical perspective 
largely comprising of two social psychological theories. These are social identity 
theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and (SCT) (Turner, 1985; Turner, et al., 1987). 
Chapter 3 will mostly be concerned with the latter, and in particular will be 
concerned with the model of social categorisation that arguably lies at the heart of 
SCT. 
 One might expect us to immediately follow Chapter 3 with an explication of 
a social categorisation account of transference. That instead arrives in Chapter 5, 
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with Chapter 4 dedicated to further setting the scene for that account. Here we are 
responding directly to the great difficulty that others have had in the past in 
communicating across the social identity to social cognitive divide. If our goal is to 
persuasively introduce a social identity approach to the phenomenon of 
transference, where the audience includes social cognitive researchers, then it 
would be foolish to ignore the common key points of misunderstanding. The intent 
in Chapter 4 is therefore to “head off at the pass” a number of issues that have 
previously acted as a barrier to the acceptance of social identity based approaches 
to social phenomenon. The first of these relates to the difference between an 
objectivist and social constructionist approach to social perception. The social 
identity approach is aligned philosophically with social constructionism, which 
broadly speaking is the expectation that reality is always subjectively understood, 
whereas the social cognition approach is rooted in objectivism, which tends to 
foster the sense that subjectivity should be avoided. Without some introduction to 
the social identity approach’s assumptions about the perceiver’s relationship with 
reality, some of the more specific tenets of the approach are likely to seem 
misguided, if not incoherent. The second, and related, issue likely to impede 
persuasion is the different conceptualisations of social categories as a 
psychological phenomenon. Here too the social identity approach and social 
cognition approach have fundamentally different presumptions. For social 
cognition researchers, psychological social categories deal with collections of 
individuals specifically. In contrast, for social identity theorists social categories 
are implicated in the perception of single individuals also. Drawing attention to 
these different views, and some of the reasons for the divergence, again is intended 
to address in advance a number of concerns that may otherwise prove a 
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distraction and hindrance. Chapter 4 then concludes with a commentary on the 
social identity literature. This occurs in recognition of the fact that the social 
identity approach can be particularly impenetrable for newcomers. We see merit 
in spending some time discussing how someone from a social cognition 
background might best navigate that literature and avoid some of the 
misapprehensions that frequently arise. 
 The social categorisation approach to transference is then introduced. In 
Chapter 5 this comes in the form of a specific cognitive model of transference, 
which we have named the social categorisation model of transference. As we 
articulate the key aspects of that model, it will be seen that we draw very heavily 
from the social identity approach, and the tenets of SCT specifically. For instance, 
the cognitive mechanism argued to underpin transference is the accentuation of 
intraclass differences that naturally follows from social category salience, where in 
the model a SO and target can form the basis of an inclusive social category; social 
category salience and accentuation both being central elements of SCT. Similarly, 
when it comes to the antecedents to instances of transference, this is argued to 
involve an interaction between perceiver contributions to perception and stimulus 
contributions; the former is encompassed by the concept of perceiver readiness 
while the latter sits within the concept of fit. This perceiver readiness by fit 
interaction is also lifted directly from SCT. In the course of introducing the social 
categorisation model of transference we make clear the ability of that model to 
account for many of the existing social psychological observations of transference. 
More critical for our argument in favour of a social identity approach, in this 
chapter we close by turning our attention to some of the immediate advantages of 
that model. In particular, we explain how this model better prepares us to face the 
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three key limitations of the social cognition approach to transference that we 
identified in Chapter 3. They were: similarity based cueing, SO representation 
storage, and SO representation application. 
From here we turn to the empirical contribution of this thesis. In Chapters 6 
and 7 we report three studies that serve as initial empirical tests of the social 
categorisation model of transference. The rationale behind all these tests is the 
same. Here we use the tenets specific to that model to derive predictions about 
how transference should unfold in an experimental context. If those predictions 
are supported, and because those predictions could not be derived from the 
currently dominant account of transference (i.e., the social cognitive model of 
transference), then this may be taken as evidence that the social categorisation 
model of transference should be a preferred model of the phenomenon. Such 
empirical support would complement the theoretical advantages of the social 
identity based model already identified in Chapter 5. The focus for Study 1 is on 
the fit element of the perceiver readiness by fit interaction, while in Study 2 and 
Study 3 predictions are derived from the perceiver readiness concept as 
articulated in that model. 
 In Study 1 and Study 2 the results were not in line with our predictions, 
meaning that these studies cannot serve as evidence for the social categorisation 
model of transference. Indeed, in those studies we were not able to replicate the 
basic social psychological transference finding that, when a newly encountered 
target person resembles a SO, perceivers will be more likely to ascribe SO 
characteristics to that target person. In Study 3, however, we were able to replicate 
the basic transference finding, and were also able to obtain results that reflected 
our additional social categorisation based predictions. In that study we observed 
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that both the extent of transference and the content of transference are 
constrained by perceiver readiness concerns, and in particular the processing 
goals of perceivers. Study 3 thus serves as initial empirical support for the 
proposed model of transference, in addition to being a critical independent 
replication of findings frequently reported in the social psychological literature 
concerning transference. 
 Chapter 8 begins a general discussion, with this chapter dedicated to a 
reflection on the empirical program as a whole. Here, we take note of what has 
been achieved in these three studies, but also dedicate time to exploring the 
limitations of that empirical program. In particular, we are careful to point out that 
although our results provide some preliminary evidence for the predictive utility 
of the social categorisation model of transference, at least in comparison to the 
social cognitive model of transference, we have not obtained evidence of the social 
categorical nature of transference per se, which is critical to challenging a social 
cognition approach to the phenomenon. With this in mind, we explore a number of 
future possibilities for the empirical study of transference as a social categorical 
phenomenon in the social identity sense. In Chapter 8 we also describe a number 
of research directions for social categorisation in general, irrespective of whether 
SOs are involved. The argument for doing so is as follows: if transference is an 
instance of social categorisation, then advances in our understanding of social 
categorisation will necessarily enrich our understanding of transference. In the 
pursuit of a social psychological account of transference one should therefore 
consider current challenges for social categorisation theorising, and indeed 
theories of cognitive categorisation more generally, as well as possible avenues for 
their resolution. 
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 Our general discussion continues in Chapter 9, with this final chapter 
focused on further theoretical and practical implications for the social 
categorisation model of transference. We explore a number of ways in which that 
model may impact three areas of interest that were encountered in our earlier 
review of the social psychological literature concerning transference. These are a) 
transference and other social psychological phenomena, b) the relational self, and 
c) transference in the clinical domain. We see this exploration as especially 
justified because, even without strong empirical support for the model, the 
proposed account of transference is particularly parsimonious. Unlike the social 
cognitive model of transference, the categorisation based account of transference 
advanced here proposes no new mechanisms and no special cognitive processing 
features. In fact, our argument is that transference is, cognately speaking, an 
unremarkable outcome of standard social categorisation processes. The last of 
these, transference in the clinical domain, returns us to the ideas introduced at the 
opening of this thesis. It is here that we once again note the parallels between the 
emerging intervention suggestions concerning transference and the long standing 
interventions concerning intergroup relations that centre around individual 
psychology. Further, with a social identity approach to transference now fully 
elucidated, we propose alternative ideas around how transference might be 
appraised, and subsequently managed, in therapeutic settings. 
Summary 
 Overall the goal of this thesis is to make the case for a social categorisation 
based approach to transference that is heavily informed by the social identity 
approach, and SCT specifically. We attempt to make this case by introducing the 
social categorisation model of transference, discussing the theoretical advantages 
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of that model, and then reporting some initial empirical tests of that model. We 
then use this model as the basis for proposals about how transference should be 
best researched as a social psychological phenomenon and how the management 
of transference should be best approached. 
We have argued above that transference has to date remained “largely 
insulated from social identity ideas” (emphasis added).  The subtext here is that 
this is not strictly speaking the first time that the social identity approach has been 
brought to bear on transference. In the course of researching this thesis it became 
apparent that Hogg (2001) has also advanced a SCT based account of transference, 
if only very briefly. That account is so brief, in fact, that we can reproduce it here in 
its entirety: 
[T]here are some interesting parallels between SCT’s explanation of group 
membership-based perception and Andersen’s social cognitive model of 
interpersonal transference (Andersen & Berenson, 2001; Chen & Andersen, 
1999). Andersen explains that people form exemplar-type cognitive 
representations of interpersonally significant others (e.g., parents, lovers) 
that are stored in memory (cf. prototypes of social groups). The 
representation can be triggered (automatically or more deliberately; cf. 
salience) by encountering a new person who somehow resembles the SO 
(cf. social categorisation), and this leads to a “transference” of the contents 
of the representation to the new person, who becomes imbued with the 
properties of the relevant SO (cf. prototype-based depersonalisation). 
Andersen also believes that connection (defined in terms of intimacy, 
tenderness, and belonging) is a basic human need and that the 
representations of SOs encompass the need for connection. Thus 
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transference engages a process of connection with the new person (e.g., 
Andersen et al., 1996). The motivation to affiliate is a consequence of 
transference. (Hogg, 2001, p. 328, emphasis in original) 
Needless to say, the treatment provided in this thesis of the potential connection 
between transference and SCT is far more detailed. More substantively, and as will 
be seen in the coming chapters, we are far less accommodating of the social 
cognitive model’s representation storage, activation, and application approach that 
is implied by Hogg to be congruous with SCT’s account of social perception. Indeed, 
following others in the social identity tradition, we feel it is more illuminating to 
attend to the incongruities between the two approaches. 
 It may be said that there is a second goal to this thesis, one that is 
intertwined with the first. That goal is to enact an instance of integrationist social 
psychology. As will become clear, we have come to accept the long standing critique 
that the field of social psychology is severely hampered by overspecialisation and 
redundancy; the result being a field that is a) increasingly riddled with 
unaddressed internal inconsistencies, b) largely impenetrable to non-experts, and 
c) all too often contributing only trivially to “real world” psychological and societal 
challenges. In short, social psychology is not living up to its promise as a social 
science. What is the appropriate recourse, or treatment, for this state of affairs? A 
concerted and persistent effort is needed on the part of researchers toward 
integration. Researchers must be on the lookout for, and then pursue, 
opportunities to combine research streams and bring disparate observations 
together under encompassing theoretical frameworks; the desired end result being 
a social psychology that is unified around a central theoretical framework, much in 
the same way that has been achieved for the “hard” sciences. This thesis represents 
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one small step in that direction. Our advocacy for a social categorisation based 
account of transference is an attempt to absorb transference into the range of 
social-perceptual phenomena that are already accepted as cognitively founded on 
social categorisation. In this way we hope to help move social psychology 
marginally closer to the state of unity and coherence that some have argued is 
definitional of a true science (Staats, 1983). Indeed, Staats’ quote below calls for 
exactly this kind of endeavour: 
There are few theoretical studies to draw on that have already unified some 
of the schisms in psychology; there are few theoretical studies that have 
systematically reduced the redundancy and artificial diversity in 
psychology; there are few studies that have bridged the differences 
between some of the opposed methodologies in psychology; and so on. 
Consequently, the grand, unified theorist must confront those tasks herself 
or himself, with little foundation. (Staats, 1991, p. 908)  
Our ideal would be that the theoretical and empirical work reported in the 
following chapters will prove useful for social psychology’s future “unified 
theorists”. May our efforts someday make the herculean task of unification that 
little bit easier and that little bit less lonely. 
 
Notes 
1. Although this thesis conforms to British English spelling conventions, the name 
self-categorization theory retains its original American English spelling. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRANSFERENCE IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
What follows is an overview of the social psychological study of 
transference that has occurred to date, henceforth the social psychology of 
transference. This overview will follow approximately the chronology of 
transference research, and will focus on key thematic developments in the field. 
Specifically, we will begin with transference’s first appearances in the social 
psychological literature, then explore the development of the social cognitive 
model of transference, and finally provide coverage of the subsequent research 
trajectories that stemmed from that social cognitive perspective. It is those 
research trajectories, and in particular the corresponding empirical observations, 
that must be able to be reconciled with any alternative theoretical approach to 
transference. 
In term of those trajectories, we have clustered these together under three 
broad themes. In the first we will review the social psychological exploration of the 
content of transference. We will look at examples where transference researchers 
have investigated the type of content, or information, associated with a SO that 
may be brought to bear on a newly encountered person. Second, we will provide 
some review of the development of the relational self as a theoretical perspective, 
which has been developed on the back of transference research. It is the most 
substantial theoretical extension to date of the social cognitive model of 
transference. Moreover, as a theory of self-concept, like the social identity 
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approach, it is particularly close to our own interests. Finally, in the third sub-
section, we will review research that has explored transference alongside other 
social psychological processes. In other words, we will briefly also turn our 
attention to research that has sought to identify where this particular social 
cognitive process sits in relation to other cognitive processes of interest to social 
psychologists. There is, of course, some overlap with this theme and the two other 
thematic chapter sections, and vice versa, but this structure will suffice to help 
digest this wide-ranging body of research. 
Prior to delving in to the social psychology of transference, however, we 
will first briefly take note of the clinical and psychodynamic research setting from 
which contemporary transference research in social psychology emerged. Here the 
origins of transference as a topic of academic interest will be described, the intent 
being to contextualise this thesis and its message for those unfamiliar with 
transference as a research subject. 
Transference in clinical psychology and psychoanalysis 
 Transference received its first academic attention from those in the 
psychodynamic tradition, well before social psychology took interest. In fact, it was 
with none other than Freud that transference gained academic notoriety. Freud 
introduced the concept of transference chiefly as a counter-therapeutic 
phenomenon (Breuer & Freud, 1895/2000; Freud, 1912/1950), where 
transference was primarily the act of making the physician the target of disruptive 
fantasies and impulses (see also Freud, 1915/1993). Transference thus 
represented a key source of resistance to the successful treatment of patients 
whose full development of the libido had been impeded. Freud made a number of 
assertions as to the key features of transference. Inter alia, he argued that the 
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content of transference may vary widely (e.g., encompass both negative and 
positive feelings), that the mechanics of transference involve relational 
interactions that are mentally stored as patterns of behaviour, akin to stereotypes, 
and that what makes transference notable is the deviation from otherwise rational 
perception (Breuer & Freud, 1895/2000; Freud, 1912/1950). 
These initial ideas were impactful. For clinical researchers and practitioners 
transference still primarily represents the impact of the maladaptive interpersonal 
habits of a patient on the therapeutic context. There have, of course, been 
developments within this theme, three of which are worthy of mention here. First, 
the theorised psychosexual underpinnings that are so characteristic of Freud are, 
for the most part, gone from modern clinical accounts of transference. These have 
been replaced with a more generalised causal picture, where challenging and 
disruptive patterns of interpersonal interaction may have developed for any 
number of reasons; although that development is often attributed to traumatic 
experiences with SOs (Greenson, 1965; Weiss, 1986a). This is more in line with 
Sullivan’s concept of paratraxic distortion, which describes a similar phenomenon 
as Freud’s transference. In paratraxic distortion people develop patterns of 
interpersonal behaviour, or dynamisms, that play out with a therapist. The source 
of these dynamisms are a patient’s past close relationships and when misapplied to 
a therapist the result is a “paratraxically illusory personal characterisation” 
(Sullivan, 1940, p. 235). Paratraxically illusory personal characterisations can 
entail a wide array of content (e.g., they can be either positive or negative), and are 
also considered to be a deviation from otherwise rational perception. 
The second development in the study of transference was the expansion of 
the role of transference in the therapeutic context. For many clinicians 
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transference is now seen less as a hindrance to therapy and more as a part of their 
therapeutic arsenal. Transference from SOs to a therapist has been viewed as a 
window, for both therapist and client, into the impact that past relationships are 
having on present behaviour (Horney, 1939; Safran & Segal, 1990; Sampson et al., 
1986). Transference is also commonly now seen as a potential foundation upon 
which a therapeutic alliance may be built (Fenichel, 1939; Greenson, 1965; Stone, 
1961), where a therapeutic alliance between the therapist and the client is often 
regarded as critical to the success of clinical treatment1. Third and finally, some in 
the clinical sphere have gone on to reject transference in this psychoanalytic 
tradition as a meaningful phenomenon (Bandura, 1969; Safran & Segal, 1990). This 
is not a research development in the obvious sense, but it is important to note in 
order to avoid the impression that transference is a dominant feature of all 
modern clinical perspectives. 
The clinical interest in transference has had a substantial impact outside the 
context of psychological research and clinical practice. As it stands the concept of 
transference has a vibrant life in the common lexicon, and it is not unusual to hear 
transference invoked as an explanatory tool for bar stool psychologists. Indeed, it 
not an unreasonable wager that you, the reader, without exposure to the 
transference literature, have in the past suggested that someone’s unusual, but 
familiar, interpersonal interactions are outcomes of transference from another 
past relationship or experience. Why has transference experienced such popular 
appeal? One possibility is that transference’s popularity reflects the powerful role 
that the phenomenon plays in our everyday social interactions. That is, 
psychologists have simply provided the label for what is essentially an 
omnipresent and intuitively apparent aspect of social relations. In this scenario 
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transference, by whatever name, was always going to be part of the lay analysis of 
human behaviour. This would likely be the explanation given by social 
psychologists who have taken an interest in transference. As will be seen in the 
next chapter section, a key message of that social psychological literature is that 
transference should be thought of as a day-to-day perceptual phenomenon, rather 
than as part of the fringes of human social functioning. 
First social psychological attention 
Aside from a handful of mentions (Higgins & King, 1981; Sarbin, Taft, & 
Bailey, 1960), for a long time social psychology left the phenomenon of 
transference largely untouched. It was not until 1990 that the first social 
psychological paper dedicated to transference was published, and even then, this 
was to some extent transference redefined. Authors Andersen and Cole (1990) 
recast transference and were careful to shed some of what was characteristic of 
the clinical and psychoanalytic approach that had come before. First, and without 
disrespect to what was accomplished by clinicians and psychoanalysts in the area, 
Andersen and Cole turned away from the focus on pathology and therapy in their 
thinking about transference. They saw an opportunity to view transference 
entirely as a general perceptual process, in action across a broad array of contexts 
and in no way defined by particular maladaptive interpersonal outcomes. Second, 
and facilitated by the shift away from an emphasis on interpersonal outcomes, they 
made the SO the critical defining feature of transference, where a SO is defined as 
any person who has been important and influential in an individual’s life. Said 
otherwise, Andersen and Cole took the early clinical interest in past experiences 
with the SO as a source of patterns of interpersonal behaviour and made the SOs 
themselves the source, and only source, of transferred content. Here they drew less 
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so on Freud’s transference, and more so on Sullivan’s paratraxic distortion, 
essentially making the latter the new meaning of transference. In paratraxic 
distortion a perceiver’s assumptions and knowledge about a SO of theirs is used as 
the basis for judgements about new people (Sullivan, 1940). They thus defined 
transference as a phenomenon whereby “memory representations of SOs can be 
activated in social interaction and, when they are, that they can influence 
inferences about new people, interpersonal expectancies, and affective responses” 
(1990, p. 385). The 1990 paper introduced transference to social psychology as a 
day-to-day perceptual phenomenon whereby perceivers may use their memories 
of SOs to assist them in forming impressions of newly encountered people.  
From this new starting point Andersen and Cole connected transference 
conceptually with other social-perceptual processes under investigation in social 
psychology. They positioned transference as highly comparable to processes such 
as social categorisation and schema activation, in much the same vain as had been 
done for paratraxic distortion three decades earlier (Secord & Jourard, 1956). 
Further, by specifying memories of SOs as the source of content for transference, 
and by drawing on the previous work of Cantor and Mischel (1979), Andersen and 
Cole were able to operationalise transference in a way that was ideal for 
investigation using social psychological experimental techniques; the presence of 
transference was said to be detectable via the appearance of SO characteristics in 
descriptions of newly encountered persons. 
Study 3 of the 1990 paper is the outcome of these theoretical manoeuvres. 
In that study participants were asked to nominate a SO of theirs and list features of 
that SO. Then, in an ostensibly unrelated second research activity, participants 
completed a memory task: they were required to learn characteristics of a new 
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person, or “target”, and then accurately identify whether a series of characteristics 
was, or was not, a characteristics of that target in a subsequent recognition task. 
For Andersen and Cole a mistaken declaration by participants that additional 
characteristics of their SO were also characteristics of the target may be an 
indication that the process of transference was affecting the perception of that 
target. Thus, “false-positives” for SO characteristics under certain conditions could 
be used to experimentally demonstrate that transference was occurring. 
At this point it is appropriate to take note of the specification of “new 
people” as the targets of transference, which is a restriction that is also not present 
in the prior clinical literature. In all likelihood this reflects the influence of 
methodology on theory, rather than the other way around. The above empirical 
demonstration of transference is facilitated by the tabula rasa quality of newly 
encountered people. Transference studies where the target person is previously 
known would be additionally complicated by the potential for other sources of 
inference to mask or moderate possible transference effects. It is this 
methodological constraint that permeated back into the theory; it appears that to 
create congruence between the methodological and the theoretical the social 
psychology of transference has become about the perception of newly encountered 
people, despite the fact that outside of social psychology the target of transferred 
content can be anyone. The point is not that this is a major concern. It is simply an 
explanation for why the range of targets of transference has been restricted. 
Indeed, there is reason to believe that transference researchers are not particularly 
wedded to this direction in thinking. The social psychology of transference has 
been more recently described as closely aligned with Greenson’s definition of the 
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phenomenon (Andersen & Przybylinski, 2012), which does not specify the 
destination of transference as being newly encountered people: 
Transference is the experiencing of feelings, drives, attitudes, fantasies, and 
defenses toward a person in the present which are inappropriate to that 
person and are a repetition, a displacement of reactions originating in 
regard to significant persons of early childhood. (Greenson, 1965, p. 156) 
Greenson does, however, view the source of transference as SOs from early 
childhood, which as we have seen is more narrow than the definition introduced 
into the social psychological literature. In Andersen and Cole’s conception of 
transference the source of transference may involve memories or characteristics 
from any SO, regardless of whether that person became important to the perceiver 
during childhood or later in life. Again, this reflects the move away from 
transference as involving particular patterns of interpersonal interaction, toward 
transference as an everyday phenomenon.  
Andersen and Cole go on to argue that SO representations are cognitive 
structures that are likely to be highly accessible and distinctive, as well as 
particularly rich in content. Consequently, they reasoned that although SO 
memories function similarly to social categories and schemas, SO memories should 
be more powerful sources of inference in social perception. In other words, 
transference was not just special because the source of information was SO 
memories, but was also a special case because, all things being equal, transference 
should be the inferential process of choice when seeking to understand newly 
encountered people. Studies 1 and 2 of that paper addressed this aspect of 
transference. In both studies Andersen and Cole compared the amount of features 
listed, time taken to list features, for a SO, a trait, and a stereotype. In Study 2 they 
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also compared the associative relations between features listed for the three types 
of stimuli, reasoning that mental representations that are distinct will possess 
features that are less readily associated with other mental representations. Overall 
they found that when describing a SO, participants listed more traits, listed those 
traits faster, and listed traits that were less concurrently descriptive of the other 
types of stimuli (i.e., the trait and the stereotype), thus supporting the special 
nature of SOs as a type of memory or mental representation. 
On this empirical front there is some scope to critique what amounts to the 
first substantive foray into transference within social psychology. Although the 
authors argue that they ensured that the SOs, traits, and stereotypes were 
equivalent in terms of relevance to participants, the steps taken to ensure this 
were far from water tight. For example, in Study 2 the stereotype stimuli were 
generated by asking participants to nominate a noun that describes their SO, then 
presenting that noun back to participants as the stimuli. While this ensures that 
the stereotype stimuli are relevant to the participants perception of their SO, this 
hardly ensures that the stereotype is equivalently relevant or meaningful to the 
participant. Really, a stereotype that would be intuitively comparable to a SO in 
terms of relevance to the perceiver would be an ingroup that the perceiver is 
highly identified with. It is our view that the demonstrated ‘special’ qualities of the 
SOs are just as likely outcomes of the comparative banality for participants of the 
traits and stereotypes they were compared against2. Leaving this limitation aside 
though, the 1990 paper remains significant as the beginning of a story of the social 
psychology of transference. The fact remains that Andersen and Cole’s theorising 
in this first paper was in many ways a mould from which the social cognitive model 
of transference was cast. As we will shortly see, themes around the uniqueness of 
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SO memories and mental representations, as well as the potency of such 
representations in influencing our impressions of new people, remained front and 
centre in subsequent transference publications in social psychology. 
Before getting to that model though, it is worth touching on two other social 
psychological papers that also came prior to the formal statement of the social 
cognitive model of transference. These built on the foundation provided by that 
first transference paper and that also explored transference empirically. First, 
Andersen and Baum (1994) demonstrated the potential for transference in this 
new social psychological sense to additionally impact affect. They achieved this by 
asking participants to nominate both positive and negatively experienced SOs and 
then measuring liking ratings for the target person, as well as the transient 
affective state of participants. On both measures participants transferred affect 
consistent with their nominated SO when the target person was experimentally 
manipulated to resemble that SO. Second, Andersen, Glassman, Chen and Cole 
(1995) sought to further explore the role of accessibility in transference, which 
following Higgins and colleagues (e.g., Higgins & King, 1981), they understood as 
the readiness to use, or activation potential, of different types of stored 
information. In two studies they thus tested for ‘false positive’ recognition of SO 
characteristics in a target person while experimentally manipulating the delay 
between the SO characteristic listing task and target characteristic recognition 
task. In both studies data suggested pervasiveness of transference effects, which 
Andersen and colleagues interpreted as evidence for the “chronic accessibility” of 
SO representations. More critically for our purposes, both the Andersen and Baum 
paper and the Andersen and colleagues paper advanced the methodology used for 
investigating transference. For example, both papers introduced a control 
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condition whereby another participant’s SO characteristics were used for target 
learning and in the resemblance task. This ruled out the alternative explanation 
that all SO characteristics are in some way special regardless of who’s SO those 
characteristics belong to. As another example, both papers also introduced a two 
week delay between SO characteristic listing and the learning and recognition 
tasks. The rationale here was that a two week delay between experimental 
sessions should be sufficient to rule out the straight forward priming effects of 
listing the SO characteristics in the first place. Indeed, both these innovations 
became part of what was to become a standardised methodology for studying 
transference. In fact, that methodology would become just as defining for 
transference research as the theoretical perspective that it supported, both of 
which we will introduce presently. 
Launching a paradigm 
In a 1996 paper Andersen and Glassman laid out what amounts to a formal 
statement of the social cognitive model of transference. They also, in that same 
paper, proposed a standard methodology for demonstrating and investigating the 
transference phenomenon. Both these contributions would prove to be influential 
to the social psychology of transference. So influential, in fact, that it is fair to say 
that the theoretical perspective and empirical approach contained in Andersen and 
Glassmen’s paper quickly became established as the paradigm for transference 
research. As will become apparent later in this chapter, it is no exaggeration to say 
that all social psychological research into transference up to this draws very 
heavily from this early effort. 
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The social cognitive model of transference  
The formal social cognitive model of transference itself draws heavily on 
the prior work of Andersen and colleagues introduced above. In terms of theory, it 
does not differ dramatically from that which was present in that earliest social 
psychological research. First and foremost, the defining outcome of transference is 
maintained as the perception that a newly encountered person possesses 
characteristics or qualities that are not actually present in that person, but rather 
are the characteristics or qualities of a SO of that perceiver. Further, to a large 
extent the cognitive process theorised to underpin transference closely resembles 
earlier reasoning, and can still be adequately captured in a concise statement: 
Transference occurs via the application of a cognitive representation of a SO that is 
stored in memory to the impression of a newly encountered person, which is cued 
by the observed similarity between that newly encountered person and the SO. 
 
Figure 2.1. The social cognitive model of transference in its first schematic 
depiction (Andersen & Glassman, 1996, p. 265).  
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In Figure 2.1 we have reconstructed Andersen and Glassman’s own 
depiction of the key elements of the social cognitive model of transference. The 
authors describe this transference model as in line with Bruner’s (1957) landmark 
description of perceptual processes. Transference is described as “going beyond 
the information given”, where the perceiver is “filling in the blanks” (1996, p. 266) 
about a newly encountered target person by drawing upon a SO representation. In 
terms of more specific parallels with other social perceptual models, the social 
cognitive model is described as akin to Fiske and colleagues schema triggered 
affect model (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). This is a social cognitive model of social 
categorisation where stored category content, specifically a category’s evaluative 
tone, is activated and then cognitively linked to a target person. The authors 
suggest that this process of activation and linking is the basic process that 
underlies transference. 
The social cognitive model also draws on social cognitive notions of 
construct accessibility. In fact, the notion of a high, or chronic, accessibility (Bargh, 
Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988) is retained as a permanent part of the social cognitive 
model . In Figure 2.1, for instance, the top down processing includes “considerable 
readiness to apply the SO representation”. This, as we have seen, follows from their 
earliest theorising on the nature of transference. Here too the authors argue that 
due to the familiarity of SOs, the frequent relevance of SOs to our lives, and the 
importance of SOs to us, transference includes a chronic accessibility component. 
This argued chronic accessibility component of transference is one of two key 
features establishing the social cognitive model of transference as a distinct 
cognitive process (see also Chen et al., 1999). By this we mean that it positions the 
social cognitive model of transference as something other than just a mirror of 
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other models of social perception already present in the field. Without such unique 
components the model would be necessarily redundant; equivalent apart from 
differences in the source of information (i.e., a SO) and the key stimulus (i.e., a 
newly encountered person). 
 The second distinctive feature of the social cognitive model of transference 
is based on the concept of “n-of-one” representations. Andersen and Glassman 
argue that SO representations are special in that they are stored as exemplars. 
These exemplars, or n-of-one representations, correspond to the collection of 
knowledge about a single person only. For them this can be contrasted with the 
storage and use of social categories (see also Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen et 
al., 1995), where social categories encompass multiple individuals. This positions 
the social cognitive model firmly in contrast to categorisation models such as the 
schema triggered affect model, and here they draw on Higgins and King’s 
distinction between categories and “proper constructs” (1981). They also see 
precedent for this line of reasoning in the exemplar based processing literature 
(Smith & Zarate, 1990, 1992; see also Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), although the 
expectation that individual people correspond to cognitive exemplars is not 
generally a presumption of exemplar models. An exemplar based approach does, 
however, resolve a logical problem for Andersen and Glassman. For them an 
inclusive social category approach, where the SO and target would come to share a 
social category, would imply that “one identifies the [target] as being the 
significant other” (1996, p. 271, emphasis in original). As transference does not 
entail confusion of the target’s identity, a social categorisation approach is 
considered to be an ill fit. Instead, the phenomenon of transference is said to 
necessitate a model that allows for the use of SO information in social perception 
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in a way that does not imply that other stimuli are subsumed within a SO category. 
Hence the appropriateness of an exemplar based mechanism; one that does not 
rely on categorisation, but instead on the similarity based activation and 
application of discrete SO representations. In sum, it is for these two reasons that a 
unique n-of-one representation approach is required, even if in all other respects 
these theorised cognitive structures are expected to “exist and operate as do other 
social constructs” (e.g., classes of people, social roles, trait groupings) (1996, p. 
171; see also Hinkly & Andersen, 1996). 
 At this point we have covered the key components of the social cognitive 
model of transference. It is this model that has provided the theoretical foundation 
for the extensive body of transference research that has followed. While we will 
provide a snapshot of that research in the remainder of this chapter, it is first 
worth noting that this social cognitive model has received twenty years of 
academic attention largely without attempts at revision or modification. Although 
there have been theoretical extensions (most substantively the ‘relational self’; see 
this chapter, below) the model itself enjoys wide spread and continued acceptance 
in its original form (e.g., Andersen & Berenson, 2001; Andersen & Przybylinski, 
2012; Baum & Andersen, 1999; Berk & Andersen, 2000). The one addition to the 
model, if it can be called that, has been to make explicit parallels between the social 
cognitive model of transference and an if-then relations perspective on social 
cognition (Andersen & Berk, 1998). Specifically, it has been argued that the notion 
of stable “if-then” associations, of the kind that Mischel and Schoda (1995) posit in 
their cognitive-affective theory of personality, is an appropriate way to understand 
the cue and response components in the social cognitive model. That is, a person’s 
cognitive system can be thought of as comprised of if-then units, where each ‘if’ is a 
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cueing condition and each ‘then’ is a linked behavioural or affective response. 
Thus, in the context of transference, the ‘if’ is some perceived similarity between a 
SO and a newly encountered person and the ‘then’ is the consequent transference, 
or the application of SO information to an impression of that person. This analogy, 
maintained consistently in the transference literature (Andersen & Chen, 2002; 
Andersen & Przybylinski, 2012; Andersen & Saribay, 2005), provides further 
clarity as to what type of cognitive process the social cognitive model of 
transference is attempting to capture. 
A methodological framework 
Andersen and Glassman rightly devoted a sizeable portion of their 1996 
paper to the experimental method that they developed for demonstrating 
transference effects. Not only was that experimental method an innovative 
solution to a challenging methodological problem, but that method would also 
underpin later transference research at least as much as their theoretical analysis. 
Although we have already seen how this challenge was overcome - the 
methodological solution in the 1996 paper does not differ meaningfully from that 
which had been developed first for Andersen and Baum’s (1994) study - for the 
sake of emphasis and clarity it is well worth taking the time to spell it out here. 
The methodological challenge we refer to stemmed from two competing 
needs: first, the need to recognise the uniqueness of each person’s SOs, and second, 
the need for consistent methodologies across participants. Non-conscious 
cognitive processes, of the kind transference is theorised to be, are easily affected 
by the extraneous factors in the research environment. Investigating non-
conscious processes consequently requires the use of very subtle research 
methods, often administered across large numbers of participants. At the same 
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time, we all have SOs that are very different from the SOs of other people. This is a 
problem if an experimenter wishes to involve SOs as stimuli in experimental 
conditions aimed at investigating processes considered to be more or less 
universal. While an experimenter may expect reasonably uniform responses when 
providing stimuli pertaining to gender, race, class, etc. (but see Haslam, Turner, 
Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1997), there is no general account of SOs that can be 
expected to capture the manner in which each SO is important to a wide range of 
participants. In sum, how one might investigate the universal effect that SOs have 
on social perception is not obvious. 
Andersen and Glassman’s solution was a variation on Higgins and 
colleagues’ methodological approach to self discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987, for 
review). This approach was described by Andersen and Glassman as an 
idiographic-nomothetic design. Idiographic, because it allows participants to 
generate personalised descriptions of SOs that they themselves nominate, and 
nomothetic because these personalised descriptions are used to generate 
experimental stimuli that are, from a particular perspective, consistent across 
participants. Two experimental sessions are used to achieve this simultaneously 
idiographic and nomethetic design. In the first session participants are asked to 
describe a SO of theirs. Participants are asked to nominate a SO (e.g., “[Think of a 
person] who is very important to you and has been for many years”; Andersen et 
al., 1995, p. 46), and then descriptors, or SO characteristics, are obtained by asking 
participants to complete a series of sentences about that nominated SO (e.g., My 
significant other is…). In this session participants are also asked to nominate 
characteristics that are irrelevant to their SO from an additional list of adjectives. 
These irrelevant characteristics are used as distractor items in the second session. 
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After two weeks participants are introduced to the second experimental 
session, however, the connection between the first and second sessions is not 
revealed to participants. Here they are informed that they will be learning about a 
new person and completing a memory task. In practise this second session has 
been presented to participants as an ‘impression formation study’ and they are 
told that researchers are interested in the way people form impressions. For the 
sake of credibility and maintaining the interest of participants the learning task is 
often described as pertaining to a person that they will actually be meeting. For 
example, in a number of studies participants were told that they will be meeting a 
new person who has been performing a similar task in the next room (e.g., 
Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1996; Baum & Andersen, 1999; Berenson 
& Andersen, 2006; Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008). 
In the task itself participants are asked to remember a series of descriptors 
of the new person and are told that their memory will be tested in a recognition 
test. Unbeknownst to participants they are split into ‘resemblance’ and ‘no 
resemblance’ experimental conditions. In the resemblance condition some of the 
descriptors of the new person are drawn from that participant’s own self-
generated list of SO descriptors. That new person therefore resembles that 
participant’s SO to some degree. In the no resemblance condition some descriptors 
of the new person are instead drawn from a different participant’s SO descriptors. 
Andersen and Glassman called this ‘yoking’ and the result is that pairs of 
participants across experimental conditions are exposed to the same SO 
characteristics in the learning phase. The purpose of this yoking is to ensure that 
any differences between the experimental and control conditions are attributable 
to the specific relationship between the participant and characteristics from their 
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own SO, rather than the inclusion of more or less SO characteristics generally. If 
yoking did not occur, and instead non-SO descriptors were included in place of SO 
descriptors in the no resemblance condition, then it would not be possible to argue 
confidently that what is being observed is transference; the alternative explanation 
would remain that participants are merely leveraging expectations about the 
characteristics of SOs in general. 
In the subsequent recognition test participants are asked to declare 
whether a series of items were or were not present in the list of new person 
descriptors. In this test items from that participant’s own SO descriptions that 
were not present in the list of new person descriptors are included. Transference is 
most commonly measured by the number of false positives for these SO items. 
That is, the number of SO items that were not present in the list of new person 
descriptors but are mistakenly declared as having been present. 
Andersen and Glassman provide a tabulated summary of their suggested 
experimental design and we have reproduced that table here verbatim (see Table 
2.1.). This table does not include mention of the experimental control condition 
(i.e., the yoking procedure), but otherwise is a good summary of the key 
components of the methodology. 
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Table 2.1. 
Andersen and Glassman’s suggested methodology for experimentally demonstrating 
transference (1996, p. 287) 
Phase 1: Idiographic stimulus procedures 
1. Subjects name a significant other (and possibly other people or 
categories). 
2. Subjects complete a series of sentences (usually 14) to characterise the 
person, and then rank-order these listed sentences in terms of how 
descriptive they are of the person. 
3. Subjects select from a list of adjectives those that are neither descriptive 
nor counter descriptive of the person (i.e., those that are essentially 
irrelevant to the person. 
Phase 2: Learning about a new person and completing a recognition-memory test. 
1. Subjects participate in a learning task in which they learn about one or 
more new target persons. 
2. In the learning task, the target person (or one of the target persons) is 
characterised by some of the descriptive statements subjects listed earlier 
to describe their significant other, as well as by some irrelevant filler 
statements. 
3. After completing a brief distractor task to clear short-term memory, 
subjects rate their confidence that they actually saw and learned of each 
of a series of descriptive statements about the target person. The 
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descriptive statements include those that were actually learned about the 
target and those that were not actually learned. 
Representation-consistent biased memory is indexed by relatively high 
confidence ratings about statements that were not actually presented about the 
target person but that do describe the representation. This reflects the activation 
and application of the representation via the tendency to “fill in the blanks” 
(Bruner, 1957) about the new person. 
 
The content of transference 
We begin this chapter section by stepping back momentarily in the 
chronology of transference research. This is because the first investigations into 
the content of transference came before the social cognitive model of transference 
was formally articulated. Andersen and Baum (1994) investigated the possibility 
that, in addition to SO characteristics, the affect that is associated with SOs can also 
become part of the impression of a newly encountered target. As briefly described 
above, those researchers augmented the basic transference methodological 
paradigm by asking participants to nominate a positive and a negative SO. They 
were able to show that resemblance to positively regarded SOs led to more liking 
of the target person in comparison to targets resembling another participant’s 
positively regarded SO, while resemblance to negatively regarded SOs led to less 
liking of the target person in comparison to targets resembling another 
participant’s negatively regarded SO. They also detected effects on their measure 
of depressed affect; subjects reported feeling better in relation to targets when 
those targets resembled their own positively regarded SO as opposed to another 
participant’s positively regarded SO. 
38  
These findings were then extended by Andersen, Reznik, and Manzella 
(1996) in two ways. First, they altered the methodology to ensure that target 
persons were described using an equal number of positive and negative 
descriptors. This helped rule out the alternative explanation that the specific SO 
characteristics, rather than the overall affective tone of the SO representation, 
were driving differences in affective response. Second, they added a physiological 
measure of affective response. Specifically, they asked independent judges to 
assess the facial expressions of participants that were recorded while those 
participants read aloud characteristics of the newly encountered target during the 
learning phase of the experiment3. It was found that facial expressions during 
learning corresponded to the overall tone of the SO, where resemblance to a 
negatively toned SO resulted in observed negative facial affect and resemblance to 
a positively toned SO resulted in observed positive facial affect. Such differences 
were not observed in yoked control conditions. 
Andersen and colleagues, by now armed with the theorising of Andersen 
and Glassman (1996), also added measures of interpersonal motivations and 
expectancies. They anticipated that during transference, stored motivations to 
approach or avoid (i.e., to become emotionally close or not) would become 
activated and applied to a newly encountered target, as well as stored rejection or 
acceptance expectancies. They indeed found that, in contrast to a negatively toned 
SO, when a target resembled a positively toned SO who was “someone in whose 
presence you feel happy and great about yourself, and someone you want to be 
close to, want to share your feelings with, and do not want to distance yourself 
from” (1996, p. 1112, emphasis in original), participants indicated to a greater 
degree that they would approach and be more emotionally open with the target, 
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and that they would expect to be liked by that target. These differences did not 
emerge in the yoked control condition where targets resembled the positively and 
negatively toned SOs of other participants. 
These empirical results are part of the development of the theory of the 
relational self, which we will discuss in detail shortly. Here we see that, consistent 
with theorising elsewhere (Ogilvie & Ashmore, 1991), transference researchers 
turned toward the possibility that a wide variety of content, including self-relevant 
information such as the relationship between the SO and the self, may be stored 
alongside SO representations. This SO-to-self connection was also the research 
focus of Hinkley and Andersen (1996). They similarly suggested that SO 
representations would be linked in memory to particular patterns of interaction 
with the perceiver. They described these patterns of interaction as a part of the 
self, suggesting that a “self-when-with-the-SO” schema may become activated 
during transference (see also Deaux, 1991; Ogilvie & Ashmore, 1991). The 
activation of this schema would manifest in changes to the working self-concept, 
which is said to be the currently accessible and operative aspects of self (Markus & 
Wurf, 1987). An illustrative example they provide is of a person whose 
relationship with their SO results in feelings of their own incompetence. The 
theory here is that if that SO representation is activated in transference then those 
feelings of incompetence will also become activated, due to their linked status in 
memory; the result being an operative self-concept along the lines of ‘I am an 
incompetent person’. 
In order to test these ideas Hinkley and Andersen augmented the standard 
transference methodological approach by asking participants to visualise what 
they are like in the presence of nominated SOs and then write down a 
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corresponding description of themselves. The researchers used this information, 
as well as baseline measures of global self-esteem, to look for changes in the self-
concept across the two experimental sessions. In terms of self-description, the 
critical finding was that, when once again asked to describe themselves after 
encountering a target person, in resemblance conditions participants’ session two 
self-descriptions overlapped more with their corresponding session one self-
descriptions than in the yoked control conditions. In terms of self-esteem, although 
no reliable differences were found on the global self-esteem measures, by 
measuring the particular tone of overlapping self-description items it was possible 
to observe reliable changes in the overall tone of that self-description. Specifically, 
it was observed that in the resemblance condition the tone of overlapping self-
description items were more matching to the overall tone of the corresponding SO, 
again comparing with the yoked control conditions. Both these findings were taken 
as strong evidence that transference not only results in shifts in the perception of a 
newly encountered person, but also in shifts in the working self-concept in a 
direction corresponding to the self-when-with-the-SO schema. 
There were two unpredicted findings in this research that are worth 
mentioning. First, Hinkley and Andersen observed that encountering a positively 
toned target, whether resembling their SO or another participant’s SO, led to a 
descriptive shift toward a working self-concept similar to that associated with a 
positively toned SO. Second, they observed that when a target resembled 
participants’ own negatively toned SOs those participants came to perceive 
descriptors unrelated to that SO but descriptive of their present self-concept to be 
more positive. Both these effects were interpreted as pointing to additional social-
cognitive processes running parallel to transference. The former was argued to 
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represent the potential for affect to directly cue various self-schema and thus alter 
the working self-concept. The latter was interpreted as a kind of “self bolstering” 
where participants took the to opportunity to emphasise the positivity of other 
aspects of themselves in the face of negative self-concept change. This line of 
thinking was given further attention by Baum and Andersen (1999) who were also 
interested in how the content of transference may lead to other psychological 
responses. They investigated the interaction between transference and ‘role 
expectations’, which are the expected behaviours of the self and another person in 
interpersonal interactions, as well as the goals to be pursued with that other 
person (e.g., Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996; Downey & Feldman, 1996). Specifically, they 
theorised that transferred content could include role expectations and that the 
interaction between these role expectations and the actual interpersonal 
interaction would impact mood. When transference is from a positively regarded 
SO and those role expectations are met the researchers predicted a positive mood 
response. However, when transference is from a positively regarded SO and those 
role expectations are not met they predicted a negative mood response. This 
prediction was supported in their study where they manipulated interpersonal 
role congruence between the SO and the newly encountered target in addition to 
the standard resemblance manipulation. 
In terms of the trajectory of transference research, both this study and 
Hinkley and Andersen’s research represent early empirical linkages between 
transference and other concurrent but distinct self and social perceptual 
processes. This new emphasis will be covered in the next chapter section. Before 
that though, we will turn our attention to three more examples of the study of 
transference content, all of which turned transference back toward the clinical 
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space. Berenson and Andersen (2006) investigated the possibility that when a SO 
has been abusive, then transference may include that history of abuse and lead 
people to be, inter alia, more wary and disliking of a newly encountered target, as 
well as more expecting of rejection from that target. They did this by asking 
participants who had been abused by a parent to nominate that parent as their SO 
in session one of their study, to be compared with a control group of non-abused 
participants. A manipulation of threat in session two was also included in the study 
design; it was anticipated that differences between transferred content from an 
abusive SO and transferred content from a non-abusive SO would be more 
apparent when a newly encountered target was described as “getting increasingly 
tense and irritable” (p. 1513), thus cueing particular aspects of the abusive SO 
relationship. Results largely supported the theorising, although with some 
unanticipated results. Straightforwardly, transference led abused participants to 
expect rejection more, as well as to be more mistrustful, indifferent, and disliking, 
than non-abused participants. Somewhat counter to expectations, the threat 
manipulation led to more disliking when the target resembled a non-abusive SO 
but did not alter disliking when the target resembled an abusive SO. This was 
interpreted as a ceiling effect, where abused participants already exhibited 
heightened dislike of the newly encountered target. 
Brumbaugh and Fraley (2006) connected transference with styles of 
interpersonal attachment (e.g., Bowlby, 1969). They theorised that transference 
may be a key mechanism by which patterns of attachment permeate across an 
individual’s interpersonal relationships. Thus, in their study they extended the 
standard transference methodology by asking participants to complete measures 
of attachment-related anxiety and attachment-related avoidance in the context of a 
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former romantic partner and their relationship with that partner. In session two 
participants were presented with two personal ads; one that resembled their 
nominated SO and one that resembled another participant’s SO. As the critical DV 
participants were asked to again complete attachment-related anxiety and 
attachment-related avoidance measures, but this time in the context of imagining 
their relationship with the potential dating partners presented to them. Results 
indicated that, while attachment patterns impacted the perception of the two 
targets generally, resemblance with a SO led to increased correspondence between 
past attachment-related thoughts and feelings and anticipated attachment-related 
thoughts and feelings. This was taken as evidence for transference playing a role in 
the classic clinical phenomenon whereby patients recreate the interpersonal 
dynamics of past relationships in present relationships. 
Continuing the interest in the relationship between transference and 
interpersonal attachment, Berk and Andersen (2008) similarly proposed that 
interpersonal goals that are connected with SOs may be stored in memory 
alongside our representations of those SOs. They theorised that whether that goal 
has been satisfied or not may also be stored alongside SO representations, and 
consequently goal satisfaction or dissatisfaction may be part of transferred 
content. The authors were able to obtain empirical support for their theorising. In 
their study participants whose relationship with their SO was characterised by 
chronic dissatisfaction of affection goals displayed reduced motivation to engage 
with a newly encountered target who resembled their SO. They also displayed 
increased hostility and reduced persistence on a task designed to solicit liking form 
the new person. 
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Looking back toward the clinical space is a reoccurring theme in the social 
psychology of transference. Indeed, in addition to the above two empirical papers, 
which link transference to topics traditionally considered to be clinical in nature 
(i.e., parental abuse outcomes and interpersonal attachment patterns 
respectively), there are a number of theoretical papers that discuss more broadly 
the possible implications of social psychological transference research for clinical 
assessment and treatment. Andersen and Berk (1998), for example, speak at 
length to this topic. In their paper they reposition the social psychological research 
that had been conducted up to that point for a clinical audience; their aim being to 
use the research findings around the process and content of transference to help 
clinicians anticipate when transference will occur and what implications 
transference may have for a patient. Further, they propose methods for “dealing” 
with transference. These draw upon notions of mindfulness and self-monitoring 
(e.g., Mahoney & Thorenson, 1974), where the basic premise is that once 
maladaptive transference processes are known to the perceiver then opportunity 
exists to overcome or halt those processes; the result being improved outcomes for 
the patient, or in Andersen and Berk’s language, “as the client's reactions become 
less transferential and more piecemeal, the maladaptive content of the schema 
should slowly change in the direction of new, presumably less maladaptive 
experiences” (1998, p. 94). These sentiments have been echoed more recently by 
Andersen and Przybylinski (2012), although they do pour cold water on any notion 
that interrupting transference once it is identified will be straight forward. Their 
more reserved position is based on further research reported to indicate that even 
once a perceiver is consciously aware of transference, and is motivated to stop 
transference from occurring, the process may still run its course (Liviatan & 
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Andersen, 2008, February; Przybylinski & Andersen, 2011, May). Still though, 
Andersen and Prsybylinski remain optimistic that with time and guidance from a 
therapist transference can be controlled, even if some level of finesse is required 
on the part of that therapist. 
The relational self 
A theory of the relational self was proposed by Andersen and Chen (2002) 
as a natural extension of the social psychology of transference. According to the 
authors the ambition was to extend the literature “by proposing a theory that 
articulates how various manifestations of the self and, more broadly, personality 
can emerge in interpersonal contexts when transference is elicited” (p. 619). Their 
theory was expressed in five propositions (Table 2.2), although the brevity of those 
propositions does mean that the substance of the theory is really in the fine print. 
In that fine print, however, a reader would be forgiven for coming away with the 
impression that the newer theory is largely a rebranding of that earlier social 
cognitive model of transference. This is because this theory of the relational self 
follows the model of transference introduced above very closely. Shared features 
include the storage of SO representations containing idiographic knowledge in 
memory (i.e., n-of-one representations), the particular psychological prominence 
of those SO representations (i.e., chronic accessibility), the cueing and use of those 
SO representations in social perception (i.e., transference), as well as a social-
cognitive framework inspired by schema-activation research (i.e., if-then 
relations). 
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Table 2.2. 
The five propositions of Andersen and Chen’s “interpersonal social–cognitive theory 
of the self and personality, the relational self”, (2002, p. 619) 
1. Relational selves are a product of the profound importance of the 
significant other. 
2. Relational selves emerge in the context of transference 
3. Relational selves have both idiographic and socially shared elements. 
4. Relational selves provide a basis for an interactionist model of 
personality 
5. Relational selves are cognitive–affective units in an if–then model of 
personality 
 
So what then are the novel aspects of Andersen and Chen’s theory of the 
relational self? In attempting to answer this question the instinctive move is to 
look to the ‘relational self’ construct. Relational selves are described in the theory 
as the connections in memory between SO representations and particular self-
representations (Figure 2.2). These representations are characterised by relational 
content that is informed by the corresponding interpersonal history. As we have 
seen, however, aspects of self-to-SO relationships were proposed to exist as 
cognitive representations since well before the inception of the social cognitive 
model of transference (Ogilvie & Ashmore, 1991). Indeed, we have reviewed the 
early empirical work related to the proposal that SO cognitive representations and 
the associated relational content may be transferred to newly encountered people 
(Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). This makes the relational self construct a problematic 
point at which to establish the novelty of this theory of the relational self. At most 
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we can say that the relational self achieves a shift in emphasis toward a particular 
type of transferable content: relational content that could also be viewed through 
the lens of the social cognitive model of transference. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Andersen and Chen’s (2002) depiction of linkages between the self and 
significant-other representations in memory (p. 621). They describe individuals as 
possessing a “repertoire of relational selves” (p. 619). 
 
Where else then might we look for the novelty of this new theory? There are 
two explicit claims in this regard; one seemly robust and one seemingly 
questionable. Turning first to the more questionable of the two, the authors argue 
that a novel aspect of their theory is that the content of relational selves may 
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include not just idiographic elements unique to the SO-to-self relationship, but also 
‘socially shared elements’ that are cognitively linked to that SO representation: 
The present theory continues to recognise the idiographic elements of 
significant others and relational selves but goes further by positing that 
when an idiographic significant-other representation is activated, this in 
turn activates not only idiographic self-with-significant other knowledge 
but also generic, socially shared constructs, such as social categories or 
social identities, that are linked to the significant other. (Andersen & Chen, 
2002, p. 264) 
The empirical example is given of the finding that gender information can become 
salient in response to the cueing of SO representations (Karylowski, Konarzewski, 
& Motes, 2000). Really though, the inclusion of nomothetic content in transference 
was never something that was precluded in the social cognitive model of 
transference. Quite the opposite in fact: transference of nomothetic content was 
argued to have already been demonstrated (Andersen & Glassman, 1996). Why the 
discrepancy in interpretation? What appears to have happened here is that the 
novel methodological approach of the social psychology of transference, the 
idiographic-nomothetic design, has been misremembered as a theoretical 
component of the social cognitive model of transference. In other words, and not 
for the first time in social psychology (Haslam, Ellemers, Reicher, Reynolds, & 
Schmitt, 2010; Turner, 1981), the empirical has been conflated with the 
theoretical, leading researchers to forget the capacity of the social cognitive model 
of transference to cope with socially shared constructs of the kind described by 
Andersen and Cole; hence our assessment that this particular claim toward novelty 
is on shaky ground. 
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Really, the sole novel aspect of this theory of the relational self is the 
second, more ambitious, expansion. This is to make relational selves a key basis for 
interactionist personality (see propositions four and five), where personality is a 
function of person × situation interactions (e.g., Carson, 1969; Endler, 1984; 
Magnusson, 1990; Mischel, 1973; Parvin & Lewis, 1978). The authors achieve this 
by further drawing on the work of Mischel and Shoda (1995). In addition to the use 
of if-then relations to understand the cognitive process underlying transference, 
here the authors adopt fully the cognitive–affective system theory of personality, 
where personality is understood as a person’s unique constellation of if-then 
responses to situational stimuli. They argue that relational selves are a special case 
of a person’s personality, owing to the rich and important nature of the particular 
if-then relations that correspond to our SOs. In terms of richness, the authors again 
mention the inclusion of both idiographic and nomothetic content, but also detail a 
number of motivational processes and interpersonal goals that they argue are 
stored in memory as mental constructs and are included as part of our relational 
selves. They emphasise in particular the need for human connection (e.g., 
belongingness; Baumeister & Leary, 1995), but also anticipate that needs for 
autonomy, competence, meaning, and felt security will form part of our relational 
selves. In terms of importance, the authors point back to the chronic accessibility 
of SO representations as reason to anticipate that relational selves will be a 
particularly strong influence on peoples’ response patterns; or in the 
nomenclature of the article, people’s personality. 
In sum then, the critical contribution of the theory of the relational self is to 
advance transference and self-when-with-the-significant-other representations as 
a driver of personality. This particular source of personality is then positioned 
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between other established sources of personality and self-concept. Specifically, this 
relational self is situated at an intermediate level of inclusiveness between the 
personal self, which is described as the self as an independent and autonomous 
entity, and social identities, which are described as the self as experienced through 
group memberships. This ‘level of inclusiveness’ perspective is argued to serve as 
an integration of otherwise disparate theoretical attitudes toward the self (see also 
Andersen, Reznik, & Chen, 1997) allowing for a more complete picture of self-
processes. Additionally, this theory of the relational self and the associated efforts 
toward integration are viewed by the authors as complementary to other three 
level conceptions of the self. That is, those that conceptualise the self concept as 
comprised of relational selves among personal selves and collective selves (Brewer 
& Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Gaertner, 2001). 
While there have been a number of empirical studies conducted under the 
banner of this theory of the relational self, in the present context the work of 
Saribay and Andersen (2007) is particularly notable. This is because their research 
is closely tied to the particulars of this relational self theory and cannot just as 
easily be thought of as an investigation of the social cognitive model of 
transference4. They theorised that, because the relational self and collective self-
structures are closely related, during transference collective identity relevant 
content, such as ethnicity, may come to be applied to a newly encountered target 
person. That content can subsequently cue social identification with that collective 
identity for the perceiver; this outcome being expected only on occasions when the 
SO is of the same ethnic category as the perceiver. Data across two studies, both 
using variations of the traditional transference methodology, followed this 
expected pattern; the salience of a perceiver’s ethnic identity, as measured by 
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ingroup favouritism, was increased when a target person was made to resemble a 
SO who shared that ethnic category membership. This effect was moderated by the 
level of ethnic diversity in the SOs social network, which was expected to inhibit 
ethnic identity salience. This empirical research, which connected the relational 
self with notions of collective selves, social identification, and ingroup favouritism, 
helps make clear the positioning of the relational self as a fundamental self-
structure that is on par with other established sources of self-conception studied in 
social psychology. 
Connecting transference with other psychological processes 
We have already seen a number of examples where transference has been 
linked to other psychological processes. Processes relating to interpersonal 
motivation have been argued to guide the content of transference (Andersen et al., 
1996; Berk & Andersen, 2008), and the transference process has been suggested as 
one of the mechanisms underlying the influence of interpersonal dispositions 
across multiple relationships (Berenson & Andersen, 2006; Brumbaugh & Fraley, 
2006). It has also been suggested that the content of transference may cue defence 
mechanisms and efforts to maintain a positive sense of self (Hinkley & Andersen, 
1996). In all these cases, however, the focus has remained, in one way or another, 
on the content of transference. Here, in contrast, we will make mention of a 
handful of research examples that have been concerned first and foremost with the 
relationship between transference and other psychological processes largely 
irrespective of content, beginning with the relationship between transference and 
mental resources. 
Kruglanski and Pierro (2008), drawing on the social cognitive notions of the 
cognitive miser and the motivated tactician (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, 1991; see 
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Chapter 4), reasoned that transference would be relied upon less in impression 
formation when perceivers have the cognitive resources and motivation to go 
beyond heuristic processing of social stimuli. This is an extension of Andersen and 
Glassman’s analogy between transference and other schema based social 
perception processes. Here the authors draw upon the view that top down social 
perception strategies such as schema activation and the use of social categories 
can be contrasted with a data driven, bottom up, process of individuation (e.g., 
Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Or in the language of the authors, 
[If] transference reflects the misapplication of an activated significant-other 
schema to a newly encountered individual, and if an activated schema is 
more likely to be misapplied in the absence, rather than the presence, of 
processing resources, then more pronounced transference effects should be 
observed under conditions of [reduced processing resources]. (Kruglanski 
& Pierro, 2008, p. 297)  
Processing resources was operationalised by varying between subjects whether 
data collection occurred during ‘circadian match’ or ‘circadian mismatch’. This was 
achieved by first surveying participants to determine their level of ‘morningness’ 
(i.e., the extent to which morning activity is preferred over evening activity). In the 
circadian match condition data collection was conducted in the morning for those 
high in morningness and in the evening for those low in morningness. In the 
circadian mismatch condition the pattern was reversed. In all other ways the study 
resembled the standard transference research methodology. Results supported 
predictions; transference was only observed in the circadian match condition, 
supporting the theorised role of mental resource scarcity in moderating the 
transference effect. 
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 Similar research comes from Pierro and Kruglanski (2008) who were also 
seeking to identify potential moderators of transference. On this occasion the 
moderator of interest ‘need for cognitive closure’ (NfCC; Kruglanski, 2004; 
Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), 
which is often, but not always, approached as an individual difference variable. The 
key prediction across the two reported studies was that those who are higher in 
dispositional NfCC will rely more on transference as a tool for forming impressions 
of others. The basis for this being that those who are high in NfCC are anticipated 
to be more motivated to complete their impression formation processes and are 
therefore more reliant on the accessible cognitive schemas in impression 
formation. Or put conversely, those with lower NfCC are anticipated to have 
greater motivation to reserve judgement and instead individuate the target, basing 
their perception instead on further scrutiny and detail. The results of both studies 
supported this prediction. NfCC moderated in the expected direction the extent of 
transference from a SO to a newly encountered person (Study 1) and from a past 
leader to a newly encountered person placed in a leadership position (Study 2). 
This was again interpreted as support for a social cognition approach to 
transference, where social perception is based on either top-down or bottom-up 
processes and the choice of process is determined by the motivations and cognitive 
resources of perceivers. It was also noted that such a view on transference differs 
dramatically from the traditional psychodynamic perspective, where transference 
is described as an outcome of highly motivated processing relating to unmet 
psychosexual or developmental needs (see also Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008). 
 A third example of research of this type, concerned foremost with 
transference in relation to other cognitive process, investigated the potential role 
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of social categories as barriers to transference. Kraus, Chen, Lee and Straus (2010) 
investigated whether social category memberships may interrupt the transference 
of content from a SO to newly encountered people. More specifically, they 
theorised that, owing to the inferential power of transference and the emotional 
significance of SOs, transference would be able to overcome social category 
incongruities between a SO and a target that would otherwise undermine the 
perceptions of similarity that are required to cue transference. In two studies the 
standard similarity manipulation was crossed with a manipulation of social 
category membership. In that second manipulation the newly encountered person 
was either described as sharing or not sharing political affiliation (Study 1) or 
ethnicity (Study 2) with the participant’s SO. Results supported the authors 
predictions. Transference, operationalised via both inference and evaluation, was 
observed regardless of whether the SO and target shared the manipulated social 
category5. In the second study transference was also shown to result in 
behavioural changes whereby participants chose to sit closer to a person 
resembling their SO, as well as interrupt the role of collective self-esteem 
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) in determining the evaluations of ingroup and 
outgroup members. The latter effect was interpreted by the authors as an 
indication that transference could serve as a tool for managing intergroup 
relations, where activating transference reduces out-group bias against outgroup 
members. 
Summary 
 In the course of this chapter we have reviewed transference’s time as a 
social psychological research topic. We now have a sound understanding of much 
of the social psychology of transference, which includes an understanding of the 
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psychodynamic genesis of transference as a psychological topic, an understanding 
of the emergence of early social psychological interest in the phenomenon, as well 
as an understanding of the concerted development of a more specific theoretical 
and methodological approach to transference in social psychology. Finally, we have 
seen the continued interest in transference in social psychology. Together this 
provides us with sure footing from which in the following chapter we can identify 
some of the critical unanswered questions that can be derived from the above 
content. 
 Before launching into that next step, however, there are two interim 
conclusions that can be made. First, researchers clearly believe that the 
transference phenomenon is important. We see this both in the proposed 
implications for transference, which span the clinical, personal, interpersonal, and 
intergroup domains, as well as in the sheer number of researchers devoting time 
and energy to this work. Second, a, if not the, central feature of the social 
psychological study of transference is the social-cognitive model of transference. 
Ever since its inception it is apparent that transference theorising has never 
strayed far from the ideas that are contained within Andersen and Glassman’s 
1996 paper, which are intern deeply rooted in the social cognitive tradition. It is 
therefore far from trivial for us to argue in the chapters to follow that our 
understanding of transference will be better served by an alternative to that social 
cognitive model, one based on the social identity approach. 
 
Notes 
1. Although Freud was generally focused on the threat that transference posed to 
successful therapy, he too anticipated some benefits. For example, late in his 
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writing Freud argued that transference from a parent to the therapist may create 
an avenue of influence for that therapist, albeit one that is problematic and open to 
abuse (Freud, 1940). Freud had also previously described transference during 
theory as advantageous in that it gives the therapist access to those problematic 
unconscious processes (e.g., Freud, 1905/2006). Elsewhere transference is 
described as “the vehicle of the healing process, the necessary condition for 
success” (Freud, 1912/1950, p. 314).  
 
2. A correction to the results of this paper should also be noted. Andersen et al. 
(1995) explain that it was actually both the SO and non-SO in that study that were 
found to be more featurally distinct than stereotypes and traits in Study 2. This 
naturally weakens the evidence behind the conclusion that SO representations are 
particularly distinct, and raises further methodological questions about the 
comparability of the stereotype stimuli and the individual stimuli, but because the 
distinctiveness claim is not part of our own theorising we need not concern 
ourselves further with this issue. 
 
3. See also Berk and Andersen (2000) for a further behavioural extension of the 
standard transference methodology. 
 
4. The research of Berenson and Andersen (2006), for example, can be 
characterised in this way. That research was described as an investigation of the 
nature of the relational self; however, the specific research questions are more 
closely related to the earlier social cognitive model of transference. Hence our 
decision to give it coverage in the earlier sub-section of this chapter. 
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5. A main effect was observed in Study 1 for the social category manipulation. 
Ingroup members were evaluated more positively than outgroup members. This 
counters the potential criticism that the null results for the social category 
manipulation simply reflected an ineffectual operationalisation or other 
insensitivities in the design. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS 
 
 
The social cognitive model of transference has facilitated the development 
of a vast and fruitful body of social psychological research. It is also the case, 
however, that there are some limits to the extent to which the social cognitive 
model can advance our understanding of the transference phenomenon. Indeed, 
the social cognitive model of transference has inherited from the social cognition 
approach certain gaps, or areas where the explanation overlooks, or even rests on, 
substantial unknowns. Exploring three areas where greater clarity of theory is 
required will be the first task of the present chapter. The first of these relates to 
the process of similarity based cueing, where there is difficulty in understanding 
similarity as simply a characteristic of the stimuli we are exposed to. The second 
relates to the storage of SO representations, where the storage of SO 
representations as discrete nuggets of information in our memory is hard to 
reconcile with actual observations of brain architecture. Finally, the social 
cognitive model of transference is quiet on the specifics of impression formation. 
In particular, that model does not explain what SO representations are being 
applied to during transference. 
After identifying these areas in need of further attention, we then go on to 
introduce the social identity approach, and more specifically certain critical tenets 
of SCT. In Chapter 5, these tenets will allow us to make immediate theoretical 
progress within each of these areas, and allow us into introduce further ideas 
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concerning the antecedents of transference. Indeed, that progress will be achieved 
while simultaneously introducing new parsimony to how transference is 
accounted for cognitively. 
Key limitations of the social cognitive model 
 Shortly before the 1996 formal statement of the social cognitive model of 
transference Andersen and Baum suggested that “a simple similarity-based 
activation and application process may well be the basic mechanism underlying 
transference” (1994, p. 466). All in all, this remains the crux of the social cognitive 
model. As explained earlier, in that model the cognitive process underlying 
transference is described as one where similarity between a SO and a newly 
encountered person cues the activation of a stored SO representation, which is 
then applied to the impression of that newly encountered person. This explanation 
of transference is accessible and intuitive, and has proved to some extent sufficient 
in laboratory contexts, as demonstrated by its ability to predict, or at least account 
for, obtained results. Some complexities arise, however, when the components of 
this social cognitive model are subjected to closer scrutiny.  
Similarity based cueing 
If transference is cued by an observed similarity between a SO and a newly 
encountered person, how then is that similarity observed? This isn’t an obvious 
question to ask. After all, similarity is ubiquitous to our experience; it is something 
that we recognise all around us, seemingly instantaneously and with the utmost of 
ease. This perceptual efficiency that we all appear to possess, however, masks 
what is actually a highly enigmatic area of human cognition. In fact, we need only 
probe a little to get a sense or this. Take, for example, two of the items currently in 
front of me: a book and a watch. Are these two things similar? They share some 
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features, but certainly not others. Should I consider them to be alike? There are 
also some sunglasses and earphones on my desk. Are they similar? They both go on 
my head. But they are worlds apart in a myriad of other ways. Are they instead 
different? 
 The above difficulties firstly reflect the reality that similarity does not stand 
on its own. Or in other words, all judgements are implicitly comparative (Tajfel, 
1978b), and similarity “cannot be established without delineating difference” 
(Jenkins, 1996, p. 113). What’s more, and by the same token, it can be convincingly 
argued that similarity cannot be understood as an inherent characteristic of stimuli 
(e.g., Medin, 1989; Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993; Medin & Wattenmaker, 
1987; G. L. Murphy & Medin, 1985). That is, appreciating similarities require acts 
of comparison and delineation. Similarity is thus a perceptual judgement and any 
question of similarity or difference cannot be answered by relying solely on the 
‘objective’ characteristics of the stimuli. A useful analogy here is distance. Two 
points may be a specific distance away from each other, but ascertaining whether 
those two points are far apart or close together requires further processing of 
some kind (Figure 3.1). This is awkward for the social cognitive model of 
transference, where similarity is the key predictor of transference. Similarity, it 
turns out, is hard to establish as any more than a convenient label for what is 
frequently observed but little explicated. This is thus more than a philosophical 
concern; the predictive utility of the model is brought into question if the critical 
component of similarity cannot be given substance. 
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Figure 3.1. Are the two points close together or far apart? This question cannot be 
answered without that ‘something’ more.  
 
SO representation storage 
If transference is the application of stored SO representations, how and 
where then are those representations stored? The instinctive answer here is ‘in 
memory’, and that is essentially the answer adopted by the social cognitive model 
of transference. As with the case of similarity, however, the instinctive response 
starts to fail us under close scrutiny, with the specific challenge here concerning 
neurological plausibility. 
The social cognitive model of transference paints a neat picture of SO 
representation storage; one where SO representations are discrete nuggets of 
information, placed carefully on the metaphorical storage shelves of memory, 
ready to be searched for and retrieved when needed. This is markedly different to 
what we know about where memory physically happens. That is, it is difficult to 
reconcile the architecture of our brains, which is not unfairly described as a fleshy 
mess of innumerable synapses, neurons, and neural networks, all engaged 
constantly in furious activity. Indeed, it is in large part for this reason that 
connectionist theorists argue strongly against the idea that our cognitive 
representations are static entities that are stored inertly until retrieved by a search 
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process (Conrey & Smith, 2007; Smith, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1998). The 
neurological implausibility of such accounts, termed “symbolic” in their vernacular, 
has prompted the search for other perspectives on human cognition in social 
perception. This search has yielded fruit, with an increasing quantity of more 
neurologically plausible models of social perceptual processes being developed 
(e.g., Kashima, Gurumurthy, Ouschan, Chong, & Mattingley, 2007; Van Rooy, Van 
Overwalle, Vanhoomissen, Labiouse, & French, 2003). The social cognitive model 
of transference stands in contrast to these developments. 
Impression formation 
If transference is the application of SO characteristics to a newly 
encountered person, what exactly, cognitively speaking, are those characteristics 
being applied to? The social cognitive model of transference is essentially silent on 
this point, leaving us to develop our own possible answers to this question. None of 
those answers, however, are particularly satisfying. This is because the nature of 
the social cognitive model seems to lead us toward logical dead ends in this area. 
To give an example, one attempt at an answer would be that SO representations 
are added to the cognitive representations of newly encountered target people. 
This, of course, raises the new question, where do those target representations 
come from? Here we might be tempted to say that these are also stored in memory, 
but at this point the line of thinking begins to fall down. It would not seem right 
that target representations would also be activated from memory stores, as this is 
the first time that we would have encountered the target. Overall, this perspective 
would create a strange equivalence between SO representations and target 
representations. 
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Taking a different perspective, we may be tempted to think of target 
representations as cognitive depictions of newly encountered people as they really 
are. Said otherwise, as a cognitive carbon copy of what is observed about the new 
people we come across. Here though, we end up with a different problem. If such 
carbon copy representations do exist, what would prompt the further application 
of a SO representation? The social cognitive model suggests similarity, but this is 
premised on the notion that there is some need to “fill in the blanks” or “go beyond 
the information given”. If carbon copy target representations are able to be readily 
formed, then it is unclear as to what blanks there would be that would need filling 
in, nor what further information would be required. In short, transference loses its 
apparent utility if SO representations are being applied to fully fledged perceptions 
of newly encountered people. 
It might be countered that this theoretical challenge should be forgiven due 
to the fit between the model and data that has been demonstrated thus far. The 
ambiguity of this area of the model, however, is accompanied by practical 
concerns. Without a more complete model of the impression formation process 
involved in transference we cannot justifiably have confidence that the predictive 
power that we think we have won’t be unexpectedly undermined. Or phrased 
positively, without a more complete model we cannot be sure that we aren’t 
missing opportunities to influence transference by manipulating factors beyond 
SO-to-target similarity. Indeed, shortly in this thesis it will be shown that such 
opportunities do indeed exist. Specifically, in Chapter 5 we will demonstrate that 
by looking at transference through an SCT lens, not only will we be able to make 
some progress with regard to all three of the above challenges (i.e., the ambiguity 
of impression formation target, as well as the ambiguity of similarity as a predictor 
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of transference and the neurological implausibility of SO representation storage), 
but we will also be able to extend our thinking in terms of the key predictors of 
transference. This will be achieved by developing a more complete model of the 
cognitive process of impression formation than that which is presently offered in 
social cognitive circles. 
The social identity approach 
The social identity approach is a body of social psychological theory that 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, principally in the United Kingdom, but with 
strong influences from elsewhere in Europe (Turner & Reynolds, 2010). The social 
identity approach is comprised of both SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and SCT 
(Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). The former, SIT, came first and was pioneered 
by Henri Tajfel, whose early work formed part of the ‘new look’ in social 
psychology (e.g., Tajfel, 1957, 1959, 1969). It is a theory of intergroup relations; it 
predicts certain intergroup behaviours contingent on certain key characteristics of 
the intergroup environment. These are, perceived group status differences, the 
perceived legitimacy and stability of those status differences, and the perceived 
ability to move from one group to another. To achieve this SIT invoked the concept 
of social identity, which was defined in that theory as “those aspects of an 
individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which [one] 
perceives [oneself] as belonging” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 16). 
SCT was developed subsequent to SIT and is well thought of as a cousin 
theory to its predecessor. Indeed, one of SCT’s key aims was to flesh out the social 
identity concept. As such, SCT is primarily known as an account of the self-concept, 
as well as an exploration of various intergroup and intragroup phenomena that are 
naturally implicated by that account. These phenomena include social influence, 
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group cohesion, group polarisation, and collective action (Haslam, 2001; Turner & 
Reynolds, 2001). For our purposes, however, the critical feature of SCT is that in 
order to explain social identity the theory elucidated a novel and highly developed 
account of self-categorisation, which in turn was built upon a novel and highly 
developed account of social categorisation in general (P. M. Brown & Turner, 2002; 
McGarty, 1999; McGarty & Penny, 1988; Oakes, 1987, 1996; Oakes et al., 1999; 
Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). It is in that account of social categorisation that 
we find opportunities to extend our understanding of the transference 
phenomenon. 
Social categorisation in self-categorization theory 
In this chapter section we introduce SCT’s social categorisation model, 
along with some amendments to reflect developments made since the publication 
of SCT’s twelve assumptions and twenty two hypotheses (Turner, 1985). This 
introduction, however, will be necessarily limited. For further detail on SCT’s 
account of social categorisation, and those developments, we recommend 
McGarty’s review (1999). Indeed, here we adopt a similar structure and approach 
to that review: we begin with the fundamental nature of the social categorisation 
process, and then move on to detailing the predictors of social categorisation in 
constraint relations terms. A constraint here meaning a causal link between 
psychological processes that may either increase or decrease the occurrence or 
strength of the dependent process. 
Social categorisation. SCT’s most basic assertion is that cognitive 
categorisation is the key cognitive process underlying perception. Cognitive 
categorisation being “the process of understanding what something is by knowing 
what other things it is equivalent to and what other things it is different from” 
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(McGarty, 1999, p. 1). What is this thing? What are its boundaries? What qualities 
does it have? Is it a table or an aardvark? These questions can only answered by 
determining whether ‘the thing’, whatever it is, is different from, or the same as, 
‘other things’. Here SCT follows the influential social psychological work of Bruner, 
whose unequivocal argument that “perception involves an act of categorisation” 
(1957, p. 123) itself follows from the long standing and well known 
epistemological position that “meaning is a product of a system and relation; 
nothing means anything on its own” (Jenkins, 1996, p. 113). Cognitive 
categorisation is put forth as the process that turns the buzzing confusion of our 
sensory experience into an environment that can be understood, predicted, and 
navigated. 
It does not get us very far, however, to simply say that we understand 
sensory experience via categorisation. This logical truism might help us keep 
mindful of the relativism of perception, but the statement by itself has very little 
meat to it. It doesn’t really explain how categorisation achieves what it does. Yes, 
stimuli must be categorised before they become meaningful, but what is the nature 
of the difference between the stimuli input and the information output? What are 
we doing cognitively when we categorise? SCT offers an answer to these questions 
by describing cognitive categorisation as a process of cognitive accentuation. Or 
more specifically, “accentuation of intraclass similarities and interclass 
differences” (Turner, 1982, p. 28).  
This is an application of Tajfel’s research and theorising in the field of 
perceptual distortion (Tajfel, 1957, 1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), conducted well 
before Tajfel’s better known work in developing the minimal group paradigm and 
SIT (Tajfel, 1974, 1978a; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In that 
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research Tafjel’s accentuation principle was advanced to explain the observation 
that perceivers systematically overestimate or underestimate judgements. For 
example, it had been observed that perceivers increased their diameter estimation 
of circular disks labelled with a dollar sign or Nazi symbol (Bruner & Postman, 
1948). Correlations were also observed between the monetary value and 
estimated size of cardboard cards (Dukes & Bevan Jr, 1952b), and the increased 
estimation of weights for jars containing valuable as opposed to not-valuable 
objects (Dukes & Bevan Jr, 1952a).  Such changes in estimation or appraisal as a 
function of peripheral stimuli are sometimes referred to as contrast and 
assimilations effects; contrast effects being defined as “the shift in placement of a 
stimulus away from anchor value” and assimilation effects defined as “the shift in 
placement of a stimulus toward an anchor value” (Sherif & Hovland, 1961, pp. 46). 
Tajfel’s argument was that a range of these observed perceptual effects may 
be explicable as an outcome of a pre-conscious process designed to establish 
clarity of perception after categorisation. In other words, in order to navigate our 
environment, to be clear about what falls within a category and what does not, 
Tajfel reasoned that we accentuate the differences between stimuli belonging to 
different classes and accentuate the similarities between stimuli belonging to the 
same class. This idea was demonstrated most clearly in Tafjel and Wilkes’ (1963) 
line length estimation experiment. There participants were randomly presented 
with a series of eight lines, each varying in length. The authors found that when a 
categorisation scheme was applied such that the four shorter lines were labelled 
with an ‘A’ and the four longer lines were labelled with a ‘B’ participants length 
estimations accentuated the difference at the divide between the two categories 
(see also Corneille & Judd, 1999). As predicted, accentuation was shown to provide 
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an “improvement on the acuity of discrimination between the stimuli of the series” 
(Tajfel, 1957, p. 19). It is in this sense that SCT includes accentuation as a corollary 
of cognitive categorisation: it is the accentuation of intraclass similarities and 
interclass differences that converts stimuli input into information output. 
Social categorisation in SCT is a natural extension of the above. It is simply 
the process of understanding who people are by knowing what other people they 
are equivalent to and what other people they are different from, where this is 
achieved cognitively via the accentuation of the similarities between people within 
the same class and the accentuation of the differences between people belonging to 
difference classes (McGarty & Penny, 1988; McGarty & Turner, 1992). 
Accentuation is social settings might also be labelled stereotyping, although the 
process described here has none of the pejorative baggage that is conjured up by 
that more well-known term. This is true in two senses. First, SCT does not see the 
process as relating specifically to negative attributions made about people (e.g., 
women are less good at math, African American’s are violent). In SCT social 
categorisation is neutral in valence; it is concerned equally with content that is 
negative, positive, and valence neutral. Second, SCT steers clear of the usual 
derision of social categorisation by turning away from the popular position that 
social categorisation is characterised by inaccuracy, exaggeration, and 
approximation (e.g., Allport, 1954; Campbell, 1956; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Lippmann, 1922/2007; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Operario & Fiske, 2001; 
Sullivan, 1953; Taylor, et al., 1978; for review see Ottati & Lee, 1995). SCT theorists 
instead make the opposite case that the process of social categorisation should be 
viewed as a pathway toward veridical perception (Oakes, 2001; Oakes et al., 1999; 
Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes & Reynolds, 1997; Reynolds & Oakes, 1999; Turner, et al., 
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1994). We need not go into the details of that argument here (see Chapter 4 for 
some further detail), but some of the logic of this view should be apparent given 
what we have said about cognitive categorisation already. In particular, cognitive 
categorisation was introduced as our mechanism for moving away from buzzing 
confusion and toward understanding, prediction, and navigation. Cognitive 
categorisation thus serves as an information generation tool, rather than as a 
pathway toward information loss in the form of approximation and heuristic. 
Further, understanding cognitive categorisation as a necessary mechanism for all 
perception creates problems for any accusation that cognitive categorisation, 
including social categorisation and stereotyping, is a less veridical mechanism of 
perception (i.e., less veridical than what?). In sum, here social categorisation and 
stereotyping is not thought of as correlated with prejudice, which is often the case 
in social psychology (Dixon, Durrheim, Kerr, & Thomae, 2013), as well as 
elsewhere. 
Although social categorisation is considered to be omnipresent in social 
perception according to the social identity approach, SCT does spell out a critical 
type of variation to social categorisation: social categorisation is said to occur at 
varying levels of abstraction. In an application of the ideas of Rosch (1978) to the 
social domain, social categories can be comparably inclusive, whereby many 
people are considered to be class members, or comparably exclusive, whereby few 
people are considered to be class members. For example, in a particular context 
(e.g., during the Sydney 2000 Olympic opening ceremony) a categorisation scheme 
built around nationality (e.g., Australians in contrast with Americans) would result 
in social categories that include members numbering in the millions, while in that 
same context a social categorisation scheme built around ceremonial role (e.g., 
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athletes in contrast with performers) would result in social categories that include 
members numbering in the hundreds or thousands; because in the latter scenario 
the categories have fewer members, these would be described as operating at a 
lower level of abstraction. SCT describes the limits of abstraction in terms of two 
poles. Social categorisation at the human level is described as the highest level of 
abstraction, including all humans and contrasting away from non-humans. 
Conversely, social categorisation at the person level is described as the lowest level 
of abstraction, including only one person and contrasting away from another 
person or people. 
At this point it is of value to note two minor addendums to SCT’s 
conceptualisation of the level of abstraction principle. Firstly, there have been 
some departures, which in our opinion are appropriate, from how person level 
categorisation was approached in the 1985 statement of SCT. For one, and likely as 
a result of an increased interest in the nature of person level categorisation, there 
has been a move away from considering person level self-categorisation to be the 
realm of one’s “personality” and “individual differences” (Turner, 1985, p. 95). This 
has been replaced with an emphasis on person level categorisation as an outcome 
of social constructed reality, (Onorato & Turner, 2004; Reynolds & Oakes, 1999; 
Reynolds & Turner, 2006, 2012; Reynolds et al., 2010; Turner & Onorato, 1999b; 
Turner, Reynolds, Haslam, & Veenstra, 2006), just as is the emphasis for 
categorisation at higher levels of abstraction. Further, there has been a departure 
from thinking of person categorisation as the lowest possible level of abstraction. 
Instead, intrapersonal categorisation schemes are now posited, which occur at a 
lower level of abstraction to personal categorisation schemes (Reynolds & Turner, 
2012; Turner & Onorato, 1999b; Turner et al., 2006). Intrapersonal categorisation 
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schemes are those where a partial aspect of a person is compared with another 
partial aspect of that same person. For example, intrapersonal categorisation could 
result in a categorisation scheme comparing “the me I was yesterday with the me I 
am today” (Turner & Onorato, 1999, p. 24)1. 
The second minor addendum to the level of abstraction principle concerns 
category hierarchies. In SCT social categories at different levels of abstraction are 
described as hierarchically organised; any particular categorisation scheme is said 
to be subsumed by a category at the next highest level of abstraction. For example, 
in Australia rugby union players and rugby league players all play contact sports, 
such that contact sports can be thought of as a more inclusive category at a higher 
level of abstraction, and contact sports in turn can be compared with non-contact 
sports, such as cricketers and golfers. Further, it is the shared membership in a 
more inclusive category that allows comparison between less inclusive categories 
to occur; “stimuli can only be compared insofar as they have already been 
categories as identical, “like”, or equivalent at some higher level of abstraction” 
(Turner, 1985, p. 96). 
While there is no argument that categorisation schemes are hierarchically 
structured in some instances, as in our sporting example, McGarty (1999, 2006) 
makes a strong case that such instances are likely the exception rather than the 
rule and that to restrict cognitive categorisation schemes to hierarchies creates 
difficulties reconciling theory with experience. To use McGarty’s illustration 
(1999), a hierarchical categorisation scheme struggles to reasonably reflect what 
we know about nationality and ethnicity, where ethnicity can be subsumed by 
nationality (e.g., European Australians in contrast to Indigenous Australians), but 
in many cases is not (Europeans live in a great number of countries); attempts in 
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this instance to identify an ideal subordinate category is highly contrived. We 
therefore follow McGarty’s lead and dispense with SCT’s expectation that cognitive 
categorisation schemes are hierarchically organised. That being said, we do accept 
SCT’s expectation that social categorisation at one level of abstraction informs 
social categorisation and other levels of abstraction, which is a looser rephrasing of 
SCT’s assumption that similarity at one level of abstraction is a necessary 
precondition for difference to be observed at a lower level of abstraction. Indeed, 
Reynolds and Oakes (1999) have provided evidence that categorisation at a higher 
level of abstraction can influence the dimensions on which accentuation will occur 
when a lower level of abstraction is made salient. 
With the above two qualifications covered we can now summarise the 
social identity approach to social categorisation: Social categorisation is our 
mechanism for understanding who and what people are. It entails establishing for 
ourselves where people fit in terms of social categorisation schemes. These social 
categorisation schemes result in the accentuation of features of people in such a 
way that differences and similarities among those people can be apprehended. The 
social categories themselves can include many people or very few people, and can 
include single individuals or even individual parts. They can also be hierarchically 
organised, but need not always be so. This is a good portrait of the purpose of 
social categorisation, how categorisation achieves this purpose, and how social 
categories may differ in terms of inclusiveness. Now, having established what 
categorisation does and what it looks like, we can attend to the factors, or 
constraints, that determine which particular social categories perceivers will use. 
Constraints on social categorisation. Drawing on Bruner’s accessibility 
by fit model of social categorisation (1957; see also Bruner & Postman, 1948), SCT 
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describes our unconscious choice among possible social categorisation schemes as 
determined by an interaction between aspects of the perceiver and aspects of the 
encountered environment. More specifically, an SCT based account is one where 
the form of social categorisation is determined by an interaction between perceiver 
readiness and fit, where fit is further specified as having two components: 
comparative fit and normative fit. We will introduce each of these in turn, 
beginning with comparative fit. 
Comparative fit. Comparative fit, also referred to as structural fit (Oakes, 
1987), describes the role of patterns of similarity and difference among 
encountered stimuli in directing cognitive categorisation. To be precise, and 
drawing inspiration from Campbell (1958) and also again Rosch (1978), 
comparative fit encompasses a process of comparison whereby the social 
categorisation schemes that we use will be in part determined by something called 
the meta-contrast principle: people are more likely to share category membership 
to the degree that the average differences between specific people are perceived to 
be less than the average differences between those people and the remaining 
people in the frame of reference; frame of reference, also referred to as the 
comparative context (e.g., Haslam, 2001), being the full array of people that the 
perceiver is presently aware of. The meta-contrast principle can be expressed 
mathematically by making interclass differences a numerator and intraclass 
differences a denominator, in something called the meta-contrast ratio (Figure 
3.2), although the suggestion is not that perceivers engage in a step by step, 
precisely measured, mathematical calculation during the categorisation process. 
Instead the meta-contrast ratio captures the principle that guides our highly 
organic and immediate detection of patterns among social stimuli.  
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Figure 3.2. The meta-contrast ratio as articulated by McGarty. “nd is the number of 
relevant dimensions; nx is the number of members of some category X; ny is the 
number of members outside the category X; and the x and y values are the 
positions of a member of one of or the other category on a particular dimension” 
(1999, p. 112).  
 
The role of meta-contrast and frame of reference in social categorisation 
can also be illustrated by returning to our two points ‘A’ and ‘B’, but this time with 
a third, ‘C’ introduced. In Figure 3.3 the addition of the additional point to the right, 
in this barest frame of reference, informs our understanding of all objects present. 
Whereas previously A and B appeared neither close together nor far apart, now, 
without changing the number of centimetres between them, points A and B appear 
clearly apart from one another, while B and C appear cosy. Said otherwise, our 
impression of point A is now that it is in a class distinct from points B and C. 
Critically, neither the ‘apartness’ of points A and B, nor the ‘togetherness’ of points 
B and C, is an innate quality of the distance between them. It is instead an outcome 
of comparisons among all points in the perceiver’s field of awareness. 
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Figure 3.3. Through meta-contrast the introduction of additional stimuli can 
change our understanding of all stimuli in the frame of reference.  
 
Although this scenario is intentionally stark, the minimalism should not 
mask the relevance to social categorisation as a day to day phenomenon. Just as the 
frame of reference is critical to making a determination of closeness vs. apartness 
in physical space, so too is frame of reference and meta-contrast critical to 
understanding people through social categorisation, including through commonly 
accepted or contested stereotypes. In other words, categorisation of people is not 
just a case of detecting real or imagined similarities between people; it necessarily 
requires the processing of all the encountered similarities and differences among 
all available comparison persons. Experimental manipulations of comparative fit 
have been shown to change the extent to which gender is topical (Abrams, Thomas, 
& Hogg, 1990), the extent to which stereotypes inform self-perception (Hogg & 
Turner, 1987a), change the content of national stereotypes (Haslam, Oakes, 
Turner, & McGarty, 1995), and change the degree to which newly encountered 
people are seen as similar to ourselves (Haslam & Turner, 1992). In an 
investigation of what were described as assimilation and contrast effects, the 
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principal of comparative fit has also been used to help predict attitudes and 
behaviours toward social groups (Wilder & Thompson, 1988).  
The fact that similarity, where similarity is viewed as an intrinsic 
characteristic between two stimuli, is insufficient as a constraint on social 
categorisation creates a vernacular challenge. Indeed, in the paragraph above the 
language of comparative fit and meta-contrast has forced us into an apparent 
circularly. We have claimed that upon critical consideration similarity, and by 
implication also its converse, difference, cannot usefully serve as constraints on 
social categorisation, and instead that the role of stimuli characteristics in 
determining social categorisation is better explained via the concept of 
comparative fit, which is in turn an outcome of the perceived similarities and 
differences among people in a frame of reference. Fortunately, this circularity is 
only skin deep and can be resolved easily enough. To that end Oakes and 
colleagues (1994) recommend the use of a “psychologically natural term … to 
indicate the nature of precognized stimulus relationships” (p. 98), meaning the 
shared or unshared qualities among people that are observed, but not yet 
processed. Their suggestion is “distances”, which again connects spatial relations 
with conceptual relations. Thus, precognized distances between people are to same 
vs. distinct as centimetres are at near vs. far; they are the characteristics of people 
prior to interpretation and as yet are meaningless. We adopt Oakes and colleagues’ 
suggested nomenclature for the remainder of this thesis. For example, the meta-
contrast principle can be rephrased as follows: We are more likely to include 
people in the same category to the degree that the average distances between 
those people are perceived to be less than the average distances between those 
people and the remaining people in the frame of reference. 
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Normative fit. An intuitive way of understanding normative fit is that, while 
comparative fit is concerned with social category structure, in the sense of 
detecting patterns among stimuli and establishing category boundaries, normative 
fit is concerned with social category content. That is, normative fit describes the 
role that peoples’ features have in determining the characteristics that we ascribe 
to the social categories that they are included in, or excluded from. The principle of 
normative fit is that the content of the social categories we use to understand 
people will reflect the features of category members and the dimensions on which 
those people are categorised. We will only use social categories that are 
normatively fitting, such that the category content matches category specifications. 
This principle is best illustrated by one of the earliest normative fit studies, 
conducted by Oakes, Turner and Haslam (1991). In that laboratory experiment, the 
second of two studies, the authors presented participants with a film where three 
arts students and three science students discussed university life. In reality these 
students were actors, and the researchers determined in advance the attitudes that 
each student in the film would take to university life; these attitudes were either 
pro-‘social life’ or pro-‘hard work’. There were six experimental conditions but it is 
a comparison between two of those conditions that is most relevant here. In one 
condition the three science students took a stereotypically ‘sciencey’ position (i.e., 
they were pro hard work), while the three arts students took a stereotypically 
‘artsy’ position (i.e., they were pro social life). In the other condition the attitudes 
were reversed, with the science students taking a pro social life position and the 
arts students taking a pro hard work position. The results of the study were such 
that in the former condition, as per the accentuation principle, the arts students 
were seen as more similar to one another than in the latter condition, as measured 
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by the estimated level of shared belief between one particular arts student and the 
remaining arts students in the film. Critically, this difference cannot be explained 
as an outcome of differing comparative fit, because in both conditions there is an 
equal level of agreement within groups and disagreement between groups. It can, 
however, be explained as an outcome of different normative fit. It is only in the 
former condition that the science students in comparison with arts students 
categorisation scheme was normatively fitting, with the observed persons 
exhibiting behaviour consistent with that categorisation scheme (i.e., the science 
students were sciency and the arts students were artsy). In the latter condition 
there was poor normative fit for that categorisation scheme, with the observation 
of behaviour incongruous with a science students vs. arts students understanding 
of the scenario. In sum, category content here is having an important role in 
constraining social categorisation. 
 Really though, the principle of normative fit does not in isolation fully 
explain its own role. Looking back to Oakes and colleagues’ study the question 
remains, why was the science students vs. arts students categorisation scheme not 
simply replaced by the perceivers with the alternative categorisation scheme of 
fun loving science students vs. hard working arts? The answer is, of course, that 
the perceivers brought with them expectations and theories about how science 
students and arts students behave. In terms used above, the perceivers bring with 
them understanding and category specifications. What this means is that normative 
fit is actually describing a point of connection between the experienced stimuli 
(e.g., university students’ behaviour) and what the perceiver brings to the social 
categorisation table; that is, perceiver readiness, which is the third constraint on 
social categorisation. 
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Perceiver readiness. Perceiver readiness is another area in which an 
addendum to SCT must be made. Indeed, perceiver readiness in the sense to be 
discussed here is actually absent from SCT and instead the similar but still 
different concept of relative accessibility is included to describe the way in which 
aspects of the perceiver constrain the social categorisation process. Relative 
accessibility was defined as “the readiness with which a stimulus input with given 
properties will be coded or identified in terms of a category”, which follows 
Bruner’s accessibility definition verbatim (1957, p. 133). Beyond this relative 
accessibility was described as determined by two factors: first, the “redundant 
structure” of the environment (Turner, 1985, p. 102), which is the perceiver’s 
learned understanding of the social environment, and second, the perceiver’s 
current motives. Perceiver readiness, in contrast, is defined as a person’s “past 
experience, present expectations, current motives, values, goals, and needs” 
(Turner et al., 1994, p. 455).  
Relative accessibility and perceiver readiness cover a lot of the same 
ground. Indeed, Turner and colleagues feel comfortable enough with the extent of 
overlap that they have used the terms interchangeably. Nevertheless, they are 
different and one particular difference is important enough to justify drawing a 
strong distinction between the two concepts. The difference we are referring to is 
the move away from the notion of redundant structure; redundant structure being 
the idea that perceivers keep with them a repertoire of social categories against 
which fit data is compared. In introducing relative accessibility and redundant 
structure Turner gives the example of a “latent” self-category of ‘Catholic’ that a 
perceiver may not use in the course of social perception for days at a time yet 
nonetheless comes to the fore given the right fit conditions (1985, p. 102). 
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Although intuitive, this line of thinking is deliberately absent in discussions of 
perceiver readiness. Redundant structure is instead replaced by far less specific 
references to “past experience”, with emphasis turning instead toward the 
affective and motivational aspects of a perceiver’s contribution to the social 
categorisation process. In other words, greater prominence is given to a message 
that the perceiver is an active participant in navigating their own social world; 
perceivers are not passively subject to their own social categorisation processes, 
which are heavily informed by dormant attitudes in their subconscious, but rather 
that social categorisation occurs chiefly in service of the needs and motives of 
perceivers (see also Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes & Turner, 1986b). Where past 
experience is discussed as a component of perceiver readiness it is discussed more 
broadly in terms of the constellation of beliefs, ideas, or theories that a perceiver 
may hold at any particular time. This means that perceivers’ are no longer thought 
of as having social categories (e.g., Catholics) ready in their unconscious at all 
times for deployment, but are instead considered to have notions about the 
relationship between nations, people, characteristics, and behaviours that may 
inform subsequent social category construction. These notions may arise from a 
perceiver’s direct past encounters with social category members, but they may 
also come from the internalised attitudes that others hold (see also Haslam, Oakes, 
Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). Why the general loosening of language in this area? To 
answer this question it is appropriate to turn lastly toward a discussion of the SCT 
concept of salience, and from there we will conclude our introduction to the 
constraints on social categorisation. 
Social category salience. In SCT the term salience is used to describe the 
cognitive pre-potence of any particular social category, which is the perceptual end 
81 
product of social categorisation. A salient social category is one that is currently in 
use; it has been formed in the mind and is currently guiding social perception. This 
is different to common usage of the term salience elsewhere, including within 
social psychology, where a salience is thought of as an intrinsic property of stimuli 
(Oakes, 1987). Here salience is a psychological rather than pre-psychological 
property, meaning that it is an outcome of cognitive processes. This is not to say, 
however, that salience is disconnected from stimuli. In SCT the argument is that 
social categorisation, and therefore social category salience, must be understood as 
involving an interaction between fit and perceiver readiness. 
What does then that interaction look like? In social psychology, including 
within the social cognitive tradition, the attractive response to questions around 
stimuli and perceiver interaction has been to suggest models of social category 
storage and activation (e.g., Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Here perceivers bring 
with them a library of possible social categories, of varying availability, that can be 
brought to bear in relevant social situations given certain environmental cues. This 
is, to a degree, the approach taken in SCT, in the form of relative accessibility, 
redundant structure, and latent social categories. Such models are intuitive for at 
least two reasons. First, they are familiar, owing to the obvious metaphors with 
other common information processing systems. A library is one such example, 
which we have already used, but another is computerised file storage and retrieval. 
Second, models of this kind seemingly explain the consistency in social perception 
and social categorisation that we are able to achieve in the face of constantly 
fluctuating external stimuli. That is, despite the constantly shifting particulars of 
our environment, and category members that are never completely the same, we 
are nevertheless able to make use of knowledge and language across a wide range 
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of contexts and people. Consistency is achieved by being able to effectively store 
the social categories we have used in the past, and then apply those same 
categories in new circumstances. 
The problem with storage and activation models of this type, at least for 
Turner and other SCT theorists, who turned away from this approach shortly after 
the 1985 publication of SCT, is that such models have serious incompatibilities 
with the core message of SCT’s fit by perceiver interaction. This is because the 
intention of the fit by perceiver interaction in SCT has always been to ground the 
process of social perception in the encountered environment; to allow us to 
understand social categories as inherently tied to real social-structural phenomena 
rather than simply as pictures in our heads. This is a point that SCT theorists have 
made theoretically, but also empirically, most commonly by leveraging the 
principle of comparative fit. More specifically, studies involving frame of reference 
manipulations are often used to drive this point home. Such studies have shown 
that frame of reference not only affects the boundaries of social categories, but also 
the content of social categories. Haslam and colleagues (1992), for instance, 
demonstrated inter alia that including or excluding particular comparison 
countries shifted Australian participants’ views on what was stereotypical of 
Americans.  
Demonstrated shifts in social category content along these lines reflect the 
more general observation elsewhere that the social categories are highly variable 
and that, although the labels and language of social categorisation may remain the 
same, what it means for someone to be an Australian, American, female, male, 
rugby player, etc. changes from instance to instance based on the circumstances in 
which people are encountered (Barsalou, 1987). Comparative fit manipulations 
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take this further though by making it clear that, although such variation is 
constantly occurring and the permutations apparently infinite, it is also systematic 
and predictable. In terms of the psychological process of social categorisation then, 
it becomes apparent that a predictive model is within the realms of plausibility, but 
in order to be realistic that model must also describe a process that is highly fluid 
and allows for social categorisation to be responsive to the encountered stimuli. Or 
in the language of the precursor accentuation research, if social categorisation 
serves to enhance perceptual acuity, the shape of the social categories that become 
salient must be directly informed by the nature of the category instances. 
It is these parameters that rule out models where the perceivers bring with 
them stored social categories for application to sufficiently fitting stimuli. This is 
because such models do not include a pathway by which those stored social 
categories are able to be adapted to the present circumstance. Without that 
pathway social categories cannot be responsive to encountered stimuli. Instead, 
social categories become a lens through which a perceiver may understand the 
social world in spite of encountered stimuli, hence running afoul of the intention of 
SCT to ground social categorisation in the encountered environment via the fit by 
perceiver interaction. A category storage and application account of social 
categorisation does move salience away from being an inherent quality of stimuli, 
but instead of treating salience as outcome of fit and perceiver interaction, it 
essentially places salience in the domain of the perceiver; hence the change in 
theoretical perspective on the part of SCT theorists. 
There are other problems with category storage and application models, 
some of which are used by SCT theorists to further argue against their plausibility. 
For example, Turner and colleagues point out that if the categorisation process is 
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one of storage and application, then for this to function our minds must be 
required to maintain an impractical quantity of social categories in storage; a 
unique social category for every single inference that a perceiver has ever made 
about all types and subtypes of people (Turner et al., 1994). This argument is not 
water tight, however (McGarty, 1999), and it is fair to say that it takes a back seat 
to the observed need to give fit its due in social category salience. 
What then do SCT theorists now suggest in place of a storage and 
application model? We have already seen that relative accessibility has been 
replaced with perceiver readiness, which entails more loosely our past experience 
as a constraining factor, but what does the salience determining interaction now 
look like as a psychological mechanism? Here SCT theorists push for the adoption 
of an online category formation approach to social categorisation (P. M. Brown & 
Turner, 2002; McGarty, 1999; Oakes & Turner, 1990; Reynolds & Turner, 2006; 
Turner, 2001c; Turner et al., 1994; Turner et al., 2006), meaning that at each 
instance that a social category becomes salient it has been constructed anew. 
Rather than social categories existing somewhere prior to use, either as a 
characteristic of stimuli or within the perceiver, the form that any particular social 
category takes is an emergent phenomenon. Instead of viewing the fit by perceiver 
interaction as a kind of moderation (i.e., the presence or absence of fit cues 
moderate the psychological salience of social categories) here neither the external 
environment nor the perceiver’s mind are sufficient for a social category to exist; 
the interaction is thus an act of creation, one that uses the raw materials of fit, in 
the form of comparative and normative fit, in combination with perceiver 
readiness, in the form of our past experience that provides us with theories, ideas, 
and beliefs as to how our social world works. Social category salience then, which 
85 
is the cognitive pre-potence of any particular social category, is an outcome of the 
generation of social categories, not their application or activation. 
Summary 
This chapter achieves two key goals. First, it makes clear the need to 
develop our understanding of transference beyond the currently dominant social 
cognitive model of transference. This was achieved by pointing out three 
important limitations of the model when it comes to a theory of transference. 
These were similarity based cueing, SO representation storage, and SO 
representation application. 
The second goal of this chapter was to introduce the social identity 
approach, with particular focus given to the model of social categorisation that can 
be derived from SCT. It is this model that we will use in Chapter 5 to take up the 
identified challenge and progress our understanding of transference. This model is 
one where social categorisation, which is understanding who people are by 
knowing what other people they are equivalent to and what other people they are 
different from, is recognised as an omnipresent cognitive process that allows us to 
navigate our social world by cognitively accentuating preconized distances in a 
way that provides greater perceptual acuity. Social categories can exist at varying 
levels of abstraction, including very few people or very many people, and any 
particular social category becomes salient as an outcome of a category creation 
process. That category creation process is constrained by the interaction between 
three factors: comparative fit, which involves a comparison between average 
intraclass distances and average interclass distances, normative fit, where category 
member characteristics inform social category content, and perceiver readiness, 
86  
which is influenced simultaneously by a perceiver’s past experience, present 
expectations, current motives, values, goals, and needs. 
 
Notes 
1. One might also now wonder whether the original upper limit on social category 
abstraction, categorisation in terms of humans in contrast to other species, will 
remain unchanged once subjected to further attention. Perhaps categorisation on 
the basis of sentience will soon be considered to be a more appropriate highest 
level of abstraction for social categorisation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HURDLES FOR A SELF-CATEGORIZATION THEORY BASED ACCOUNT OF 
TRANSFERENCE  
 
 
With a detailed model of social categorisation under our belts, we are 
almost in a position to articulate a new model of the cognitive processes that 
underpin transference. We say “almost” because before doing so we hope to, in this 
chapter, clear up in advance some of the confusions and misunderstandings that 
are likely to, as they have in the past, prove a barrier to the acceptance of 
explanations for social phenomenon derived from SCT and the social identity 
approach. 
There is another way to think about this task. This is to ask the question; 
why hasn’t this been done before? Why it is only now, 25 years after transference 
entered the social psychology scene, that a detailed social categorisation based 
account of transference is being proposed? Let alone one based specifically on the 
social identity approach, which has proved so influential elsewhere (Postmes & 
Branscombe, 2010). 
In this chapter we advance three reasons as to why the transference 
literature has thus far remained largely insulated from the social identity 
approach. The first concerns a philosophical schism that exists between the social 
identity approach and the social cognition approach; that is, between social 
constructionism and objectivism. The second concerns the very different 
conceptualisations of social categories across the two approaches, which we argue 
reflects a tendency that is common across psychology to segregate cognition on the 
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basis of stimuli type. Finally, we address the fact that, despite a vast literature, the 
social identity approach is for many an inaccessible body of knowledge. Here we 
point to a number of reasons as to why this has become the case, with some 
attribution to certain decisions made by the architects of the social identity 
approach in relation to how the ideas are presented and how theoretical advances 
are managed. These three areas, which can be thought of as contributing to a 
degree of research inertia, can each be sensibly titled in terms of a key antagonism. 
These are, respectively: the social cognition approach versus the social identity 
approach, individual level processes versus group level processes, and the social 
identity approach versus itself. 
The social cognition approach versus the social identity approach 
 
I was frequently put off by the frequent appearance of rhetoric that 
opposed social identity and social cognition approaches. With my own 
background solidly in social cognition, I was at first prepared to reject any 
viewpoint some of whose proponents seemed to brand me and my entire 
research tradition as the enemy. (Smith, 1999, p. 183) 
 
The above quote is a frank assessment, rare in writing, of the relationship 
between the social cognition and social identity approaches. Smith’s comment here 
speaks to a degree of intergroup conflict between researchers in these two social 
psychology camps. Smith’s language is also apt in hinting that it was perhaps social 
identity theorists who first placed the social cognition and social identity 
approaches so firmly in competition with one another. Turner in particular was 
known to be impatient for progress in the field and uncompromising in his 
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discourse with fellow researchers (Reicher & Haslam, 2015). Indeed, in numerous 
publications Turner, along with his colleagues, can be seen to be very reluctant to 
pull punches in their commentary of others’ work (e.g., Oakes et al., 1994; Turner, 
2006; Turner & Bourhis, 1996; Turner & Reynolds, 2003). This no doubt would 
have been uncomfortable and unwelcome for the particular targets of this 
ostensibly unrestrained criticism, particularly as Turner and colleagues’ tendency 
toward published confrontation was counter normative for a field more 
accustomed to geniality than unforgiving debate. This would make it hard for even 
the most ego-free of social cognition researchers to take cues from the other side 
of the divide. Indeed, it appears that the influence attempts of social identity 
theorists directed at the social cognition field have been in part frustrated by the 
ingroup/outgroup based influence processes that they have been able to bring 
such clarity to elsewhere (see the theory of referent informational influence, 
Turner, 1982, 1985, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). 
 This very human element to the story should not be over emphasised. 
Indeed, the modicum of pugnaciousness on the part of social identity theorists, and 
defensiveness on the part of social cognition researchers will get no further 
attention in this thesis. Nonetheless, it was an impactful reality during the period 
of research of interest to us here and therefore must be addressed if we are to get 
an authentic sense of the relevant research context. Moreover, attending to the 
rivalry also underscores the fact that the social cognition and social identity 
approaches exist as two distinct research trajectories (Operario & Fiske, 1999). 
After all, intergroup relationships do not emerge independent of social realities 
(Turner, 1999a; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). The intergroup relationship we have 
just described, and corresponding social identification of researchers with either 
90  
camp, only makes sense if there are real differences between the social cognition 
and social identity camps. We thus cannot be accused of reifying an otherwise 
arbitrary distinction between the social identity and social cognition traditions. 
A metatheoretical debate 
What then are the differences in theoretical approach that have been so 
irreconcilable for social cognition and social identity researchers? This question is 
actually best answered by in the first instance avoiding comparisons between 
particular theoretical assertions, and instead exploring the differences between the 
social cognition and social identity approaches in terms of metatheory; 
metatheories being “loosely organised and often implicit sets of ideas and value 
statements that identify important problems, appropriate modes of theoretical 
discourse, broad assumptions about human nature, philosophical questions, and so 
on” (Markovsky, 1994)1. This is because the social cognition and social identity 
approaches have fundamentally different metatheories underpinning the 
interpretation of their respective theories and models. As is often the case in 
psychology (Staats, 1983), it is these differences at the metatheoretical level that 
are driving the proverbial wedge. In the present case these metatheories concern 
the role of the perceiver in social perception. 
For the social cognition approach the question of social perception is about 
how and when perceptual distortions are created by the psychological processes 
utilised by perceivers (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). In other words, the social cognition 
approach has concerned itself with understanding the systematic deviations 
between social reality and our social perception. The cognitive miser and 
motivated tactician concepts are good examples of this. These have been go-to 
metaphors for social cognition researchers looking to communicate the way in 
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which perceivers navigate social landscapes (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, 1991; see also 
Allport, 1954). In terms of the former, perceivers are said to be cognitive misers in 
the sense that they will default to comparably effortless cognitive processes in 
order to build their picture of the world (i.e., they are miserly with their use of 
cognitive resources). Here effortless processes are those that leverage the theories, 
expectations, and memories that a perceiver already has on hand. This is 
contrasted with comparatively effortful cognitive processing, where the perceiver 
does the additional work required to take into account new experiences and new 
information and subsequently develop new and more accurate theories and 
expectations. Fiske and colleague’s well known continuum model of impression 
formation is an example of theory that is consistent with this view (see Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990). In that theory any particular instance of person perception is 
posited to exist somewhere on a conceptual continuum between effortless and 
effortful cognitive processing. At the extreme of effortless processing a target 
person is made sense of by way of categorisation, in that a perceiver’s stereotypes 
about familiar social categories are applied to that target irrespective of the 
target’s actual attributes. At other extreme effortful processing takes the form of 
“individuation”, where impression formation goes “beyond category membership” 
(1990, p. 1) and is based wholly on those attributes that the target person 
possesses. In that theory, and in line with the metaphor, perceivers are said to opt 
for more effortless category based impression formation where possible, moving 
toward effortful and attribute based perceptions only when the result of effortless 
categorisation proves unsatisfactory. What is a satisfactory versus unsatisfactory 
perceptual result is determined by whether there is a fit between the category 
being applied and target attributes; if target attributes cannot be reconciled with 
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category content then the perceiver is forced to abandon that particular category 
based impression and try again with an increased level of effortful processing of 
target attributes. 
The motivated tactician metaphor was introduced as an extension to that of 
the cognitive miser; the intention being to more adequately capture the role of 
perceiver goals and motivations in determining the extent to which effortful and 
accurate cognitive processes are used. In the continuum model, to continue the 
example, this is reflected in the anticipation that perceivers will move toward the 
effortful extreme of the continuum when they are motivated to do so by features of 
the target, their own goals, or the relationship between themselves and others in 
the present situation. Fiske and Nueburg (1990) provide the example of a 
perceiver who is assessing job applicants at the direction of their boss. Here, as a 
function of the relationship between the perceiver and their boss, concern about 
the implications of selecting an inappropriate applicant, and thus earning 
disapproval, may motivate the perceiver to make additional effort to ensure the 
accuracy of the impression of applicants. Alternatively, if it is understood that their 
boss expects certain categories of people to not be hired, the perceiver can be 
motivated to adopt category based impression formation. In either case, rather 
than simply minimising cognitive effort until confronted with perceptual 
incongruences that are unable to be ignored, the perceiver is deploying cognitive 
resources tactically, striving for the best possible outcomes while keeping effort 
expenditure at a minimum. In any case, the basic idea remains the same. When 
viewed as either a cognitive miser or a motivated tactician the core contrast is 
between perceivers making inferences about people on the basis of their prior 
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understandings and presumptions and perceivers understanding people on the 
basis of actual observation; or in other words, who they really are. 
It is particularly useful to pay close attention to the way the concepts of 
stereotyping and social categories are invoked in the continuum model of 
impression formation. In particular, and although the labels are the same, it should 
be clear that the process of stereotyping and social categorisation as described in 
the continuum model bares scant resemblance to the account of social 
categorisation that we introduced in Chapter 3. Indeed, this relates closely to the 
distinction we made in that chapter between common accounts of stereotyping 
versus social categorisation as it is conceptualised in SCT. There we pointed out 
that stereotyping is typically characterised in terms of inaccuracy, exaggeration, 
and approximation. In the continuum model stereotyping together with social 
categorisation as inaccuracy is played out in the extreme. This is because in that 
model understanding people via stereotypes and social categories is made poles 
apart from the process of understanding people on the basis of reality. This is not 
to say that stereotypes and social categories are not considered to be potentially 
useful for a perceiver, particularly as a cognitive resource saving tool, but in the 
continuum model they are defined as things that are an alternative to reality. 
The incompatibility with an SCT based account of social categorisation 
should be obvious. As emphasised in our introduction to social category salience in 
Chapter 3, for social identity theorists, social categorisation is understood as a 
process that always involves an interaction between social stimuli and what the 
perceiver brings with them in the form of goals, motivations, theories, and 
expectations. In fact, the continuum model, which puts social categories strictly in 
the heads of perceivers, is a perfect example of the kind of category activation and 
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application account of social categorisation that we have contrasted SCT against 
(see also Haslam et al., 1997). The continuum model is far from alone. Brewer’s 
dual process model of impression formation is a similar theory where a perceiver’s 
contribution to social perception is again a deviation from what is real. In that 
theory social perception is said to occur via one of two processes; either top down 
processing or bottom up processing (Brewer, 1988). Critically, bottom up 
processing is said to be data driven and based on the actual observed features of an 
individual, while top down processing is once again understood to be category 
based, which corresponds to the beliefs that the perceiver already has on hand, 
unadjusted to reflect observed realities. Overall the process of social categorisation 
as understood in both these dual process models of impression formation is closer 
to what elsewhere is described as schema based processing (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988), where social schemas are the mental structures that capture our 
preconceived ideas about the social world (Reynolds & Oakes, 1999). This is also 
true of the schema triggered affect model (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986), which we 
came across in Chapter 2 as a model considered to be a forerunner to the social 
cognitive model of transference. In sum, schema theories of social perception 
contrast the social perceptual contribution of perceivers against social reality. 
Social schemas are “pictures in our heads” (Lippmann, 1922/2007, p. 9) that are 
applied in a way that creates deviations from what would otherwise be the 
observed reality of whatever social situation is at hand. 
Could this particular gulf between the social identity approach and the 
social cognition approach be resolved simply through clearer nomenclature? Do 
we just need language that clearly distinguishes between the process of social 
categorisation, which is the end result of an interaction between social reality and 
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a perceiver’s contribution, and social schemas, which are the stored mental 
representations that we also use for impression formation or when faced with 
other social perceptual needs? The answer to this question is no, and the reason 
why brings us back to an incompatibility at the metatheoretical level. 
An SCT based account of social perception unconditionally and inextricably 
connects social reality and a perceiver’s contribution to social perception. The 
insistence on this connection means that social identity approach and SCT does not 
play well with any theory that in any way suggests that some kind of objective 
reality, unaffected by perceptual influence, should be the standard for veridical 
social perception. The adoption of that standard is ubiquitous to the social 
cognition approach, with varying degrees of explicitness depending on particular 
theories; the continuum model of impression formation and dual process model of 
impression formation being examples where that perspective is adopted very 
explicitly2. This brings us to the crux of the metatheoretical schism. The social 
cognition approach, as should by now be apparent, is deeply underpinned by a 
metatheory of objectivism in the sense that it presumes that social reality can be 
understood independent of a particular viewpoint or perspective3. In stark 
contrast the social identity approach and SCT embraces a metatheory of social 
constructionism, meaning that what is real is what is consensually established as 
factual, accurate, correct, and so on, among perceivers with respect to the 
particular vantage point of those perceivers (see also Operario & Fiske, 1999). 
Critically, the latter is not an acceptance of pure relativism (Oakes, 2001; Oakes et 
al., 1994), where perception is constraint free and any and all opinions on the 
world have the potential to be veridical. While the two are at times conflated (e.g., 
Funder, 1995), social identity theorists have been careful to make clear that they 
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are still materialist in that they accept the important premise that there is a 
universe that does exist outside of social perception (Turner & Oakes, 1986). The 
position instead is that the material world cannot be understood without engaging 
in some kind of perspective taking (see also Haslam et al., 1997), which of course 
follows the long standing philosophical point that reality cannot be established any 
way that is not mediated via the subjective understanding of perceivers; or more 
poetically, “that experience is incomplete until transformed, by some unseen 
power, into part of oneself” (Fernández-Armesto, 2009, p. 221). This social 
constructionist metatheory of the social identity approach has also been called the 
meaning making approach, which is a way of giving prominence to the 
epistemological implications of the SCT account of social categorisation. As we saw 
in Chapter 3, for social identity theorists the process of categorisation coverts the 
buzzing confusion of sensory stimuli into an understandable environment. In other 
words, it is the process of categorisation that imbues data with meaning (see also 
Eiser, 1996). 
Social identity theorists were far from the first to bring social 
constructionism to the social psychological study of social perception. Bruner’s 
own account of categorisation, which we have already introduced as a source of 
inspiration and ideas for the social identity approach, is one early example. 
Interestingly though, that work is often alternatively cited as a precursor for social 
cognition’s objectivist approach to social perception. In terms of that latter 
interpretation, Bruner’s work is described as suggesting that categorisation is an 
act of “going beyond the information given”, where “the information” is 
understood as the observed qualities that stimuli actually have, which through 
categorisation come to be marginalised or altogether ignored (e.g., Higgins & King, 
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1981). Bruner’s concept of categorisation is also often described as serving to 
simplify and to trim back information that is otherwise available in the perceptual 
field (e.g., Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). Either interpretation is a misreading of Bruner’s work, 
however (Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes & Turner, 1990; Ottati & Lee, 1995), and misses 
Bruner’s key message that “whatever is perceived is placed in and achieves its 
"meaning" from a class of percepts with which it is grouped” (1957, p. 124). 
Relevantly, misinterpretations along these lines are common within the 
transference literature (Andersen & Berenson, 2001, p. 238; Andersen & Berk, 
1998, p. 82; Andersen & Chen, 2002, p. 269; Andersen et al., 1995, p. 41; Hinkley & 
Andersen, 1996, p. 1279) and the notion of going beyond the information given in 
an objectivist sense was part of Andersen and Glassman’s introduction to the social 
cognitive model of transference (see Chapter 2). 
Another example of social constructionism in social psychology is Medin 
and colleagues’ advocacy for a theory based approach to categorisation over a 
similarity based approach (e.g., Medin, 1989). His theory based approach is social 
constructionist in that the categories we use to understand and explain patterns 
among observed phenomenon are said to be necessarily constrained by some prior 
theory that the perceiver has of those same patterns. A similarity based approach, 
whereby categorisation simply reflects the selective attention to categories that 
already exist “out there” (i.e., things that are similar are classed together and 
things that are different are classed apart), is deemed insufficient on both 
empirical and logical grounds. The logical argument is compelling, and Murphy and 
Medin’s example of the sources of similarity between plums and lawnmowers is 
illustrative: 
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Both weigh less than10,000 kg (and less than 10,001 kg,…), both did not 
exist 10,000,000 years ago (and 10,000,001 years ago,…), both cannot hear 
well, both can be dropped, both take up space, and so on. (G. L. Murphy & 
Medin, 1985, p. 292) 
The point of this entertaining list is to make clear that the number of shared 
properties among plums and lawnmowers is essentially infinite (see also Oakes & 
Turner, 1990). The implication being that what it is to be a plum as opposed to a 
lawnmower, and vice versa, could mean anything, and by extension means 
nothing; that is, until the perceiver makes a contribution in the form of a 
constraining theory. This is largely equivalent to SCT’s own insistence that 
categorisation is simultaneously a data driven and a perceiver driven process, 
manifesting there more specifically as the perceiver readiness by fit interaction. 
Indeed, Medin, Goldstone, and Genter suggest SCT as a good example of theorising 
that captures the “interactive nature of comparison processes and reasoning” 
(1993, p. 269). 
Looking to the converse, it is also the case that social cognition researchers 
were far from the first to bring objectivist standards to the social psychology of 
social perception. Instead it is fair to say that objectivism, and a preoccupation 
with the perceiver as a source of biases away from reality, has long been the norm 
in social psychology (Jussim, et al., 1995; Turner, 2001c), as well as psychology in 
general (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). What the social cognition approach did do is 
advance objectivist accounts of the social phenomena also within the bailiwick of 
the social identity approach, proposing cognitive mechanisms as explanations that 
were ostensibly highly similar, yet fundamentally very different. Indeed, there was 
enough metatheoretical difference between the social identity and social cognition 
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explanations to almost guarantee that efforts on the part of social identity theorists 
to critique social cognitive contributions would appear misplaced, and even at 
times incoherent. What better way to generate frustration than to have one’s 
concerted attempts at scientific advance be persistently misunderstood, dismissed 
as erroneous, and on occasions ignored? Worse, what for a scientist could be more 
infuriating than having one’s own ideas and theories, again due to 
incomprehension, also profoundly misrepresented to others, as was often the case 
when social cognition researchers made their own efforts at communicating social 
identity ideas (Haslam et al., 2010; McGarty, 2001; Turner, 1999a, 2001c; Turner & 
Reynolds, 2001)? All this during a high stakes game; these areas of scientific 
enquiry having very real societal and political consequences. 
Objectivist implications for transference 
Turning back to transference, the result of the above is that the social 
psychology of transference is to date largely untouched by social identity ideas. In 
fact, it remains in many ways a paragon of the social cognition approach, with the 
firm objectivist grounding that we might expect. Andersen and Berk (1998), for 
instance, while accepting that all knowledge generation involves some degree of 
perceiver driven meaning making, nonetheless characterise such processes as 
inherently resulting in error and bias. In terms of transference specifically, 
although the authors readily concede that the process may not always be harmful 
to the perceiver, they squarely brand transference as “reality confusion”, always 
resulting in the “distortion of the real characteristics of the new person” to varying 
degrees (1998, p. 92; see also Andersen & Przybylinski, 2012). Two other good 
examples were also introduced in Chapter 2. One is the linking of transference with 
cognitive resource scarcity (Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008), where fewer cognitive 
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resources are predicted to increase reliance on transference, and the other is the 
linking of transference to a theorised dispositional tendency to rely on schema 
based processing (Pierro & Kruglanski, 2008). In both cases, and in line with the 
cognitive miser and motivated tactician viewpoints (in the second example the 
motivated tactician metaphor is invoked explicitly), transference is viewed in 
contrast with cognitively effortful social perception that is geared toward accuracy. 
Przybylinski and Andersen (2012) come closest to a departure from social 
cognition’s objectivist metatheory, suggesting that transference is critical in giving 
meaning to social perception by acting as a lens through which to interpret and 
respond to new people. This meaning making rhetoric, however, is still somewhat 
of a veneer. The authors retain a view of transference as a source of bias in social 
perception, along with the process account whereby SO representations are stored 
in memory and applied as an alternative to actual observations. 
In viewing transference as an irrational process that results in erroneous 
perceptual outcomes, this social cognitive treatment of transference is not 
inconsistent with the clinical accounts that have come before (Andersen & Baum, 
1994). As we saw in Chapter 2, Greenson’s (1965) clinical definition of 
transference, considered useful in the social psychological literature (Andersen & 
Przybylinski, 2012), includes “inappropriate to that person” as a feature (1965, p. 
156). Indeed, as far back as Freud transference has been considered notable 
because it results in deviation from otherwise rational perception (Breuer & Freud, 
1895/2000; Freud, 1912/1950). What is different about the social cognition 
approach is its focus on the cognitive mechanism underpinning transference, 
irrespective of particular interpersonal outcomes, which in turn puts front and 
centre the social cognitive contrast between accurate perception of newly 
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encountered people, involving effortful and data driven processing, and 
transference, involving effortless perception based perceptual shortcuts. 
Conversely, this emphasis on transference as a par-for-the-course cognitive 
process in social perception makes the emotional and motivational aspects of 
transference a secondary concern, as we have seen in Chapter 2. 
In sum, the current social psychology of transference is deeply rooted in the 
social cognitive tradition. This is a key reason behind the transference literature 
having thus far remained insulated from the advances made in the understanding 
of social perception that has emerged from within the social identity approach. 
More specifically, this due to the intergroup dynamics operating between the two 
approaches, and relatedly their starkly contrasting metatheories. Indeed, the latter, 
objectivism versus social constructionism, appears to have absolutely undermined 
discourse across the two approaches; the result has been akin to having two 
different languages of social psychology. 
Related metatheoretical challenges 
Elsewhere it has been suggested that the critical metatheoretical schism 
between the social cognition and social identity approaches is due to the deep-
seated individualism of the social cognition approach (Oakes & Reynolds, 1997; 
Oakes & Turner, 1990; Reynolds & Oakes, 1999; Turner, 2001a). Individualism 
meaning here the belief that only the differences and similarities that exist at the 
individual level are real and are therefore the benchmark for what is veridical (e.g., 
Ryan, 1995); differences and similarities observed between collections of 
individuals or social groups are at best approximations, or heuristic reflections, of 
those real individual level relations4. While this additional metatheoretical divide 
does exist, and is also a barrier to communication and cross fertilisation between 
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the social cognition and social identity approaches, in our view it presents less of 
an obstacle than the objectivist versus social constructionist incompatibility. In 
fact, it is our suspicion that efforts to critique the individualism of the social 
cognition approach have frequently been ineffective because those efforts have not 
sufficiently emphasised and explained the social constructionist foundation of the 
social identity approach. 
This is not to say that efforts at explaining the role of social constructionism 
have not been made on the part of social identity theorists. It is just that the role of 
social constructionism in informing theory is invariably given only a passing 
mention, or is left implicit, in the context of a concerted disputation of 
individualism. This may be a conscious decision, and the reasoning may be that 
once the edifice of individualism comes down, theorists will have no choice but to 
also embrace a social constructionist social psychology. As Skorich and Mavor 
(2013) have made clear, however, it is possible to disentangle individualism from 
objectivism. They argue convincingly that both the perception of individuals and 
the perception of collections of individuals can be thought of as varying between 
data driven and memory based processing. This means that recognising individual 
and collective based perception as equivalent does not necessitate acceptance of 
social constructionism. In fact, the social cognition approach already posits from an 
objectivist standpoint a number of individualistic, or at least non-collectivistic, 
memory based perception tools as alternatives to actual observed reality. A 
number of these we have already mentioned. These include, relational selves, 
cognitive schemas generally, as well as, topically for us, SO representations. These 
are all examples where the activation and application of these perceiver resources 
are available as an alternative to perceiving people based on their real 
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characteristics. In sum, abandoning individualism does not necessarily mean 
abandoning objectivism. Instead, similarities and differences observed at the level 
of the individual as the standard for reality may simply be replaced by an 
alternative benchmark. Overall, we suspect that it is social constructionism, not a 
departure from individualism, that is the more difficult pill to swallow. 
Another kind of group versus individual divide in psychology has, however, 
played a role in insulating the social psychology of transference from the social 
identity approach. The status of transference as a process of applying 
characteristics from individuals to individuals has been critical in justifying the 
separation of transference from categorisation processes. The rationale is that 
individual based perception should be driven by psychological processes dedicated 
to that domain. This line of thinking is related to the above metatheoretical debate, 
but it also exists independent of it. It is therefore appropriate to explore this 
second hurdle in its own dedicated chapter section. 
Individual level processes versus group level processes 
In Chapter 2 we saw that two of the distinguishing features of the social 
cognitive model of transference was that a) the source of transferred content is SO 
representations that have an n-of-one quality, and b), that these SO 
representations are chronically accessible. With regard to the latter, while we can 
readily accept that there is, in general, a high degree of readiness to use SO 
information in social perception (as opposed to ethnic information, nationality 
information, gender information, etc.), differences in readiness, or accessibility in 
the social cognitive language, are a distinction in degree rather than kind; varying 
degrees of accessibility, including chronic accessibility, is accounted for 
satisfactorily by general ideas of cognition (Van Rooy et al., 2003). As such, the 
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greater accessibility of SO information does not serve as a basis to posit a separate 
cognitive process. Really then, the key distinguishing feature of the social cognitive 
model of transference is its n-of-one SO representations; SO representations being 
stored exemplars that correspond to collections of knowledge about a single 
person only. These are contrasted with social categories, which are said to instead 
capture knowledge about collections of individuals. It is on this basis of this 
distinction that transference is argued to be a non-categorical process. As stated by 
Andersen and Glassman, “we argue that SO representations are n-of-one 
representations rather than multiple-person categories, because they represent 
single individuals” (1996, p. 267). This puts the process of transference ostensibly 
outside of the sphere of relevance of the social identity approach; that approach 
and its constituent theories, SIT and SCT, quite clearly describe and are built 
around social categorisation processes. 
In Chapter 3, however, we saw that the social identity approach does not 
restrict social categorisation to the domain of collections of individuals (Turner et 
al., 2006). Instead, it posits that social categorisation is the ubiquitous foundation 
of all social perception, regardless of quantity of individuals in question. This is 
made clear in the level of abstraction principle, which states that social categories 
vary in inclusiveness, spanning from extremely inclusive (e.g., all humans in 
comparison with other sentient beings), down to the individual level (e.g., myself 
in comparison with the remainder of my family), and further down still to the 
intraindividual level (e.g., myself today in comparison with myself yesterday); the 
intraindividual level being a more recent inclusion that is consistent with the anti-
individualistic metatheory that goes hand in hand with SCT (Turner & Oakes, 
1986). Needless to say, this understanding of the limits, or rather limitlessness of 
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social categorisation, is very different. Here we spend a bit of time resolving this 
incongruence. More precisely, we take the time to explain the style of thinking in 
social psychology that has lead transference theorists to carve out a non-
categorical space for SO representations. Again, by devoting some attention to this 
area our hope is that we can overcome what might otherwise prove to be a 
considerable hurdle to accepting a social identity approach to transference. What 
we will be discussing here is the failure to distinguish between psychological social 
categories and sociological social categories. 
Psychological social categories versus sociological social categories 
We have already introduced psychological social categories at length. These 
are, as detailed in Chapter 3, cognitive classifications of persons, or intrapersons, 
into classes that reflect particular perceived equivalences of those who fall within 
those classes. These are the psychological creations that allow us to navigate the 
social world, necessarily founded upon both perceiver and stimuli elements. 
Sociological social categories are something different. Sociological categories are 
features of public discourse referring specifically to collections of individuals that 
have some acknowledged and accepted implication in the day-to-day goings on in 
our lives. Sociological social categories are also often the subject of contention, and 
are bound up in issues of socio-political change. Indeed, the classic examples of 
sociological social categories are those that come from the areas of controversy 
and disputation, such as within the domains of ethnicity (e.g., black and white), 
gender (e.g., male and female), political allegiance (e.g., progressive and 
conservative), as well as economic and social status (e.g., proletariat and 
aristocracy). Other more innocuous examples may come to be known through their 
implications for family life (e.g., mothers, fathers, siblings), education (e.g., 
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students, tutors, professors), maintenance tasks (e.g., plumbers, electricians, 
mechanics), recreation (e.g., skiers, scuba divers, horticulturalists), and so on. In 
either case, the distinguishing characteristic of sociological categories is that they 
are collections of individuals that have for whatever reason become a point of 
interest in public consciousness. That is, not only are these categories of people 
that individuals are conscious of, but they are categories that are talked about with 
one another, often at great length and with great intensity. Thus, a clue that a 
particular social category might be a sociological category is that there is a familiar 
nomenclature readily available for it. 
This particular psychological/sociological distinction is different to that 
which has been articulated elsewhere in social psychology. Social identity theorists 
have been at pains to make clear the critical distinction between social categories 
that perceivers apply to others and social categories that perceivers apply to 
themselves. This distinction has been called the difference between sociological 
categories and self-categories (Turner & Bourhis, 1996; Turner & Reynolds, 2001), 
or the difference between sociological categories and psychological groups 
(Reynolds, Jones, O’brien, & Subasic, 2013), and accepting this difference is a 
prerequisite for making sense of the social identity approach’s contribution to our 
understanding of a range of commonly studied group phenomena (in particular, 
ingroup favouritism and intergroup relations). Here, however, we are not 
especially concerned with social categories applied to oneself. In the present sense 
both psychological categories and sociological categories may be applied either to 
others or to ourselves. The issue here is that psychological social categories 
encompass all cognitive classing of persons (or intrapersons) used to navigate the 
social world regardless of our awareness of our use of those categories, while 
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sociological social categories are only those that we are aware of and that have 
become established in common discourse (see also "social grouping"; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990, p. 10). In short, sociological social categories are those that are 
likely to be studied by sociologists. 
Really, sociological social categories are a restricted subtype of 
psychological social categories; one that is limited to generally acknowledged 
classes of multiple individuals. This distinction is important for social psychology. 
What occurs in social psychology is that, when delving into psychological 
categorisation processes, researchers look first and foremost to those examples of 
social categorisation that have captured the attention of researchers and the lay 
community alike; namely, highly impactful sociological social categories. This in 
and of itself is unproblematic, however, somewhere along the way the social 
psychology of social categorisation becomes only about the psychology of 
sociological social categories. In other words, what it is to be a psychological social 
category comes to be conflated with what it is to be a sociological social category; 
psychological social categories come to also be defined as mental representations 
of generally acknowledged classes of multiple individuals. 
A psychology of stimuli types 
Why does this happen? Why does the psychology get limited to a particular 
type of social stimuli? The answer lies in psychology’s tendency to posit separate 
psychological processes for each possible type of input or output to those 
processes. By this we mean that an observed distinction among stimuli often leads 
researchers to make parallel distinction within the corresponding theorised 
mental architecture. The work of Andersen and Kltazky (1987), published shortly 
before Andersen took interest in SOs, serves well as an illustration of this process. 
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That paper explores the memory characteristics of different types of cognitive 
representations; specifically looking for structural differences between cognitive 
representations of traits and cognitive representations of social stereotypes. 
Taking these two types of social stimuli as the starting point, across three studies 
they find support for their expectation that the two types of representations 
possess clear differences in terms of richness and distinctiveness. On the basis of 
these findings the authors then theorise additional possible qualitative differences 
between trait and social stereotype representations (e.g., accessibility and 
processing speed), furthering the case that the original stimuli distinction is one 
that is paralleled in the architecture of our minds. 
The social psychology of perception is replete with other examples of this 
theorising style, and indeed we have come in contact with a number of these in 
Chapter 2. Higgins and King’s “categories” versus “proper constructs” is 
illustrative. In that dichotomy the former “consist of information about a class of 
objects, events, or properties”, whereas the latter “consist of information about a 
specific, individual object or event” (1981, p. 71). Here what can be maintained as a 
distinction between different types of stimuli is reified as a distinction between 
psychological processes, with a different type of mental representation allocated to 
each type of stimuli. The idiographic versus nomothetic distinction, made in the 
context of the relational self, follows the same pattern. What was originally a 
methodological distinction morphed into a distinction between different types of 
transferable social knowledge (for a critique of nomothetic-idiographic 
distinctions see Sarbin et al., 1960), which then became the basis for a distinction 
in terms of process; idiographic knowledge was posited to be underpinned by 
cognitive processes apart from those which underpin nomothetic knowledge. 
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Along the same lines, Brewer and Gardner (1996) divide up the processes that 
determine self identity on the basis of what essentially amounts to a taxonomy of 
stimuli inputs. First, there is the individual self, which is represented in the form of 
schemas that capture a person’s unique traits and characteristics. Second, there is 
the relational self, which is a reflection of a person’s interpersonal relationships 
and role relationships that involve personal bonds with others. Finally, there is the 
collective self, which is derived from membership in social categories and the 
corresponding schematic content, or group prototype, of those categories (inline 
with the social cognition approach social categories are depicted here as stored 
representations that the perceiver carries around with them). Sedikides and 
Gaertner (2001) take a similar approach, arguing that the self is comprised of four 
relatively independent mental representations: the individual self, the relational 
self, the familial self, and the collective self. Again, the driving force behind these 
psychological distinctions is a system of demarcations drawn between social 
stimuli: ourselves versus our relationships versus our families versus our group 
memberships. 
What then drives this tendency to carve up psychological processes on the 
basis of stimuli type? Here we suggest that there are two factors that lead 
researchers down this path. The first of these is the intuition that our conscious 
experience of social perception should to some extent be reflected in the cognitive 
mechanisms that produce those experiences. That is to say, the expectation that 
what produces our experiences will in some way look like those experiences. 
Where does our experience of things, experience of people, or experience of 
ourselves come from psychologically? To lay people and researchers alike there is 
an appealing simplicity to the sense that these things are straightforwardly stored 
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in our minds, much like you would find sporting equipment stored in a cupboard. 
In fact, there is often a real physicality to this, with a sense that certain concepts, 
ideas, and memories should be isolated in particular regions in our brain 
architecture.  
Of course, given the present limitations of what is known about memory 
and the mind, it is unsurprising that we should turn to our intuition to put 
something in place of what is otherwise largely a black box. There is probably 
something quite defensible in postulating cognitive processes that are more or less 
direct extrapolations from the experiences that they produce. There must be some 
connection between the two after all, and an attempt to reverse engineer processes 
from outcomes is not an unreasonable way to approach the problem. There are 
limits though, and there are good reasons to be sparing in the assumed congruence 
between experience and process. The fleshy mess that is our brains is one, as it is 
difficult to see where clearly differentiated and largely independent cognitive 
processes would reside inside that richly interconnected network of synapses and 
neurons. From this perspective we might come to anticipate the opposite state of 
affairs; that the cognitive processes that underpin our conscious experience 
actually bear little resemblance to those experiences. McGarty’s (2002) concept of 
sub-symbolic knowledge is useful here. Sub-symbolic, or implicit, knowledge is that 
which is present in the mind but not in any form that we might recognise it; it lacks 
the symbolic structure that allows knowledge and concepts to be consciously 
apprehended and communicated to others (see also Eiser, 1996; Smith, 1996; 
Turner et al., 2006). The point here is that what underpins our symbolic 
experiences may well be sub-symbolic in nature, meaning that it cannot be fittingly 
described using labels derived from our conscious and communicable lexicon. 
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Another reason that we might not expect the divisions among cognitive 
processes to mirror the divisions in our perceptual experience is the presumable 
need for some efficiency and adaptability among human cognitive processing. The 
human mind needs to be able to process an inordinate amount of stimuli and 
stimuli types. In fact, it has a demonstrated ability to grapple with a vast amount of 
information, as well as quickly accommodate novel stimuli inputs of an essentially 
infinite variety. It would make sense then that any particular cognitive process 
would be able to cope with a vast array of stimuli types, and similarly produce a 
wide range of perceptual and behavioural outputs. We would expect the powerful 
processer that is the human mind to be comprised of cognitive processes that are 
also powerful in and of themselves, not narrowly limited in purpose and certainly 
not limited by stimuli type. Said otherwise, from this perspective we should expect 
the human mind to be comprised of parsimonious systems; ones that can do a lot, 
with a little.  
The second factor driving the siloing of psychological processes by stimuli 
type is that there are professional incentives for doing so. That is, not only is it 
intuitively appealing to posit particular psychological processes that correspond to 
particular perceptual, attitudinal, and behavioural outcomes, but there are also 
rewards for researchers who take such an approach. In a scientific field that can 
appear to prioritise research novelty above all else (Appley, 1990; Berkowitz & 
Devine, 1989; Staats, 1983, 1999), positing new processes for different stimuli 
becomes a kind of inexhaustible well. The formula is straight forward: First take 
some observed perceptual outcome to do with a particular type of stimuli that has 
been yet to receive the explicit attention in your research tradition, outcome Y. 
Second, identify an existing psychological model that could similarly explain 
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outcome Y, model X. Third and finally, appropriate model X, rebranding it as model 
Y to achieve a novel, and therefore likely publishable, psychological account of 
outcome Y. The alternative, of course, is simply to make the observation that model 
X can also accommodate outcome Y, but that does not grant us the sort of new 
psychological model that seems to be attractive to journals. Nor would it be as 
helpful to researchers looking to make a name for themselves as area experts. To 
continue the hypothetical, if researchers suggest that model X is a suitable 
explanation for both outcomes X and Y then the ‘go to’ authority for those who are 
interested in outcome Y will be the author(s) of model X; the researchers who 
connected model X to outcome Y may well find themselves cut out of the loop. In 
contrast, if researchers propose model Y then it is their name that gets attached to 
the “original” explanatory model of outcome Y. This can grant the dual benefits of 
an increased public profile, if model Y becomes a matter of public interest, as well 
as an improved citation record, the latter of which being particularly important to 
advancing one’s academic career. A psychology segmented on the basis of stimuli 
type is also a convenience to researchers in that it reduces the burden on 
researchers to keep up with developments being made elsewhere; a burden that is 
made substantial by the enormous, and rapidly growing, psychological research 
literature (Bransombe & Spears, 2001). Siloing research on the basis of stimuli 
insulates one’s own field of interest from the impetus toward integration and to 
advance psychology as a coherent whole. Jacoby (1983) captures this benefit to 
researchers nicely, making the observation within his own area of inquiry, memory 
processes: 
The strategy of postulating different memory stores or dichotomies in 
processing is in many ways a tempting one. The apparent complexity of 
113 
problems, can, thereby, be reduced along with the portion of the 
voluminous literature on human memory and performance that one is held 
responsible for knowing. (Jacoby, 1983, p. 37)  
In sum there are three ways in which researchers are rewarded for 
developing a fragmented psychology and establishing isolated research streams. 
First, it generates ostensive novelty; second, it gives researchers something that 
they can put their names to; and third, it makes it easier to keep research current, 
or rather it reduces the expectation that integration with other contemporary 
research will occur. It should not be surprising then that in social psychology a 
tendency toward segmentation has, to some degree, become institutionalised. 
Indeed, in a 2010 southern hemisphere conference one member of the field, who 
shall remain anonymous, was heard to lament that social psychology has in place a 
“theory proliferation treaty”, meaning that researchers allow each other ample 
space to develop their own theoretical fiefdoms. In other words, there is an 
“acceptance of redundancy” (Staats, 1999, p. 7; see also Staats, 1991) where 
psychological research is insulated from accusations of disconnection, or even 
incompatibility, with other related work. 
There are, of course, costs. Jacoby (1983) continues, “these gains carry the 
price of ignoring similarities between problems and theoretical developments in 
different areas.” (1983, p. 37). Said otherwise, a social psychology that defaults 
toward segmentation risks slowing the rate of overall research progress by 
slowing the rate at which advances in one line of research permeate psychology 
more broadly. The “non-cumulative character of much social psychological 
research” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 152) can be discussed in the context of transference in 
social psychology, and our position is that transference has been subject to exactly 
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this kind of delayed progression. The fact of the matter is that the vast majority of 
the points we will make in Chapter 5 could have been made twenty years ago. 
Looking solely at SCT, the tenets of SCT were laid down in the mid-1980s, with 
much of the groundwork for that theory conducted over the 1960s and 1970s. By 
the mid-1990s these tenets had been subjected to targeted testing and the 
messages of the social identity approach had been refined and polished. These 
messages, however, were not applied to the social psychology of transference. It 
was instead argued that because these messages related to categorisation 
processes they fell outside of the domain of transference, which was argued to be 
not underpinned by a process of social categorisation. How was this argued? 
Primarily on the basis of stimuli type. For transference researchers the process of 
categorisation was understood to be the process of perceiving the world through 
sociological categories, a particular type of social stimuli; thus transference, 
because it does not directly involve sociological categories and instead involves 
individuals, is underpinned by something else. This is par-for-the-course 
theorising in social psychology; building distinctions among psychological 
processes based on the intuitive presumption that the way we symbolically 
structure our environment is an outcome of cognitive systems that mirror that 
structure. 
It might be said that by labouring on these particular research trends in 
social psychology that we are looking a gift horse in the mouth. In fact, another 
approach we may have taken is to maintain the transference process versus 
categorisation process distinction, and instead bring across insights from the social 
identity approach to transference in a piecemeal fashion; augmenting the social 
cognitive model of transference here and there with certain isolated facets drawn 
115 
from SCT. Our suspicion is, however, that such an approach would quickly become 
tied up in knots. For one, we would have to tip toe around the fact that a central 
message of the social identity approach is that all social perception is an outcome 
of social categorisation; we would need to maintain a distinction that is anathema 
to that point. Second, there is every chance that our contributions would be 
undermined by that individual processes versus group processes divide that is 
entrenched in the transference literature. By this we mean that attempts to add 
categorisation based notions to the social cognitive model of transference (e.g., 
comparative fit) may be interrupted by a rebuttal along the lines of “these 
processes may work for categories but cannot be applied to individuals, which is 
the concern of transference”. No, better we think to tackle the overabundance of 
stimuli based process distinctions in psychology head on. Hence our decision to 
dedicate this chapter section to explaining, and then unravelling, the presumption 
in the transference literature that a transference process must be intrinsically 
disconnected from social categorisation processes. 
To conclude this chapter section then, the social psychology of transference 
has distanced itself from research on social categorisation processes. This has been 
largely based on the argument that categorisation processes are not directly 
relevant to transference because transference concerns individuals and not 
collections of individuals. This argument, however, is based on the premise that 
categorisation ideas are only useful for explaining the influence of sociological 
categories on social perception. This premise, however, is unsubstantiated, and 
follows from certain attractive intuitions about human cognition, as well as 
institutionalised enticements for researchers to posit specific psychological 
processes for difference types of stimuli. Instead, as per the social identity 
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approach, categorisation processes should be understood as underpinning all 
social perception, regardless of whether the stimuli are collections of individuals, 
individuals, or even parts of individuals. 
The social identity approach versus itself 
Thus far we have attributed the absence of social identity ideas from the 
social psychology of transference to a) the rivalry and metatheoretical 
incompatibility between the social identity approach and the social cognition 
approach, and b) a common but spurious argument that social categorisation 
processes, of which the social identity approach is chiefly concerned, cannot 
explain phenomenon not pertaining to collections of individuals. In order to fully 
understand the absence of social identity ideas from the transference literature, 
however, there is one more area that should be given our attention: we should pay 
heed to the barriers that the social identity approach has unintentionally created 
for itself. 
The challenge of version control 
For starters, what is the social identity approach anyway? Unfortunately for 
those looking to familiarise themselves with the social identity approach, there are 
a number of different answers to this question, each with different implications for 
how one understands the messages of the social identity approach. One such 
answer is that the social identity approach is a loose collection of theorising about 
our social selves and the roles that our group memberships have in guiding our 
sense of self and our social behaviour. From this perspective social identity 
approach is a massive accumulation of ongoing research. This version includes 
under its banner any and all extensions of the early ideas, including for instance 
Hogg and colleagues’ subsequent uncertainty reduction perspective (Hogg & 
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Williams, 2000), as well as other social psychological theories dealing with social 
selves, such as optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer & Gaertner, 2001). Of 
course, the breadth of what is included in this social identity approach makes it 
largely impenetrable. It becomes a vast assortment of extensions, developments, 
and complementary theories, often incompatible with one another. 
Another common answer is that the social identity approach is chiefly SIT, 
which brings with it other challenges for those fresh to this body of work. Here 
authors may leverage SCT concepts such as comparative fit, level of abstraction, or 
social identity salience, but the source given is either Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) 
statement of SIT, or Tafjel’s edited volume Differentiation Between Social Groups 
(1978a). This means that a researcher looking for further information on these 
ideas will only find them absent from the supposed source material. Take the 
arbitrarily selected and not at all unusual example of Ryan (1995) who writes 
“according to social identity theory… individuals accentuate between-groups 
differences and within-group similarities to strengthen their social identity” (p. 
194). Ignoring for the moment the fact that neither SIT nor SCT make this exact 
claim, here the author is leveraging the SCT concept of accentuation and then 
attributing that concept to SIT (for similar examples see Lobel & St. Clair, 1992; 
Terry & O’Brien, 2001). Where in SIT is the accentuation principle? Nowhere. What 
then do interested parties do when faced with this quandary? Frankly, our 
suspicion is that they assume that social identity theorists are making it up as they 
go along. Or, alternatively, they come to the same conclusion as in our first answer: 
that the social identity approach represents only a loose collection of theorising 
about our social selves.  
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There are numerous other answers to the question ‘what is the social 
identity approach?’, and on top of the misunderstanding that any one particular 
account may cause5, merely the fact that there is dissensus is enough to generate 
substantial confusion among those looking to familiarise themselves with the 
literature. The broad point is that social identity theorists have, to a sizeable 
extent, lost control of the narrative of what the social identity approach is. The 
result is an extensive body of literature that is a real challenge to navigate6. 
Moreover, while this can be partly attributed to failures in scholarship, the truth of 
the matter is that social identity authors have scored a number of own goals in this 
area. 
To begin with, the unwieldy nature of the social identity literature can be 
partly attributed to some ostensibly innocuous language choices in the earliest 
social identity publications. Even something as simple as the naming conventions 
for the theories has proved to be fraught. For example, although Turner has since 
railed against the practice of lumping SIT and SCT under the banner of the former 
(Turner, 1999b; Turner & Reynolds, 2001), he was among those who helped set 
the precedent early on (Turner, 1987a, 1988). Similarly, Turner gave SCT the 
alternative title “the social identity theory of the group” (1987b, p. 42). While at the 
time this terminology would have seemed elucidating as to the explanatory 
domains of the two theories, with twenty-twenty hindsight this looks obvious as a 
potential source of confusion. In fact, that naming convention was identified by 
Turner as a potential difficultly, but he did not at that time seem to anticipate the 
potential scale of the problem: “It is unfortunate in some ways that two such 
closely related theories should have similar names, but also useful and 
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understandable in terms of their origin, and now in any case the labels seem 
irretrievably to have stuck” (Turner, 1987b, p. 43). 
The language used by social identity theorists around “theoretical 
development” is also relevant here. Specifically, language that describes SIT, SCT, 
or the social identity approach overall, as a work in progress (e.g., Turner, 1988, 
2001b; Turner et al., 2006) has proved a hindrance to maintaining control of what 
is canonical to the social identity approach and what is not. Such language, which 
has been regularly adopted by others publishing in the area (e.g., Haslam & 
Ellemers, 2005; Hogg, 2005; Hogg & Williams, 2000; Hornsey, 2008; Rubin & 
Hewstone, 2004; Terry, Carey, & Callan, 2001), is attractive in that it grants 
theorists scope to update their theories as new information becomes available or 
in recognition of advances in theorising elsewhere, which in turn helps maintain 
relevance. However, a problem is that it technically grants that same scope to 
anyone. In other words, if SIT and SCT are living documents, then who gets to make 
the definitive statement of either theory? Hogg and colleagues’ uncertainty 
reduction perspective, mentioned above, is a good example of how this quickly 
becomes a major challenge. Hogg, a one time student to Turner, has theorised with 
colleagues that one of the reasons that people develop inclusive social identities is 
to reduce feelings of subjective uncertainty (M. A Hogg & Mullin, 1999). This 
theorising has been described as part of the social identity approach, and SCT more 
specifically (Hogg & Williams, 2000). Elsewhere, however, this uncertainty-identity 
theorising has been argued to conflict with the tenets of SCT that speak to the 
uncertainty generating capacity of inclusive social identities (McGarty, 1999). The 
most obvious question this raises is “who is correct?”, but it also raises a second 
question: If SCT is a work in progress, whose account of SCT is the “true” SCT? It is 
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this second question that serves to confuse the literature. Indeed, while the former 
might be resolved through further theoretical scrutiny and empirical activity, given 
the precedent set by Turner and others, the latter may be unanswerable. 
To give another example, this time to do with SIT, in the late 1980s two 
empirical predictions were made that were said to be derived from that theory. 
These were that a) acts of intergroup discrimination should result in elevated self-
esteem, and b) that people with initially depressed self-esteem should engage in 
more frequent or intense acts of intergroup discrimination (Abrams & Hogg, 1988, 
1990; see also R. Brown, 2000). These were argued to be two corollaries to what 
was described as SIT’s more general self-esteem hypothesis, where an individual’s 
self-esteem is straight forwardly connected to the positive differentiation of one’s 
social identity from outgroups (see also Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Here too, whether 
this is actually a part of SIT is contested. It has been argued elsewhere that a 
straight forward self-esteem hypothesis has never been part of the theory (Long & 
Spears, 1997; Martiny & Rubin, 2016; Rubin & Hewstone, 2004), and further that 
the self-esteem hypothesis is actually incompatible with the tenets of SIT (Ellemers 
& Barreto, 2001; Turner, 1999a; Turner & Oakes, 1997; Turner & Reynolds, 2001; 
but see Oakes & Turner, 1980). How does this get resolved? The instinctive 
solution is to point people to the original sources, as indeed became a mantra of 
Turner as contention around the content of the social identity approach persisted 
and grew (1999a). However, if the social identity approach is a developing 
phenomenon then that ship may well have sailed. It may be argued that, regardless 
of whether the self-esteem hypothesis is explicitly laid out in SIT, it can be 
connected to the theory and therefore included under the banner of SIT as an 
update of that theory. And “updates” there have certainly been. Numerous 
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researchers appear to have been keen to attach themselves and their theorising to 
this body of research; it is now par-for-the-course to see either SIT, SCT, or the 
social identity approach attributed to a wide variety of authors (e.g., Barnum & 
Markovsky, 2007; Hogg & Abrams, 1999; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Triandis & 
Trafimow, 2001). 
This version propagation issue means that researchers now have the luxury 
of cherry picking which social identity approach, or which components of the 
social identity approach, they wish to engage with. This can be incredibly 
convenient, particularly for those looking to take a critical perspective. There is 
now a plethora of low hanging fruit that can be used as examples where “the social 
identity approach” has been found to come up short. This adds another layer of 
complexity for new players. Not only are researchers likely to find the social 
identity approach introduced as a number of different things, they are also likely to 
find that the social identity approach is now simultaneously regarded in social 
psychology as a well-supported source of insight and practical understanding and 
a largely disproved but nonetheless interesting aspect of the social psychology’s 
history (e.g., Operario & Fiske, 1999). 
Out with the old 
One might, based on the above, get the impression that these barriers have 
arisen disproportionately to the causes. The profound disorganisation of the social 
identity literature appears to have stemmed from very minor terminology choices 
on the part of social identity theorists, as well as a handful of remarks about the 
opportunity for future theoretical development. One might also get the impression 
that these otherwise innocuous, idiosyncrasies of the social identity literature have 
been unfairly exploited; either with the intention to bolster one’s own social 
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identity credentials, or alternatively as a way of maligning and marginalising this 
body of work. There is another component at play here, however; one that makes 
the experienced disorder of the social identity literature much more reasonably 
tied to the actions of social identity theorists. Here we refer to the reluctance on 
the part of social identity theorists to correct, criticise, or dispute parts of the social 
identity message or chapters in the social identity story. In other words, the 
architects of the social identity approach appear to have been somewhat reticent 
to address some of the inconsistencies within the approach. This has created a 
scholarly void of sorts, and in our assessment it is this void that has given others 
the opportunity necessary to broadcast their own reinterpretations, 
misinterpretations, and to generate confusion generally. 
We can begin illustrating what we mean here by looking back to our own 
introduction of the social identity approach in Chapter 3. There, in the course of 
introducing SCT’s account of social categorisation, we made mention of three 
addendums to the theory. The first related to person level social categorisations 
and the level of abstraction principle. Here the early linkage between person level 
categorisation and personality has been tempered and the range of social category 
exclusivity has been expanded to include categorisation at the intraperson level. 
Next was the move away from viewing social categories as hierarchically organised 
as a matter of course, with hierarchies instead being considered one of any number 
of possible organising structures. The third and final addendum was the move 
away from the concept of relative accessibility and toward the similar but 
nonetheless different concept of perceiver readiness, along with the corresponding 
adoption of an online social category formation understanding salience. 
Importantly, none of these three points are original theoretical assertions of ours. 
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They instead capture the laudable work of social identity theorists that largely 
took place across the 1990s, likely representing exactly the kind of “developments” 
that Turner and colleagues broadly anticipated. Critically, however, in two of these 
three examples their status as developments is something that is not made clear. 
When it comes to the progression of thinking around person level categorisation, 
as well as the shift toward perceiver readiness and emphasis on online category 
formation, these are instead presented as if they have patently always been 
components of SCT (e.g., Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1994; Turner & Onorato, 
1999; McGarty’s critique of category hierarchies is the exception, where the 
assertions are clearly communicated as counter to the tenets of SCT). The 
advantage of such a presentation, of course, is that it maintains the impression in 
the first instance that the social identity approach, and SCT in particular on this 
occasion, has always had the capability to be wielded in whatever way is occurring 
at present. Unfortunately, in our assessment this isn’t really the case. While it may 
be reasonably said that SIT and SCT have always had the potential for such 
applications and insights, a number of the contemporary uses of these theories 
cannot be derived from what was originally penned. In other words, to get us to 
where we are now SIT and SCT require an explicit update, which is not something 
that the architects of the social identity approach have provided. 
Similar challenges arise when it comes to the relationship between SIT and 
SCT. Although there are a number of statements that suggest that SIT and SCT go 
hand in hand (Haslam, 2001; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Postmes & Branscombe, 2010; 
Turner, 1999a), these are often short on detail when it comes to exactly how the 
two theories go together. The fact of the matter is that combining the two theories 
is not a simple matter and there are points at which SIT and SCT are essentially 
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incompatible. ‘What is identity?’ is a good example of this. In the social identity 
literature the question of individual identity is squarely outside the scope of the 
theory. Tajfel was adamant that the contribution of SIT to understanding 
intergroup relationships should not be lost in what he felt would likely be “endless 
and often sterile discussions as to what “is” identity” (Tajfel, 1978c, p. 63). Thus, an 
individual’s social identity was limited to “that part of an individual’s self-concept 
which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or 
groups)” (p. 63, emphasis in original). The remainder of the self-concept was 
cordoned off as a question for another time and another theory; a person’s, social 
identity, singular, was only one small part of an otherwise complex and still 
mysterious identity system, where the focus instead was the implications for 
intergroup relationships. For SCT, in contrast, the question of identity was a chief 
concern. Indeed, SCT tackled the nature of the self-head on, laying down a 
conceptualisation of the self as a cognitive structure that constructs and maintains 
our self-images through, inter alia, the process of self-categorisation. An 
implication of this is that “social identity” takes on a very different meaning to the 
one it has in SIT. In SCT our social identities, plural, are self-representations that 
are central to the self. 
In the end we are left with a critical question: in a combination of SIT and 
SCT, what is a social identity? Our view is that the most useful approach is to adopt 
SCT’s concept of social identity, essentially replacing the one provided in SIT. This 
is also the approach taken by many social identity researchers, and it might 
therefore be tempting to say that this is the obvious reconciliation. Really though, 
it is not obvious, and there are good reasons that one might think that SIT’s 
definition of social identity is the one that should be retained, not least of which 
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being that SIT got there first. The result has been substantial inconsistency in the 
way in which SIT and SCT are brought together, which again fuels confusion for 
those unfamiliar with the history and detail of these two theories. It has become 
clear that if a combination of SIT and SCT is to be consistent and generally 
accessible then detailed guidance around how to combine the two theories is 
required. Some statements along these lines have been made available (Haslam, 
2001; Reynolds & Turner, 2012; Turner, 1999a; Turner & Reynolds, 2001), 
however, they are few in number and are potentially too late to the party; a manual 
for transitioning between SIT and SCT was potentially needed as soon as SCT was 
developed. Of course, such a manual would have involved a concerted explication 
of the limitations of SIT, which presumably would have at the time been 
unappealing for those who harboured such respect for that theory. 
Deep seated feelings of respect may be a contributing factor in another area 
in which social identity theorist have been seemingly unenthusiastic to point out 
where thinking has moved on, this time at the metatheoretical level. As we have 
seen above, the social identity approach embraces a social constructionist 
metatheory, where all meaning is an outcome of cognitive categorisation, which is 
simultaneously informed by the experienced stimuli and the vantage point of the 
perceiver (i.e., their beliefs, ideas, and theories, as well present goals). The 
converse is the objectivist metatheory, where meaning is always “there” in the 
stimuli. In terms of cognitive categorisation, we have seen how this alternative 
metatheoretical perspective has led researchers in social psychology to conclude 
that the categorisation serves a meaning reduction purpose. That is, we categorise 
stimuli in order to simplify perception so that we can engage with our 
environment without exhausting our information processing capacities. Indeed, 
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this is often where the social constructionist versus objectivist antagonism is 
played out, with social identity theorists seeking to dismantle the thesis that 
cognitive categorisation equals simplification. In the course of making this 
argument, connections are generally made with Bruner’s work on categorisation, 
as well as Tajfel’s theories on categorisation and cognitive accentuation that 
predate his work on SIT and the minimal group paradigm (see Chapter 3). The 
latter connection, however, is problematic. The reason being that Tafjel also 
regularly took the position that categorisation serves a simplification function 
(Tajfel, 1974, 1978c, 1978d, 1981), as well as at least once intimating that 
individual difference is the gold standard for social perception (Tajfel, 1978b). 
Those reading into the social identity approach are therefore recipients of a 
thoroughly mixed message. On the one hand they are asked to turn away from the 
mainstream belief, both within social psychology and elsewhere, that social 
categorisation results in information loss; while on the other hand great 
importance is placed on the pioneering work of Tajfel, also a key architect of the 
social identity approach, who from time to time affirms that exact conventional 
wisdom. The result is that the social constructionist message of the social identity 
approach risks being undermined. Yet, despite this, the contradiction between 
Tajfel’s writing on the cognitive function of categorisation and the later social 
identity literature is almost always passed over. Further, the few occasions where 
this important departure from Tafjel’s writing is made clear (Haslam & Turner, 
1992; Oakes et al., 1994; McGarty, 2002) are approximately equal in number to 
occasions where Tajfel is selectively drawn upon and the impression is given that 
the metatheory has been consistent all along (e.g., Oakes & Turner, 1990; Reynolds, 
Turner, & Haslam, 2000)7. That latter portrayal isn’t without some basis, 
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particularly in light of Tajfel’s arguments around the perceptual acuity function of 
accentuation (e.g., 1957), but without also acknowledging where the social identity 
approach has moved away from Tajfel’s perceptive such a portrayal leaves one 
with a slight aftertaste of revisionism. Of course, Tajfel was a giant in the field of 
intergroup relations and across social psychology in general; so much so that it 
been suggested that there exists a “Tajfel Effect”, where theoretical debate and 
progression is stifled by the moral and rhetorical weight of Tajfel as a personal 
figure (S. D. Brown & Lunt, 2002). We would not necessarily go that far, but we do 
wonder if a degree of admiration and reverence has led social identity theorists to 
play down their metatheoretical critique of Tajfel’s work. 
Overall, the above features of the social identity story suggest that the 
architects of the social identity approach have had limited motivation to provide 
explicit theoretical updates for those seeking to engage with that approach. 
Instead, as thinking has moved on within the approach, with various tenets 
discarded or replaced, the standard has been to introduce these simply as the 
social identity approach without flagging developments as developments for the 
reader. Really though, the issue of motivation is immaterial for our present 
purposes. Rather, it is the outcome that is relevant here: social identity theorists 
have been quiet when it comes to updates despite having themselves made a 
number of key theoretical developments in the years between and after the 
publication of SIT and SCT; developments that require a departure from the 
theories’ tenets as written. In isolation the absence of such periodic updates may 
not have been an issue, and the issue of communicating the messages of the social 
identity approach could still have been reasonably straight forward. We, for 
instance, have in Chapter 3 treated SIT and SCT to be exactly as has been originally 
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written (see also Haslam, 2014), choosing to augment those theories explicitly 
where required. Alternatively, one might choose to declare a more contemporary 
statement to be the updated theory, as did McGarty in his review of SCT: “I will 
assume that what SCT is is whatever Turner maintains it to be in his most recent 
writings on the topic” (1999, p. 110, emphasis in original). This also works quite 
well so long as you are clear on which more recent sources are being leveraged and 
that there has been a departure from the original sources, as was McGarty. As we 
have seen, however, the social identity approach sails in treacherous waters; 
waters filled with researchers keen to add their own name to social identity 
approach, as well as those far from motivated to portray the social identity 
approach in the best possible light. 
Pulling all of the above together, the social identity literature has become 
somewhat of a quagmire due to a perfect storm of sorts. While some confusion 
may have innocently arisen due to some early trivial nomenclature choices, this 
confusion has been compounded by a degree of opportunism exhibited by those 
publishing this research space, which has been empowered by the absence of clear 
and incontrovertible messages from the architects of social identity about what 
should be understood as the current social identity approach. 
Our point is not, however, that the social identity approach faces unique 
challenges in this regard, or that the social identity approach is comparably worse 
off than other social psychological theories. Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto (2001), 
for example, describe substantial difficulty in navigating the symbolic racism 
literature due to the tendency for theorists, including the key architects of that 
approach, to describe symbolic racism in different ways across publications. 
Meanwhile, Sidanius and colleagues’ own theory, social dominance theory, has 
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been described as undergoing undocumented revisions; revisions that alter the 
fundamental tenets of that approach (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004). 
Nevertheless, it is the case the social identity literature is vast and regularly 
inconsistent. Consequently, it is often impenetrable for newcomers. This no doubt 
has made it difficult to see opportunities to apply the social identity approach to 
transference, and indeed has limited its appeal more generally. 
Summary 
The role of this chapter has not been to provide context for context sake. 
Instead it is hoped that, by taking the time to explain why a concerted SCT based 
account of transference has been such a long time coming, we might head off 
certain areas of confusion before they arise. Neither the social constructionist 
metatheory of the social identity approach, nor a conceptualisation of cognitive 
categorisation as a ubiquitous perceptual process, can be considered to be 
rudimentary notions; more often than not both take some time to get one’s head 
around. Thus, should we have launched straight into description of our SCT 
derived model, the risk would have been that the model would be rejected on the 
basis that it violates one or a number of expectations for what a social 
psychological model of transference should look like. With some luck this chapter 
has served to mitigate this risk. By explicating these ideas fully, the anticipation is 
that an unfamiliar reader will be better placed to understand the assumptions that 
underpin a social identity based model of transference, and the form that model 
takes. Here we follow as similar point made by Turner and Reynolds in the context 
of collective psychology: “Understanding the metatheory of social identity is not a 
luxury; it is a crucial part of its legacy and a prerequisite for the full development 
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of social psychology’s analysis of intergroup relations and human social conflict” 
(2001, p. 149). 
By the same token, by making an issue of the confusion surrounding what 
the social identity approach does and does not entail, the hope is that any 
misconceptions about the theoretical approach that we are drawing from might be 
allayed. In sum, the foremost aim of this chapter has been to establish a firm 
foundation from which an SCT based model of transference may be understood. 
Having attempted this to the best of our abilities, we can now turn to the task of 
laying out that model. 
 
Notes 
1. A more succinct definition for metatheory is that it is “collection of related 
underlying themes that together represent the dominant explanatory approach” 
(Turner, 2001a). Even more pithy, Tajfel describes a particular theory’s 
metatheory as the “kind of theory it is or the approach to the problem that it 
represents” (Tajfel, 1978b, p. 435). 
 
2. Interestingly, despite adopting an objectivist standpoint in their continuum 
model of impression formation, Fiske and Neuberg (1990) also pay a moments 
respect to Allport’s clearly social constructionist statement that “open-mindedness 
is considered to be a virtue, but strictly speaking it cannot occur. A new experience 
must be redacted into old categories.” (1954, p. 20, emphasis in original). Allport 
himself introduces Bertrand Russell’s more pithy statement on this topic: “A mind 
perpetually open will be a mind perpetually vacant” (cf. McGarty, 1999). 
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3. To give a straight forward example of objectivism in action in social psychology, 
Lee and Duenas define stereotype accuracy as “the correspondence between 
perceived cultural difference and objective cultural difference” (1995, p. 163). The 
contrast between social constructionism and objectivism is similar to what is 
elsewhere described as the difference between sortalism and antisortalism 
approaches to cognition and perception (Blok, Newman, & Rips, 2005). 
 
4. Social psychology, including the social cognition approach, has received criticism 
from social identity theorists for being individualistic in a second sense of the term. 
They reproach the field for severing individual cognitive processes from the social 
and societal context in which they are situated and then focusing solely on the 
former (Oakes et al., 1999; Oakes & Turner, 1986a; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, & 
Haslam, 1997; Turner & Oakes, 1986; Turner, Reynolds, & Subasic, 2008). The 
result being a social psychology that fails to adequately address the critical and 
inextricable connections between individual perception and social reality. 
 
5. One eyebrow raising account of the social identity approach has been that SCT 
was developed largely in an effort to correct SIT (Operario & Fiske, 1999). 
 
6. Irrespective of issues of narrative control, Postmes and Branscombe describe 
the social identity literature as “unusually fragmented” (2010, p. 2) with core 
publications across a wide range of books and journals, spanning decades. This no 
doubt also contributes to the confusion as to what the social identity approach 
entails. 
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7. It is also not unheard for social identity theorists to stray into an objectivist 
standpoint themselves. Hogg and Abram’s introductory text to the social identity 
approach (1988), for example, adopted the same distortion and simplification 
misinterpretation of Bruner’s categorisation message as is common to the social 
cognition literature. This, with its endorsement from Turner in the forward, is an 
even more straight forward source of inconsistency. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE SOCIAL CATEGORISATION MODEL OF TRANSFERENCE  
 
 
In the first section of this chapter we propose the SCT based social 
categorisation model of transference. This model is founded on the theorising of 
the social identity approach, and in particular SCT, which was introduced in 
Chapter 3. Briefly stated, the social categorisation model of transference is one 
where transference is the accentuation of within class distances for a salient SO 
and target social category, where the salience of a SO and target category is an 
outcome of an online category formation process, which always entails an 
interaction between perceiver readiness and comparative and normative fit. In the 
course of introducing this model of transference we will show that it is easily able 
to account for the wide array of findings in the transference literature. This 
includes the classic transference effect, whereby SO characteristics are 
misremembered as present in a newly encountered target, as well as the transfer 
of additional SO content (e.g., affect, interpersonal motivations, patterns of 
interaction). 
After detailing the social categorisation model of transference, we will then 
explore some of the immediate implications of the model. This exploration will be 
structured in terms of three areas of the social cognitive model of transference that 
were identified in Chapter 3 as posing theoretical challenges: similarity based 
cueing, SO representation storage, and SO representation application. In terms of 
the first, we move past similarity as a problematic theorised antecedent of 
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transference, replacing it with the more coherent perceiver readiness and 
comparative and normative fit interaction. Next, we move away from stored SO 
representations as an initially intuitive but none-the-less implausible aspect of the 
social cognitive model of transference, turning instead toward an online category 
formation model, underpinned by neurologically plausible connectionist 
theorising. Finally, in terms of SO representation application, some further 
implications of an online category formation model for impression formation will 
be made explicit; by rejecting an application and activation model of cognition we 
are no longer compelled to seek out some cognitive entity for information to be 
applied to. Instead, sensory input may be thought of as inextricably tied up in the 
representation formation process, just as are the background knowledge, beliefs, 
and expectations of perceivers. 
We conclude the chapter by outlining the general approach taken in this 
thesis to generating empirical support for the proposed social categorisation 
model of transference. 
The model 
In the present model, transference is an outcome of a social categorisation 
process. More specifically, the observed phenomenon of transference, where SO 
characteristics come to be perceived as present in another person, is an outcome of 
the accentuation effects that arise when social categorisation schemes become 
salient. Accentuation effects, as you will remember from Chapter 3, encompass the 
cognitive accentuation of the precognized distances between classes and the 
precognized stimuli distances within classes. We posit that transference is the 
accentuation of within class distances for a salient social category that 
encompasses a perceiver’s SO and a newly encountered target person. 
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A salient social category that encompasses a SO and a newly encountered 
target can be given the label SO and target, straightforwardly reflecting those 
whom the category includes. This is a dyadic categorisation scheme, but the issue 
of how many individual people are included within the bounds of the social 
category is inconsequential. In terms of describing the cognitive process at play in 
transference we can simply state that social categories are cognitive class 
structures that are not limited in terms of their level of inclusiveness. Nor are 
social categories limited in terms of the type of stimuli that they encompass (see 
Chapter 4, where we explored the tendency in social psychology to confound social 
categorisation with sociological social categories). 
Accentuation within SO and target social categories 
Looking more closely at the accentuation of within class distances for a SO 
and target category, the application of the accentuation principle to the 
phenomenon of transference parallels the use of the same principle to explain 
observed increases in perceived characteristic concordance in the context of social 
groups (e.g., Haslam & Turner, 1995; Hogg & Turner, 1987a). Specifically, the 
presence of a salient SO and target category may be expected to cause perceivers 
to understand the SO and target to be conceptually close. It is this conceptual 
closeness that is then accentuated via the perception that a greater number of SO 
characteristics are also shared by the target, thus accounting for the classic 
transference finding that SO characteristics come to be experienced by perceivers 
as also present in newly encountered targets. We can also think about this in terms 
of an increase in the cognitive interchangeability between the SO and the target. In 
other words, the salience of the SO and target category makes it perceptually 
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irrelevant as to which individual possesses what particular characteristics, thus SO 
characteristics are diffused generally within that category1.  
This does, of course, raise the possibility of accentuation in the other 
direction: from the newly encountered target to the SO. That is, and again as a 
function of accentuation of conceptual closeness, we might expect characteristics 
of the target to come to be seen in the SO. To our knowledge such an effect has 
never been tested for, so we cannot say on the basis of empirical observation 
whether it occurs or not. This issue of characteristic diffusion direction has been 
raised in the context of self-categorisation, and a number of researchers have 
concerned themselves with whether inclusive self-categorisation results more in 
self-anchoring or self-stereotyping (e.g., Ames, 2004; Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; 
Krueger, 2007; Otten & Epstude, 2006; Veelen, Otten, & Hansen, 2013); self-
anchoring, or social projection, being the perception of other ingroup members on 
the basis of self characteristics2, and self-stereotyping being the perception of the 
self on the basis of fellow ingroup member characteristics. We need not spend 
much time on the question of diffusion direction here; whether accentuation 
occurs from the target to the SO or not, does not change the fact that intraclass 
accentuation fits as a cognitive mechanism for transference. However, it is worth 
pointing out that from the perspective of SCT the underlying mechanism for 
accentuation is not inferences made from certain category members to other 
category members. Instead, the mechanism is actually inferences made from the 
inclusive self-category itself (Onorato & Turner, 2004; see also Turner, 1982), 
where the content of that self-category is informed to varying degrees by the 
characteristics of all class members (see also Veelen et al., 2013). 
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Applying this to SO and target categories, this would suggest that inferences 
are really made about both the SO and newly encountered target on the basis of 
the inclusive SO and target category, with the category content informed by the 
characteristics of members as they are available. Consequently, we would not be 
surprised to find asymmetries in the accentuation of characteristics between a SO 
and a target; this is because little is known about newly encountered targets in 
comparison with the well known SOs, meaning that there isn’t much opportunity 
for the observations targets to inform SO and target categories. To give a crude 
illustration, if we only observe that a newly encountered target is bold and brave, 
whereas we know our SO to be cheerful, clever, cunning and careful, then there is 
more opportunity to use SO characteristics to inform the SO and target category; 
the maximum quantity of characteristics sourced from the target is two and the 
maximum sourced from the SO is four. 
SO and target social categories and multiple social categorisation 
In the social categorisation model of transference it is anticipated that SO 
and target categories will become salient concurrently with other social 
categorisation schemes. This reflects the expectation that social perception will 
always be informed by numerous social categorisation schemes, many of which 
may be subsumed within, or cross-cut, each other. Flagging the existence of 
simultaneously salient cross-cutting social categorisation schemes is important for 
maintaining the plausibility of a categorisation based account of transference. As 
we have seen in Chapter 2, one of the reasons that a categorisation based account 
of transference was originally ruled out was that shared category memberships for 
the SOs and targets were expected to result in difficulty distinguishing a target 
from a SO (Andersen & Glassman, 1996). By recognising the existence of cross-
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cutting categories this need not be the case. Instead, accentuation of the intraclass 
distances between a SO and a new target may be expected to impact perception as 
one of a myriad of categorisation based accentuation effects. In particular, co-
occurring categorisation of both a SO and a target as distinct individuals will allow 
a perceiver to easily navigate who is who while transference is in operation. This 
again parallels the expectations for accentuation effects in the context of social 
groups; categorisation on the basis of SO and target does not prevent a perceiver 
from identifying that the new person is not actually their SO in just the same way 
as categorising and stereotyping people as American does not prevent a perceiver 
from also distinguishing between different Americans. 
Our emphasis on simultaneous social categorisation may be surprising to 
some readers. This is because SCT is often construed as positing that social 
categories are strictly functionally antagonistic, meaning that only one social 
category may ever be salient at any one time and that the salience of one social 
category inhibits the salience of others (e.g., Hornsey, 2008; Lobel & St. Clair, 1992; 
Rink & Ellemers, 2007). This, however, is a misinterpretation of SCTs stated 
position. SCT instead has always anticipated that social perception would be 
underpinned by multiple categorisations. Speaking to the topic of personal and 
group categorisation schemes, Turner writes: “Personal and ingroup-outgroup 
categorisations, then, are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they probably 
operate simultaneously most of the time, but their perpetual effects are inversely 
related” (1985, p. 99; see also Turner et al., 1994). What the principle of functional 
antagonism does anticipate is that broadly speaking there is predictive utility in 
expecting the behaviour stemming from a particular self-category to be curbed by 
an increase in the salience of an alternative self-categorisation scheme. Functional 
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antagonism was a cognitive explanation of SIT’s interpersonal-intergroup 
behavioural continuum, not a strong statement about the detail of cognitive 
categorisation processes (Turner et al., 2006; cf. Jetten & Postmes, 2006). It is 
therefore consistent with SCT to posit a model of transference where a salient SO 
and target categorisation scheme, acting amongst other salient categorisation 
schemes, leads to the accentuation of within class distances, manifesting as an 
increase in the degree to which SO characteristics are perceived as also shared by a 
newly encountered target, without inhibiting the ability to recognise that the two 
category members are indeed different people. 
The content of SO and target social categories 
Looking beyond the transfer of SO characteristics, where characteristics are 
thought of primarily as semantic descriptors, what we have articulated thus far 
also accounts well for the transfer of other types of SO content. For example, the 
transference of the affect associated with a SO can also be understood as an 
outcome of accentuation effects (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1996), 
so long as affective tone is viewed as in some way tied to our memories of SOs in 
the same way that a quality, trait, or mannerism might be. The same can be said of 
the transfer of interpersonal motivations and patterns of interaction (Andersen et 
al., 1996; Baum & Andersen, 1999; Berenson & Andersen, 2006; Berk & Andersen, 
2008; Brumbaugh & Fraley, 2006; Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). These could either 
be explained directly as a function of a diffusion of interpersonal scripts associated 
with our SOs to newly encountered targets (e.g., the target is the same as my SO in 
that they are the kind of person that I approach), or more indirectly as a response 
to newly encountered people that have become imbued with SO characteristics 
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that evoke particular interpersonal responses from us (e.g., I can safely approach 
the target because they are the same as my SO).  
It is notable that all of the above can be accounted for without positing any 
additional cognitive mechanisms. This is a key point of difference with the social 
cognitive model of transference, which posits additional processing features in 
order to account for the transference phenomenon. The most obvious additional 
feature is the suggestion that transference is underpinned by the existence of 
specific SO representations, which are special in their accessibility, clarity, and n-
of-one status. A less obvious additional feature is the social cognitive model’s 
activation and application model in general, which although ubiquitous to the 
social cognition approach, is additional because it is argued to be an alternative to 
bottom up social perceptual processes. Our account of transference in contrast, 
following the social identity approach and SCT, relies on a singular process 
underpinning social perception that is necessarily both stimuli and perceiver 
driven; a categorisation based approach may be described as particularly 
parsimonious for this reason. 
Constraints on SO and target social categories 
Having identified the cognitive mechanism that may be said to underpin 
transference, we can now turn to the matter of the predictors of transference. In 
short, when can we expect transference to occur and when not? Based on the 
above we can put this question in cognitive terms; because transference is said to 
be underpinned by the accentuation effects that arise from a salient SO and target 
category, we can rephrase this question as, when will a SO and target category 
become salient? From here the answer then follows naturally: the salience of a SO 
and target category will be predicted by the same thing that predicts the salience 
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of any social category, the interaction between perceiver readiness and 
comparative and normative fit. 
 To recap from Chapter 3, perceiver readiness encompasses the perceiver’s 
past experience, present expectations, current motives, values, goals, and needs; it 
is what the perceiver brings to the perceptual process. This may be contrasted 
with fit, which is largely stimuli centric and has two components. One is 
comparative fit, which is determined by the principle of metacontrast; stimuli are 
likely to be categorised together to the degree that the average precognized 
distances between those stimuli are perceived as less than the average 
precognized distances between them and the remaining stimuli in the frame of 
reference. The other is normative fit, which refers to the role of stimulus content in 
constraining the formation of the salient category. For example, although 
comparative fit may indicate a line of demarcation between social stimuli (e.g., two 
groups of people), normative fit still plays a role in embedding that demarcation 
with meaning by matching the observed content of the groups with known 
patterns (e.g., the presence of long hair and skirts in one of the groups indicates 
that the group is one of females). 
Applying the perceiver readiness and fit interaction to transference is 
straight forward. Beginning with comparative fit, we can posit that a SO and target 
category is more likely to become salient to the extent that the distance between 
the SO and the target is smaller than the distances between those two stimuli and 
other stimuli in the frame of reference. Or in other words, SO and target category 
salience is more likely under conditions of high meta-contrast. This to some extent 
parallels, but also extends, the social cognitive model of transference’s principle 
that transference will be cued by characteristics that are shared across the SO and 
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target. Yes, the principle of comparative fit anticipates that shared SO and target 
characteristics will increase the likelihood of transference occurring, just as the 
social cognitive model does, but it also anticipates that what is shared or not 
shared with other people in the frame of reference will also play a role in 
determining whether transference occurs. This is depicted in Figure 5.1; there we 
show how the salience of a SO and target category can be made more likely due to 
either an increase in the number of shared characteristics between a SO and a 
target (scenario B), or alternatively via a decrease in the number of shared 
characteristics between a target and other people (scenario C). Indeed, the 
precognized distances between the SO and target and others in the frame of 
reference will be critical in establishing the meaningfulness of a SO and target 
category. This is because in the absence of others within the frame of reference 
(i.e., in addition to the SO and the target) a SO and target category will not become 
salient; if interclass distances are nonexistant then intraclass distances cannot be 
small in comparison (or mathematically speaking, the meta-contrast ratio would 
be missing its denominator). This should have an intuitive appeal. If the frame of 
reference consists of only two objects then attending to what is shared between 
the two makes little sense; what is meaningful for the perceiver will be those 
features that distinguish one from the other. 
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Figure 5.1. Varying SO and target category salience as a function of different shifts 
within the frame of reference. Increased salience is denoted by the solid category 
border while the consequent degree of accentuation is depicted by the shaded 
figures. The position of the black figures within the frame of represents the 
“objective” precognized distances among these social stimuli (see also Haslam, 
2001). 
 
The principle of normative fit provides a further extension of the role of the 
observed stimuli in constraining transference, this time in regard to the content of 
Frame of reference 
A. Baseline SO and target category salience 
SO Target Others 
B. Increased SO and target category salience 
SO Target Others 
Frame of reference 
C. Increased SO and target category salience 
SO Target Others 
Frame of reference 
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transference, and in two specific ways. First, normative fit would suggest that we 
should not expect a SO and target category to accentuate what is shared between a 
SO and a target across all possible dimensions evenly. Instead, a SO and target 
category will have particular content, where that content is to a large extent a 
reflection of those dimensions where there is a high degree of meta-contrast. For 
example, if a SO and target are experienced as being comparatively close in terms 
of their degree of professional ambition (e.g., they both are hardworking and 
driven, they both actively develop strategic professional networks, and they both 
seek out opportunities to demonstrate their skill and aptitude) then it is in areas 
relating to professional ambition that we would expect to see the most 
accentuation; conversely, in areas not relating to professional ambition (e.g., 
favourite foods, hair colour, sporting pursuits) we would expect to see mild 
accentuation at best. To put it another way, the principle of normative fit suggests 
that the observed characteristics of the SO and target play a central role in 
establishing what is defining about the SO and target category. What is defining of 
that category is then the lens through which both the SO and the target will be 
perceived, with non-defining dimensions remaining peripheral to social 
perception. 
Something akin to the dimensionality of transference has come up before in 
the social psychology of transference. Andersen and Glassman anticipated the 
possibility that “not all aspects of the significant other representation are equally 
likely to be applied” (1996, p. 273). Indeed, in a number of experiments it has been 
observed that some SO characteristics are more likely to be transferred than 
others (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Pierro & Kruglanski, 2008; Pierro et al., 2009). This 
has thus far been attributed to the varying centrality of particular characteristics to 
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stored SO representations (i.e., certain characteristics are more central, or core, to 
the representation), which to a degree sits well with our categorisation based 
model. However, rather than making characteristic centrality a feature of stored 
SO representations, here characteristic centrality is understood to be a result of 
the categorisation process and a property of the emergent salient SO and target 
category. Which characteristics are central and which are not is thus fluid and is 
always determined by the interaction between comparative fit, normative fit, and 
perceiver readiness. This is true for SO and target categories in the same way that 
it is true for any other social category. For example, Reynolds, Turner and Haslam 
(2000), in the context of the categorisation of social groups, explored the potential 
impact of dimensionality in the context of inclusive self-categories. They found 
across three studies broad support for the prediction that ingroup and outgroup 
favouritism would occur to differing degrees depending on the extent to which 
traits were typical of the ingroups and outgroups in question. This prediction was 
predicated on the expectation that categorisation schemes are limited in their 
dimensionality and that some dimensions, or traits in the context of this study, are 
more typical and defining to social categories than others. 
It is also relevant here that Reynolds and colleagues viewed their findings 
from the perspective of the impact of normative fit on the degree of social category 
salience. They theorised that the different measures used to test for ingroup 
favouritism are likely to themselves influence the degree of ingroup favouritism 
that occurs. This is because some of those measures undermine the salience of 
ingroup categorisation schemes by being normatively ill-fitting. More specifically, 
they reasoned that on those occasions where negative trait measures are used to 
test for ingroup favouritism the salience of an ingroup might be diminished 
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because thinking of one’s own group as "less bad than the out-group" (2000, p. 68) 
is a violation of one’s theories and beliefs that one’s ingroup is on the whole a 
positive entity. Paolini, Harwood and Rubin (2010) used a similar rationale in their 
research, also connecting normative fit with intergroup relations. Across two 
studies they found support for their prediction that, when there is a background of 
intergroup tension, negative valanced contact would result in greater social 
category salience than positively valanced contact. Their rationale being that 
negatively valanced contact is more normatively fitting for those social categories 
where perceiver expectations are negative. Because social category salience is 
considered to be critical to the efficacy of intergroup contact in improving 
intergroup relations (social category salience is the cognitive pathway to 
generalised intergroup attitudes; see Brown and Hewstone, 2005), Paolini and 
colleagues suggest wariness of unstructured intergroup contact as an intervention. 
The conclude that, all things being equal, unstructured contact is more likely to 
entrench existing intergroup beliefs than attenuate them (see also Barlow et al., 
2012). 
The research of both Reynolds and colleagues (2000) and Paolini and 
colleagues (2010) connects normative fit with perceiver readiness, which as we 
will recall from Chapter 3 includes the beliefs, ideas, or theories that a perceiver 
may hold at any particular time. This point of connection is the second valuable 
contribution of normative fit to our categorisation based model of transference. It 
is on the basis of this connection that it can be theorised that the content of 
observed stimuli, not just the distance relations between them, will have an 
important constraining role in whether any particular categorisation scheme will 
become salient. Put in the language of SCT, a high meta-contrast ratio will only be 
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expected to result in a corresponding salient social category if the direction of 
meta-contrast is congruent with the belief and theories of the perceiver; said 
otherwise, their expectations. 
Applying the above to transference, from here we can additionally posit that 
a SO and target category will only become salient to the extent that there is 
sufficient comparative fit, where average interclass distances exceed average 
intraclass distances, and the direction of those distances does not violate the 
expectations of the perceiver. Continuing on from the earlier example, we can say 
experiencing a SO and target as being comparatively close in terms of their degree 
of professional ambition will only result in a salient SO and target category, and 
consequently transference, if the experience of these two as ambitious does not jar 
with some prior notion or idea of the SO, the target, or both. For instance, if 
displays of ambition to be a professional boxer are unusual for our stay at home 
mother, or for our newly experienced other who we understand is a chaplain, then 
the likelihood of a shared category becoming salient on the basis of boxing 
ambition would be low, even if in the present moment both SO and target are both 
displaying a great deal of interest in taking up boxing. 
In addition to our theories and beliefs about the social world, perceiver 
readiness also encompasses our current motives, values, goals, and needs, which is 
consistent with Bruner’s early conceptualisation of the categorisation process 
(1957; See also Secord & Jourard, 1956). Perceiver readiness is therefore a highly 
wide-ranging and broadly defined concept. Such breath is necessary, however, in 
order to adequately reflect the reality that a perceiver’s contribution to the act of 
social perception is never passive. Social perception is instead always a highly 
active and motivated process, driven by perceivers’ short term and long term 
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objectives. Or to paraphrase a classic adage, social perception is first and last and 
always for the sake of our doing (James, 1890/1950). It is here then that we should 
incorporate how transference may be of service to the perceiver. This brings us 
close to the theorising around the relational self. Recall that the relational self 
represents an attempt to expand the social psychology of transference into a 
partial model of personality; one that encompasses self-relevant motivational 
processes such as need for belonging, autonomy, competence, meaning, and felt 
security (Andersen & Chen, 2002). Without getting into the validity of any 
particular theorised motive3, it is within the domain of perceiver readiness that 
such aspects of self-psychology may be integrated. Perceiver readiness therefore 
becomes an avenue through which transference can be connected to other 
psychological concerns of the perceiver. 
Overall comparison with the social cognitive model of transference 
At this point we have detailed the categorisation based account of 
transference in full. Thus, it should be clear that this categorisation based model 
entails a substantial extension from the starting point provided by the social 
cognitive model of transference. In that model what predicts transference is 
principally a single factor: the observed similarities between a SO and a newly 
encountered person. In the model we have articulated above, transference is 
constrained by three factors: perceiver readiness, comparative fit, and normative 
fit, all acting in interaction, with no factor being more or less critical than any 
other. 
It is actually possible to entirely accommodate the social cognitive model 
within this new SCT based account, although to achieve this the role of similarity in 
transference must be reconceptualised. As we have seen in Chapter 3, from the 
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social identity perspective, similarity is not an antecedent to social perception, but 
rather is an outcome of it. As such, it is incongruous with the social identity 
approach to think of similarity as a characteristic of the environment and as a 
direct driver of transference, as it is in the social cognitive model of transference. 
Instead, similarity must be thought of as the result of a cognitive process, one that 
is a mediator between the features of stimuli and subsequent perception of those 
stimuli. Here the relationships between the stimuli (given the label distances in an 
imperfect but convenient shorthand; see Chapter 3) inform a sense of stimuli 
similarity, which in turn changes the way those stimuli are perceived. If this can be 
accepted then an integration of the two models becomes relatively simple (Figure 
5.2). Similarity becomes synonymous with social category salience, while 
transference, or the perception that SO characteristics are present in a new target, 
becomes synonymous with accentuation. Meanwhile the degree to which the SO 
and target share features, now intraclass distances, naturally finds its place as one 
half of the metacontrast ratio calculation that drives comparative fit. 
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Figure 5.2. The social cognitive model of transference subsumed within the social 
categorisation model of transference. 
 
Accommodating the social cognitive model of transference within the social 
categorisation model of transference helps make clear the exact nature of 
theoretical extension we are advancing. The proposed model adds three more 
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factors to the list of those things that are critical to determining whether or not, as 
well as in what form (i.e., what will be the content of the SO and target category), 
transference will occur. These are perceiver readiness and normative fit, as 
detailed above, but also specifically interclass distances, as opposed to intraclass 
distances, meaning what is shared or not shared between the SO and the target 
with others in the frame of reference. 
Before turning to the immediate theoretical implications of this model, it is 
worth taking a final moment to again take note of the parsimony of the model. This 
is because it is possible that, by highlighting the increase in the number of 
theorised constraints on transference, we may unintentionally give the impression 
that the model entails a series of additional novel theoretical assumptions. This is 
not the case. Nothing in the above model is new in terms of the social psychology of 
social perception and impression formation. Cognitive accentuation, social 
categorisation, category salience, perceiver readiness, comparative fit and 
normative fit, are all tried and true concepts that have been present in social 
psychology for upwards of 30 years. All we have done is applied this 
understanding of social perception to the particular context of transference, which 
up until this point had been treated as a special case of social perception. Said 
otherwise, the theoretical thrust of the above model is to bring transference back 
within the fold of everyday social perceptual processes. We can therefore consider 
the above to be parsimonious from three different perspectives. First, as observed 
earlier in this chapter, the present model does not necessitate a separate category 
activation and application process in addition to the online category formation 
process posited here. Second, the model in fact does not require us to posit any 
additional theoretical assumptions to that which has been established already in 
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the social identity approach. Third and finally, the above model abandons the 
broad assumption that transference is driven by a distinct cognitive process. 
Theoretical implications 
In Chapter 3 we identified three key theoretical limitations of the social 
cognitive model of transference. These related to a) similarity based cueing, b) SO 
representation storage, and c) impression formation. At this point, with a social 
categorisation model of transference under our belts, we return to each of these 
areas in turn. As will be seen, in each of these three areas the categorisation based 
model allows for some immediate progress to be made. This is not to say that in 
any particular area the social categorisation model resolves all possible lines of 
enquiry; far from it. In fact, on a number of occasions the progress we speak of 
merely takes the form of turning us toward the right questions. In any case, what 
follows is an advance of our thinking around the transference phenomenon. 
Similarity and transference as outcomes of SO and target category salience 
In Chapter 3 we raised the question, if transference is cued by an observed 
similarity between a SO and a newly encountered person, how then is that 
similarity observed? In the social cognitive model of transference, observed 
similarity is understood as the degree to which the SO and the target share 
features as stimuli irrespective of perception (again reflecting its objectivist 
metatheory, see Chapter 4). However, as we have articulated in our discussion of 
comparative fit, such an understanding does not sufficiently reflect the fluidity of 
similarity as a function of perceivers’ frame of reference. To what extent features 
are shared is a comparative quality, and to be able to say that a SO and target share 
features requires us to also know the extent to which the SO and target share or do 
not share features with others; in other words, the interclass distances. SO and 
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target feature “sharedness” only makes sense in the context of a particular broader 
frame of reference. Viewed in this light, the social cognitive model’s similarity 
cueing account begins to look incomplete; it neglects the interclass distances that 
are necessary for inclusive social categories to become salient. In sum, 
comparative fit suggests that it will be insufficient to only attend to SO and target 
feature overlap, or intraclass distances, if the goal is predictive power. 
There is a second reason for us to question the completeness of the social 
cognitive model of transference and its treatment of the concept of similarity. In 
Chapter 4, in the context of our discussion of objectivism versus social 
constructionism, we came up against the issue that similarity cannot exist in the 
absence of some form of constraining theory. When it comes to social stimuli there 
are always a practically infinite number of features that are either shared or not 
shared between stimuli. Or to return to Murphy and Medin’s (1985) example, just 
as what is shared or not between a plum and a lawnmower could be almost 
anything, the same is true of any two people, including SOs and newly encountered 
targets. Indeed, both a SO and a target are likely to weigh less than 10,000 kg, not 
exist 10,000,000 years ago, not hear well (at least if they are elderly), can be 
dropped, take up space, etc. Less facetiously, both may be white, middle class, 
male, like skiing, have blond hair, are Australian, are short, can swim, identify as 
atheist, enjoy a beer, etc. The point being that given any two random people there 
will always be an endless list of arbitrary shared features, each driven by some 
degree of comparative fit. Thus, something additional is needed to allow us to 
reduce the number of dimensions of sharedness, or to allow for selectivity in 
perception. That “something” is the constraining theories and perspectives of 
perceivers. Perceivers bring with them ideas and beliefs about what relationships 
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will exist between stimuli, as well as goals and motivations that make some 
dimensions of greater interest or relevance to the perceiver than others (see also 
G. L. Murphy, 2005). It is this that narrows down perception to that which is within 
the realm of attention and that which is useful (see Oakes & Turner, 1986b, for this 
argument applied to the other side of the coin: distinctiveness). 
What we have just described is, of course, perceiver readiness; the 
perceiver’s past experience, present expectations, current motives, values, goals, 
and needs. It is perceiver readiness that allows us to bootstrap ourselves out of an 
unbounded and thus meaningless perceptual experience. Yet perceiver readiness, 
or another comparable concept, is absent from the social cognitive model of 
transference. Instead, the cueing of transference on the basis of shared features 
between the SO and the target is a “bottom up” process, positioned in contrast to 
the perceiver’s contribution to transference (see Figure 2.1, Chapter 2). Stimuli 
sharedness is thus presumed to be an inherent characteristic of said stimuli; one 
that does not require input from the perceiver to identify or discern. It is in this 
area then that the social cognitive model of transference may also be said to be 
incomplete. By not including the constraining influence of the perceiver in 
determining the dimensions on which similarity is judged, similarity becomes 
functionally unmanageable. 
In sum, there are two reasons to view the social cognitive model’s use of 
similarity as an antecedent to transference as insufficient. That invocation of 
similarity, which rests on a conception of similarity as an innate quality of 
objective stimuli, firstly fails to account for the comparative and fluid nature of 
similarity, and secondly fails to account for the perceiver’s role in determining, 
inter alia, the dimensions on which similarity will be judged. For these two reasons 
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observed similarity is necessarily limited in its value as an antecedent to 
transference. Without a coherent explanation of where observed similarity comes 
from, we cannot expect the model to retain predictive power. 
These limitations are not present in the above SCT based account of 
transference, where similarity is understood as a consequence of salient inclusive 
cognitive categorisation. This allows us to answer our original question: we can 
now state that observed similarity is a result of the interaction between perceiver 
readiness, comparative fit and normative fit. Stimuli feature overlap plays a role in 
this, but that role is by logical necessity only a partial one; stimuli feature overlap, 
or intraclass distance, constrains social categorisation via its impact on 
comparative fit. 
Really though, our original question (i.e., where does observed similarity 
come from?) is the wrong question to ask in the context of transference. This is 
because observed similarity is actually tangential to the transference phenomenon. 
Really, explaining where similarity comes from does not serve to flesh out our 
model of transference. Instead, better understanding similarity advances our 
model of transference by pushing similarity, as an antecedent to transference, 
aside. As we have seen, in the SCT based model transference is not cued by 
observed similarity, and instead both similarity and transference are outcomes of 
the antecedent perceptual process of social categorisation. This allows us to 
rephrase our question into something more to the point: what factors lead to the 
emergence of a salient SO and target category? To this we can give the answer, the 
interaction between perceiver readiness and comparative and normative fit. 
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SO knowledge, online category formation and connectionist networks 
Apart from the occasional fleeting reference to the online construction of 
representations of the self (Andersen & Berenson, 2001; Andersen & Chen, 2002), 
the clear message of the social psychology of transference is that SO knowledge is 
stored in the form of cognitive representations, ready for activation and 
application to newly encountered targets. In contrast, in the above social 
categorisation based model of transference there is no role for SO representations 
that are stored as static entities ready for application. Instead, SO knowledge is 
more generally understood to be the theories, beliefs, and expectations of the 
perceiver; all of which are part of perceiver readiness. At first glance this may seem 
like a step backward. Here a seemingly concrete explanatory mechanism, SO 
representations, is being replaced by something more amorphous. In the present 
chapter section, however, we will explain why the latter is actually a step forward. 
This case will be made on the basis of neural plausibility. 
Symbolic versus connectionist models of cognition. Across the 1980s 
cognitive psychology saw the emergence of distributed connectionism as a 
theoretical tradition (Smith, 1996). Distributed connectionism (henceforth 
“connectionism” for brevity sake) in psychology is the expectation that cognitive 
activity occurs in a network space with certain properties. Most critically, these 
networks are comprised of nodes and connections where nodes do not mean 
anything in and of themselves. In other words, nodes do not correspond to 
particular semantic content (i.e., concepts, ideas, knowledge, facts, etc.). Where 
semantic content does exist, its corresponding form in a connectionist network is a 
pattern of activations and connectivity across multiple nodes. This distinguishes 
connectionist models of cognition from symbolic models, which may still be 
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described as a network, but where each “piece” of semantic content has a 
permanent and insulated presence in the network space. For example, in 
McConnell’s (2010) associative network model of the self, the multiple self-aspects 
framework, units of self-knowledge (i.e., semantic content) are stored, essentially 
as nodes, in memory, with connections between one another depending on the 
relationship between units (Figure 5.3). Should one or a number of these units be 
cued by some internal state or external stimulus, they are activated and become 
part of the current cognitive state of the perceiver. McConnell’s model may be said 
to be symbolic in that all of the components within the system mean something. 
Andersen and Klatzy’s (1987) exploration of the difference between the cognitive 
representations of traits and social stereotypes (see Chapter 4) serves as another 
useful example. They are also clear in advancing a network model where nodes 
equate to “conceptual representations” such as attributes and objects (p. 235). 
Smith (1996) suggests a filing cabinet or storage bin as an appropriate metaphor 
for symbolic models along these lines. This is because symbolic models 
conceptualise information storage much like documents in a filing system; each 
can be interpreted in isolation and, although documents may be side by side, they 
do not interact with one another.  
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Figure 5.3. The multiple self aspects framework, depicted as a hypothetical self 
concept for a person called Rachel (McConnell, 2010). Note that each node in the 
network represents a stored piece of semantic content. 
 
Connectionist models paint a different picture (Smith, 1996; Conrey & 
Smith, 2007). Because semantic content is the outcome of an activation pattern 
across multiple nodes and multiple connections, it does not make sense to think of 
semantic content as stored in the form of discrete and inert units. Instead, each 
activation leaves a residual impact in the network space in the form of increased or 
decreased connection weights among nodes; connection weights being the ease by 
which activation can occur between nodes. This means that when semantic content 
is not presently being supported by a pattern of activation, cognitively speaking it 
disappears from existence. What does continue to exist is its impact on connection 
weights among the network, and therefore the readiness by which a similar 
activation pattern, with corresponding semantic content, may emerge again. This is 
not to say that knowledge is not stored in memory. It patently is, and it is clear that 
we are able to bring to bear vast quantities of information to new situations. The 
difference is that in connectionist models the storage of knowledge is not 
presumed to resemble in any way our experience of the same. This is in line with 
our discussion in the previous chapter around the potential disconnect between 
cognitive processes and the experienced outcomes of those processes. Indeed, we 
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may consider residual connection weights among nodes in a neural network as a 
model of “sub-symbolic” knowledge. 
The clear advantage of modelling cognition sub-symbolically, in terms of 
nodes and the activation and connection weights between those nodes, is that it is 
in line with the physiological observations of neuroscience. The architecture of the 
brain entails a large network of cells (neurons) that are extremely interconnected 
with one another (through axons and dendrites). This convergence with 
neuroscience is not, however, the only reason that connectionist models of 
cognition are attractive in cognitive psychology. Connectionist models are also 
attractive because they also possess a number of processing advantages purely on 
the basis of the type of structure they describe. For one, connectionist models are 
efficient with regard to learning. In connectionist models the same mechanism by 
which an idea or concept comes to mind (i.e., becomes cognitively prepotent or 
salient) is that which also allows the same idea or concept to find its place in 
memory. Because any activation event at the same time strengthens or weakens 
corresponding connection weights, resulting in facilitated or inhibited activation in 
the future, learning occurs as a natural by-product of activation. Memory is thus 
“updated” without the need of any additional cognitive action on the part of 
perceivers. In connectionist models learning may occur across concepts even in the 
absence of direct activation. This is because patterns of activation are said to take 
part in the same network space. Nodes and the connections between nodes are not 
perfectly insulated from one another and physical overlap across different patterns 
of activation is anticipated; activation patterns may share parts of their structure 
with one another. Further, residual changes to connection weights caused by the 
activation of a particular activation pattern have the capacity to alter the 
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architecture of the network space in which other activation patterns take place, in 
turn affecting the structure of said patterns. Thus, within a connectionist model, 
engaging with one idea or concept has the capacity to alter the way in which other 
ideas or concepts are understood via that single cognitive event. To give a basic 
example, if a perceiver were to come across someone’s pet poodle which has some 
novel characteristic (e.g., it is unusually small), any learning that occurs is not 
necessarily limited to the concept of that particular dog or other “considered” 
canines. Instead, without any further activation or cognitive activity, and without 
expending any further cognitive resources, that perceivers understanding of all 
dogs can be impacted upon and updated (e.g., dogs have a wider potential size 
range). 
The potential for pattern overlap in connectionist models also allows for 
efficiencies in terms of the utilisation of storage space. Because activation patterns 
may occur in the same network space, using many of the same nodes and 
connections between nodes, a singular cognitive architecture can be used to 
support the cognitive activity corresponding to all ideas and concepts. Moreover, 
because it is the patterns of activation, not any particular node, that corresponds to 
an idea or concept, a limited number of structural features can be used to underpin 
a vast quantity of ideas and concepts. Indeed, the number of different connection 
patterns that may possibly occur has the potential to increases exponentially as 
additional nodes are added to that structure. Of course, a straight forward 
exponential relationship assumes that all nodes are connected with one another, 
which is probably an unrealistic assumption. Nevertheless, this potential efficiency 
of connectionist network structures grants a substantial advantage over a filing 
cabinet like structure. Filing cabinet like structures, as implied in symbolic models 
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of cognition, would require as many nodes as there are possible ideas, concepts, 
thoughts, etc., all stored separately but still alongside one another. 
Connectionism and the social identity approach. At this point we are 
beginning to tread familiar ground. We came in contact with similar themes during 
the earlier discussion of the principle of social category salience. We noted that the 
shift within the social identity approach away from an activation and application 
model of cognition, toward an online category formation conceptualisation, was in 
part driven by concerns about cognitive efficiency, and consequent plausibility 
issues. In that chapter the idea of a stored repertoire of social categories, one vast 
enough to accommodate all the types and subtypes of people ever experienced, 
was deemed to stretch credulity. What was called for instead was a more flexible 
and adaptive model of cognition; one that is informed by past experience and 
expectations, but is not rigidly constrained by such factors. This is a key point of 
congruence between the social identity approach and connectionist theorising. 
Both are sceptical of the existence of stored and fixed representations in memory 
on the basis that such a structure would struggle to accommodate our cognitive 
requirements. Indeed, both the social identity and connectionist approaches 
represent efforts toward an alternative to activation and application models of 
cognition. 
It terms of those efforts, both the social identity approach and 
connectionism are considered highly complementary to one another (Abrams, 
1999; McGarty, 1999; Smith, 1999, 2006). In particular, both advocate for a model 
of cognition where the outcome of perceptual processes is best thought of as 
constructed anew in each instance. In the social identity approach this takes the 
form of online category formation, where cognitive categories are constructed 
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online and are simultaneously a reflection of the stimulus array (i.e., the frame of 
reference) and the lens through which the perceiver encounters that array. In 
connectionist models, as described above, patterns of network activation are said 
to be guided by past activation via the connection weights present in a perceiver’s 
network space. They are also said to be influenced by sensory input, where 
features of the stimuli array have a direct impact on the network space. The dual 
influence of existing connection weights and sensory input within the same 
network space means that any activation pattern will necessarily be an emergent 
and novel outcome of both the characteristics of the perceiver and the 
environment, mirroring the social identity approach’s online category formation 
message. 
Overall, the extent of the parallels between the social identity approach and 
connectionist theorising suggest that both theoretical perspectives are broadly 
speaking converging on the same reality, albeit from different initial perspectives; 
the social identity approach has come at this issue from a background in social 
interaction and social perception, while connectionism has emerged from a 
background in cognitive psychology and neurology. This is not to say that either 
renders the other redundant. Rather, the suggestion here is that both perspectives 
should be retained in any account of social perception, with the social identity 
approach describing the process of social categorisation at a functional level, along 
with a number of its implications (e.g., social influence, group polarisation, 
collective action), and connectionist models describing in further detail the 
cognitive mechanisms that underpin that process. In fact, steps have already been 
made in that direction, with connectionist networks being successfully used to 
model SCT’s principle of accentuation (Van Rooy et al., 2003). 
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Having established the close relationship between the social identity 
approach and connectionist theorising, we are in a position to round off our 
discussion in Chapter 3. Early in that chapter we noted that it is difficult to marry 
symbolic models of cognition, of which social cognitive model of transference 
qualifies (cf. Andersen & Berenson, 2001), with our understanding of brain 
architecture (i.e., “the fleshy mess”) and are hampered by serious efficiency 
concerns. Connectionist models of cognition perform better in these domains. They 
possess a number of natural efficiencies and have an as yet unmatched neural 
plausibility, which makes them highly attractive as an alternative. An 
understanding of connectionist theorising, as well as its potential hand-in-hand 
relationship with the social identity approach, thus resolves for us the challenge 
faced at the outset of this chapter section. The social identity approach takes a 
critical view of models of cognition that hinge on the activation of stored symbolic 
representations, preferring instead a more “fuzzy” characterisation of perceivers’ 
cognitive mechanisms. Far from being a step backward, however, what we find is 
that more fuzzy cognitive models is exactly what is called for by recent advances in 
the field. Rather that replacing concrete symbolic models of memory with a 
veritable black box, the social identity approach provides a point of linkage to the 
well developed and highly specific world of connectionist modelling. 
With the above in mind, it is appropriate now to return to the question 
posed in Chapter 3: If transference is the application of stored SO representations, 
how and where then are those representations stored? We can now advocate with 
substantial clout for a rejection of the concept of stored symbolic representations 
that are activated and then applied in the course of social perception. Instead, 
transference is sensibly understood as an outcome of an online category 
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construction process, which is itself an outcome of an interaction between 
perceiver readiness and comparative and normative fit, operating within a 
neurologically plausible connectionist architecture. 
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Impression formation as a unified cognitive process 
If transference is the application of SO characteristics to a newly 
encountered person, what exactly, cognitively speaking, are those characteristics 
being applied to? This was the final question that we came up against in Chapter 3. 
There we found that the activation and application nature of the social cognitive 
model of transference leads us toward logical dead ends in this area. Now, having 
laid out our social categorisation based model of transference, and detailed the 
parallels with connectionist theorising, we are in a position to progress our 
thinking in this area also.  
To briefly recap, in the previous chapter section we put additional 
theoretical weight behind an online category formation perspective of social 
perception, imbuing it with a more tangible quality as an alternative to the concept 
of stored cognitive representations (i.e., “online category formation can be thought 
of as operating within a neurologically plausible connectionist architecture”); 
online category formation being an alternative to activation and application 
models of cognition. There we used the online category formation understanding 
to offer a favourable alternative to the traditional thinking around activation 
processes. The same is possible in terms of the other side of the coin, application. 
That is, we can move past the usual presumption that there exists some manner of 
construct that representations or characteristics can be applied to. 
As we have seen above, in an online category formation model a picture is 
painted whereby the targets of social perception are just as much bound up in the 
cognitive activity required to produce that perception as any other contributing 
input. In the language of the social identity approach this is the contribution of fit, 
both comparative and normative, to the category formation process, while in 
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connectionist language this is the influence of sensory input in the network space. 
In the context of transference, this means that we would no longer think of a newly 
encountered target as in some way wholly present and fully formed in the 
perceptual field, ready to have SO characteristics applied to them. Instead, the 
stimuli input of newly encountered targets would be expected to impact the 
categorisation as a partial and incomplete influence. Only when the category 
formation process is complete can it be said that a social target is present in 
cognition in any recognisable semantic sense. Bringing this back to our question, 
what we find is that because transference is not a process of applying SO 
characteristics it is therefore inappropriate to seek out some discrete part of the 
cognitive system for things to be applied to. 
This isn’t really an extension of the above theorising, but is instead simply a 
case of further emphasising the implications for impression formation processes. 
Nonetheless, it is worth taking the time here. For one, this short discussion is 
another good example of how an online category formation approach is able to 
move us past some of the inherent challenges faced by activation and application 
approaches to cognition; it is therefore of value to ensure that the implications are 
clear. Moreover, this discussion presents another opportunity to reiterate the 
parsimony of this approach to transference. What we have presented above is an 
alternative to what would otherwise necessitate a dual process model of social 
perception. The social cognitive model of transference is an account of the impact 
of existing knowledge and beliefs on social perception, but it does not speak to the 
development and retention of new information. Subsequently, in order for a 
semblance of completeness to be achieved, a stimulus learning process would be 
needed to complement the memory based application process that is the social 
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cognitive model. Or in other words, if transference rests on a system of “ifs” and 
corresponding “thens”, then an additional system would be required to produce 
the “thens” in the first place. In the social identity approach these are one and the 
same, with the same cognitive process, social categorisation, allowing for both 
learning and the use of what has previously been learned. In fact, the social identity 
approach suggests that both will always necessarily occur; because online category 
formation cannot occur without some constraining influence of the perceiver, and 
is also simultaneously a new instance of experience for the perceiver, some degree 
of both knowledge use and knowledge updating (or perhaps reinforcing) is 
unavoidable. 
Key implications for parsimony of the application and activation and online 
category formation approaches to perception are captured in Figure 5.4. There we 
see the absence of a category learning pathway, where also absent is the “direct 
perception” mechanism that categorisation is contrasted against. In contrast, the 
online category formation approach does not require a direct perception 
mechanism, and also includes a feedback loop: salient social categories become 
part of perceivers’ experiences, and ultimately inform their theories of their social 
world. Of course, the online category formation model is itself incomplete. There 
are a number of elements unspecified in that model, in particular relating to the 
exact manner in which sensory information enters into the categorisation process, 
and the exact manner in which theories and expectations are translated into 
category expectations (see Chapter 8 for further discussion). However, these are 
areas of unknown for both the category activation and application and online 
category formation approaches; it is simply the case that the former removes these 
issues from consideration via the assumption of a direct perception mechanism. 
168  
 
 
Figure 5.4. The category activation and application approach to social perception 
and the online category formation approach, with key unspecified elements 
identified. 
 
Summary and empirical challenge 
This chapter began with an introduction of the social categorisation model 
of transference. The model extends the range of constraints that are anticipated to 
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be critical in determining the extent to which transference occurs, as well as the 
form that transference will take, by drawing on established social psychological 
theory and integrating transference within that theory. That model is thus a 
substantial extension of the cognitive understanding of transference. In this 
chapter we also returned to the three theoretical challenges identified in Chapter 3 
as largely unaddressed by that incumbent model: similarity based cueing, SO 
representation storage, and impression formation. There we made use of the 
newly available social categorisation model of transference to make modest 
theoretical progress within these areas.   
In the last of these three short discussions we took the opportunity to once 
again affirm the parsimonious nature of the social categorisation model of 
transference; the theoretical parsimony of our approach being a recurring point in 
this chapter. We see this as a key advantage of the above social categorisation 
model, although that parsimony does, however, pose a challenge in terms of 
corresponding empirical investigation. Above we have described our theoretical 
thrust as being to bring transference back within the fold of everyday social 
categorisation processes; from our perspective transference is suitably accounted 
for in cognitive terms via the model of social categorisation established by the 
social identity approach. How then does one establish this empirically? What we 
are essentially tasked with is to prove a negative: that transference is not different 
to other social perceptual processes accounted for by social categorisation. 
Fortunately, there are two pathways through which this challenge can be 
met. First, we can look to the additional predicted constraints of transference, 
beyond SO and target distance, that the proposed model includes. Here it is 
possible to leverage the additional detail of the “how and when” of transference 
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that is suggested by the social identity approach. The utility of the social 
categorisation model of transference can be demonstrated by studies showing that 
transference can be predictably manipulated via comparative fit, normative fit, or 
perceiver readiness. Second, we can put on trial some of the posited unique aspects 
of the social cognitive model of transference; those which are used to justify the 
characterisation of transference as a special case of social perception, underpinned 
by a distinct cognitive process. 
These are the two directions that will be taken in the following empirical 
chapters. In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 attempts will be made to show that, in 
addition to SO and target distance, transference may be predictably affected by 
manipulations of comparative fit and perceiver readiness respectively. In the 
course of that same empirical activity, we will also attempt to manipulate 
transference in a manner that challenges the notion that SO based perception is 
underpinned by stored, stable, and chronically accessible, n-of-one cognitive 
representations; chronically accessible stored n-of-one cognitive representations 
being a, if not the, key distinguishing feature of the social cognitive model of 
transference. 
The degree to which we are successful in these empirical pursuits will then 
be reviewed in Chapter 8, which serves as the beginning of a general discussion. 
There we will also discuss key limitations to the present empirical program as well 
as possible future research directions. 
 
Notes 
1. Diffusion is imperfect terminology. In chemical science diffusion is the 
movement of a substance from regions of high concentration to regions of low 
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concentration. If we extend the metaphor we might anticipate accentuation to 
dilute the perception of SO characteristics within the SO. This is not our 
expectation. 
 
2. Social projection in the sense described here should not be confused with 
projection as described in the psychodynamic tradition. In that literature 
projection is understood more as the perceptual displacement of negative 
characteristics, either traits or motives, away from ourselves and toward others 
(Allport, 1954)  
 
3. For instance, there is some scepticism among social identity theorists with 
regard to the idea that humans have a fundamental need for belonging (Platow, 
Hunter, Haslam, & Reicher, 2015; Spears, Ellemers, Doosje, & Branscombe, 2006; 
see also Chapter 8). 
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CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 1:  TRANSFERENCE AND COMPARATIVE FIT 
 
 
In order to build an empirical case for the social categorical nature of 
transference we must be able to demonstrate the predictive utility of that 
perspective. Specifically, we must be able to demonstrate greater predictive utility 
than that which can be obtained via the social cognitive model of transference. 
Fortunately, as made clear in Chapter 5, the social categorisation model of 
transference that we have advanced introduces a number of additional constraints 
on transference in comparison to the social cognitive model of transference. While, 
the social cognitive model of transference rests almost entirely on intraclass 
distance (or SO to target similarity in the lexicon of that model) as a driver of 
transference, the social categorisation model of transference anticipates that the 
extent and nature of transference will additionally be determined by interclass 
distances, normative fit, and perceiver readiness factors. This means that added 
predictive utility of the social categorisation model can be demonstrated if data 
can be obtained where transference is lawfully influenced by these additional 
constraints. In this chapter we report on the first of our efforts in this area: the aim 
of the present study is to show that the extent of transference will be in part 
determined by the principle of comparative fit. 
Comparative fit is the obvious first port of call for an empirical program of 
this kind. This is because comparative fit can be a particularly persuasive aspect of 
SCT’s account of social categorisation, for two reasons. First, comparative fit 
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carries with it an air of precision. Because comparative fit can be thought of in 
mathematical terms, in the form of the metacontrast ratio, predictions made on the 
basis of comparative fit bring along the rhetorical weight of the “hard sciences”. 
The metacontrast ratio alludes to a process of literally calculating how people are 
likely to respond to social stimuli, which is nigh unheard of in the context of social 
psychological models and hints at a future where social psychological 
interventions are wielded with as much confidence as one might have when 
combining an acid with a base, or when managing forces by way of a pulley. 
Second, comparative fit manipulations can be powerfully counterintuitive. For 
those who are not used to viewing similarity and difference as an outcome of a 
comparison process, and instead are accustomed to thinking of both as inherent 
qualities of object relations, to be able to hold intraclass distances constant and 
still have similarity or difference perceptions change as a function of changes to 
interclass distances can be very surprising. Said otherwise, to have absolutely 
nothing change with regard to the characteristics of one group of people (e.g., 
qualities among male work colleagues) and then have those people treated as 
more or less equivalent as other people enter or exit the environment (e.g., the 
changing presence or absence of female work colleagues), is for many a bit 
astonishing. The principle of comparative fit is thus able to contribute to our 
understanding of social perception well beyond that which is common sense, 
where offering little more than common sense is an accusation regularly levelled at 
social psychological theories. Indeed, this readily apparent added value, coupled 
with the sense of precision mentioned above, in part explains why the period 
immediately following the publication of SCT was largely dominated by 
demonstrations by social identity theorists of the impact of comparative fit on 
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social perception and social phenomena (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990; Haslam et al., 
1995; Haslam & Turner, 1992, 1995; Haslam et al., 1992; Hogg & Turner, 1987a, 
1987b; Oakes et al., 1991). 
To recap on the application of the comparative fit principle to transference, 
this was achieved by viewing comparative fit as a partial predictor of the salience 
of a SO and target category; salient SO and target categories, and the associated 
intraclass accentuation effects, being the cognitive mechanism that underpins the 
observation that SO characteristics can come to be seen as shared by a newly 
encountered target person. Breaking down comparative fit, we argued that a SO 
and target category is more likely to become salient to the extent that the 
intraclass distances are smaller than the interclass distances, where intraclass 
distance corresponds to the shared characteristics between the SO and the target, 
and interclass distances correspond to the shared characteristics between those 
two stimuli and other stimuli in the frame of reference. 
The transference methodological paradigm lends itself well to comparative 
fit manipulations. This is because that paradigm is built around the manipulation 
of the quantity of shared characteristics between the SO and the target, meaning 
that one half of comparative fit, intraclass distance, is already under experimental 
control. This can be transformed into a complete comparative fit investigation by 
augmenting that methodology with a concurrent manipulation of interclass 
distances, which in this case can be pursued by introducing additional persons into 
the frame of reference and then manipulating the quantity of shared 
characteristics between those additional persons and either the SO or the newly 
encountered target. The latter, manipulating the quantity of shared characteristics 
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between additional persons and the target, is the path followed in the present 
study. 
In terms of the specific hypotheses selected for testing, in the present study 
we opted for two: one pertaining to the classic intraclass distance manipulation, 
and the other pertaining to an interclass distances manipulation. Indeed, because 
the intraclass distance manipulation is classic within the social psychology of 
transference, we can consider the first of these hypotheses to be a replication 
effort. In line with that literature we can predict that memories of SOs will play a 
greater role in the perception of newly encountered people who share 
characteristics with those SOs (H1). 
With regard to the second hypothesis, there are innumerable options in 
terms of how one might alter the interclass distances within a frame of reference. 
Given that any of these would be sufficient to demonstrate the role of intraclass 
distances, and therefore comparative fit, in driving transference, we selected as 
straight forward a manipulation as possible: we aimed to produce a basic 
moderation effect in the context of transference. Specifically, we set out to 
moderate the impact of the classic intraclass distance manipulation with an 
orthogonal interclass distance manipulation. We anticipated that the presence of 
another person in the frame of reference who also shares characteristics with a 
newly encountered person would reduce the likelihood that in a low intraclass 
distance condition memories of SOs will play a role in the perception of that same 
newly encountered person. This is because, following the meta-contrast principle, 
low interclass distance renders intraclass distances comparatively greater. This is 
depicted in Figure 6.1, which is an adapted version of the earlier Figure 5.1 that 
served to illustrate the role of interclass distances in transference more generally. 
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Moving down through the scenarios presented in that figure, a reduction in 
intraclass distance may be expected to increase the salience of a SO and target 
category (scenario A to B). However, that increase in salience may be attenuated if 
there is a concurrent decrease in interclass distances (scenario B to C). Rephrasing 
this in line with our first hypothesis, we would predict that memories of SOs will 
play a role in the perception of newly encountered people who share 
characteristics with those SOs, but this will occur less so when characteristics are 
shared with other people in the frame of reference (H2).  
 
Figure 6.1. Moderated SO and target category salience as a function of changes to 
intraclass and interclass distances. Increased salience is denoted by the solid 
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category border while the consequent degree of accentuation is depicted by the 
shaded figures. The position of the black figures within the frame of represents the 
“objective” precognized distances among these social stimuli. 
 
It is worth repeating that this is just one of many possible comparative fit 
scenarios, and that there are thus many other manipulation options available. 
These include those concerning the distance between the SO and others in the 
frame of reference, as well as options that introduce or remove people from the 
frame of reference entirely. Our choice of the particular moderation effect of 
interest merely reflects an attempt to parallel the existing transference empirical 
literature as much as possible. By maintaining as much equivalence as possible 
(e.g., by leaving intraclass distance manipulations unchanged) the additional role 
of interclass distances in constraining transference effects should be clearest. 
Method 
Procedure overview 
We introduced the idiographic-nomothetic experimental procedure that we 
will be following, which dominates the social psychology of transference, in 
Chapter 2. Because that procedure is reasonably complex unto itself, it is worth 
restating that procedure again in the first instance. We will then turn to how that 
procedure is adapted to the current research context. 
The experimental procedure transpires over two laboratory sessions. In the 
first session participants are asked to nominate and then describe a SO of theirs, 
where descriptors are obtained by asking participants to complete a series of 
sentences about their SO. In this session participants are also asked to nominate 
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characteristics that are irrelevant to their SO from a list of adjectives, to be used as 
distractor items in the second session. 
After a two week delay participants are introduced to the second 
experimental session, without revealing to participants the connection between 
session one and session two. Participants are told that the researchers are 
interested in the way people form impressions. In the laboratory task participants 
are asked to remember a series of descriptors about the new person and they are 
told that their memory will be tested in a recognition test. Unbeknownst to 
participants they are split into ‘high resemblance’ and ‘low resemblance’ 
experimental conditions. In the high resemblance condition some of the 
descriptors of the new person are drawn from that participant’s own self-
generated list of SO descriptors. That new person therefore resembles that 
participant’s SO to some degree. In the low resemblance condition the new person 
descriptors are drawn from a different participant’s SO descriptors. This is 
described as ‘yoking’ and results in each pair of participants being exposed to the 
same SO characteristics in this learning phase. Consequently, any differences 
between the experimental and control conditions are attributable to the specific 
relationship between the participant and characteristics from their own SO, rather 
than the inclusion of more or less SO characteristics generally. In the recognition 
test participants are asked to declare whether a series of items were present in the 
earlier presented list of new person descriptors. Here items from that participant’s 
own SO descriptions that were not present in the list of new person descriptors are 
included. Transference is classically measured in relation to false positive 
responses for these newly included SO items. 
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In our research context the manipulation of SO resemblance corresponds to 
a manipulation of intraclass distance, and is where a test of H1 may take place. Our 
model conceptualizes intraclass as a continuum, rather than the traditional two 
levels (e.g. ‘on/off’). Therefore we tested across three levels of intraclass distance, 
in the hope of obtaining stronger evidence for our model of transference. This 
would also provide evidence against explanations that posit the inadvertent 
introduction other qualitative differences between the two conditions. The three 
levels of resemblance were: a high resemblance condition corresponding to 
comparably low intraclass distance, a low resemblance condition corresponding to 
medium intraclass distance, and a no resemblance condition corresponding to high 
intraclass distance. 
In terms of H2, this is where a more substantive alteration to the above 
procedure was made. Specifically, rather than asking participants to perform a 
recognition task pertaining to one new person in session two, in the recognition 
task participants were introduced to two newly encountered people. One of those 
new people (Person A) served the usual purpose as per the idiographic-nomothetic 
design (i.e., they were the perceptual target against which SO related false 
positives could be measured), while the other new person (Person B) allowed us to 
manipulate interclass distances. Specifically, by varying the amount of 
characteristics that Person B shared with Person A, we could create a shared 
characteristics, low interclass distance condition, and a no shared characteristics, 
high interclass distance condition. 
Participants and design 
Participants were recruited through two separate avenues; one avenue 
being social media1, and the other being an undergraduate research participation 
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program. In terms of the former, social media, 585 online responses were received 
for session one. Of these, 80 participants completed the session one questionnaire 
such that they could be invited for the second experimental session, including 
supplying a contact email. Of those who were invited for session two, 31 returned 
to participate. In terms of the undergraduate research participation program, 97 
third year undergraduate psychology students at the Australian National 
University volunteered to participate as part of course content. Of these, 79 
participants completed the session one questionnaire such that they could be 
included in second phase of the study. Of those who were included in the second 
phase of the study, 69 returned to participate. 
Taken together there were 100 participants who were included in both 
experimental sessions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six 
experimental conditions in a three (intraclass distance: low/medium/high) by two 
(interclass distance: low/high) between subjects factorial design. Participants 
ranged in age from 17 to 65 with an average age of 262. Approximately 14% of 
participants had learned English as a second language3, and approximately 75% of 
participants were female4,5. 
Procedure 
Recruitment. Participants recruited through social media were first invited 
to participate in a psychological study where they would be required to answer 
questions about someone important to them. Upon completion of that ostensive 
study, which corresponded to the first experimental session, participants were 
presented with information about a second unrelated study, conducted by a 
different researcher, concerning impression formation processes. Participants 
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were invited to provide their email if they were happy to participate in this second 
study, which corresponded to second experimental session. 
Participants recruited through the undergraduate research participation 
program were presented with two ostensibly unrelated psychological studies to be 
completed as part of content within a third year psychology course covering 
advanced research methods. Similar to the social media recruitment, the first 
experimental session was introduced as a study relating to important people in our 
lives, while the second experimental session was introduced as a study concerning 
impression formation. Participant responses to the study were used to generate 
data sets that served pedagogical purposes within the course; however, students 
were also given the opportunity to indicate at the end of the second experimental 
session that they did not want their personal data included in any subsequent 
analysis. In all other respects the methodology was equivalent for all participants, 
irrespective of recruitment method. 
 Experimental session one. Survey materials for this study, and indeed for 
all studies in this research program, were developed using the Qualtrics Research 
Suite (Qualtrics, 2009). Upon entering the first experimental session participants 
were informed that they “would be asked a number of non-invasive questions 
about an important person in your life” and were presented with the relevant 
information pertaining to the ethical collection of human data. Participants were 
next told that the study’s aim is to “investigate important events and people in our 
everyday lives” and were requested to be honest and complete in their answers, 
which would be treated as strictly confidential. 
 Participants were then asked to provide the name of a SO of theirs. 
Specifically, there were told: “We would now like you to think about a person who 
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is very important to you and has been for many years. This could be a person who 
you would describe as a significant other and could be a close friend, romantic 
partner, or relative” (bold in original). They were then asked to list 12 different 
features that they would describe as characteristic of their SO. Three example 
features were provided (i.e., unsophisticated, impressionable, and ordinary) and 
using piped text participants were presented with 12 sentences to complete with a 
SO characteristic (i.e., “when I think of [SOs name] one feature I think of is…”). On 
the next page of the questionnaire participants were asked to choose 10 adjectives 
that are irrelevant to their SO from a list of 95. These were to be “characteristics 
that you would not say [SOs name] possesses, and that you would not say [SOs 
name] definitely does not possess”, again using piped text. The 95 adjectives were 
selected from Andersen’s (1968) list of 555 adjectives ordered by valence. The 
adjectives falling closest to the middle of the list were selected, with the exclusion 
of “clownish”, which was considered too anachronistic for the present audience 
and likely to rouse suspicion if presented across both experimental sessions. These 
adjectives were presented to participants as a single alphabetical list. 
 Subsequent to the characteristic listing and characteristic selection tasks, 
participants were asked to complete a PANAS mood measure (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988), which served to bolster the cover story of the study; the PANAS 
served as a plausible dependent variable that would help instil in shrewd 
participants the sense that experimental session one was indeed self-contained. 
This was followed by the collection of demographic information, including gender, 
first language, and year of birth. 
The final two components of the questionnaire were an open ended 
response field, asking participants what they perceived the study to be about, as 
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well as an interim debrief consisting primarily of confidentiality information and 
other ethical considerations. 
 Experimental session two. After a delay of two weeks participants were 
sent an email inviting them to participate in the ostensibly unrelated second study. 
In that two week period the SO features that were listed in session one were 
prepared for use in session two. Specifically, the responses of participants were 
paraphrased in order to prevent immediate recognition if presented to 
participants a second time, while preserving the same meaning. The paraphrasing 
also removed spelling errors and introduced a consistent grammatical approach. 
For instance, “warmth” became “is warm”, “down to earth” became “is grounded”, 
and “HOT!!!” became “is attractive”. 
 Upon entering the second experimental session participants were informed 
that the objective of the study was to “explore how we form impressions of people” 
and in particular “how perception of a person changes in light of new information”. 
Participants were also presented with the relevant information pertaining to the 
ethical collection of human data. On the next page of the questionnaire, 
participants were given the instructions for a recognition task. Participants were 
told that they would be presented with information about two people, Person A 
and Person B, and that they should attempt to memorise this information as they 
would be asked to later retrieve that information in a brief memory test. The 
information about Person A and Person B was said to have been generated by 
asking members of the community to engage in some self-description tasks, and 
participants were informed that they would be presented with 20 descriptors to 
learn in total; 10 relating to Person A and 10 relating to Person B, where 
descriptors would be presented one at a time for eight seconds each, alternating 
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between Person A and Person B. Descriptors were then presented to participants 
in the form of “Participant A is warm”, “Participant B is grounded”, “Participant A is 
attractive”, etc. 
It is at this point that the two experimental manipulations occurred. In 
relation to the intraclass distance manipulation, characteristics were presented to 
participants such that across the three experimental conditions there were 
different quantities of shared characteristics between Person A (i.e., the newly 
encountered target) and the participant’s SO. Specifically, in the low intraclass 
distance condition six shared characteristics were embedded within the list of 10 
descriptors, in the medium intraclass distance condition three shared 
characteristics were embedded with the list, and in the high intraclass distance 
condition no shared characteristics were embedded within the list. In line with the 
yoking procedure, where participants’ SO characteristics were not selected 
characteristics from a paired participant’s SO took their place. The remaining four 
characteristics were taken from the characteristics identified by participants as 
irrelevant during session one. All Person A characteristics were presented in 
random order. 
In relation to the interclass distance manipulation, characteristics were 
presented such that across the two experimental conditions there were different 
quantities of shared characteristics between Person A and Person B. Specifically, in 
the low interclass distance condition four shared characteristics were embedded 
within the list of ten Person B descriptors, and in the high interclass distance 
condition no shared characteristics were embedded within the list. These shared 
characteristics between Person A and Person B were presented immediately after 
one another in an attempt to strengthen the manipulation, and the shared 
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characteristics were either presented comparatively early in the list or 
comparative late in an attempt to avoid possible order effects (i.e., the shared 
characteristics were either located as the first, fourth, sixth and seventh positions, 
or the fourth, sixth, ninth and tenth positions). The remaining Person B 
characteristics were randomly taken from the characteristic selections of other 
participants. 
On some occasions there were additional naturally occurring shared 
characteristics between a participant’s SO and Person A, and between Person A 
and Person B. These were rare, however, and thus not considered to be a problem 
for the study. In fact, given that some degree of characteristic overlap would be 
anticipated with any two people, this could be interpreted as representing a move 
toward ecological validity. 
Before being introduced to the test phase of the recognition task 
participants were given a two minute distractor task. This took the form of a find-
a-word, where participants were asked to find and record as many words as 
possible, after which the instructions for the test phase were provided. 
Participants were told that they would “be presented with 20 sentences that either 
were, or were not, presented about Person A” and that their task would be “to, as 
quickly as possible, indicate whether they think the sentence was or was not 
presented about Person A.” Participants were told that their response speed was 
being timed, and were asked to use the “A” key to indicate that a sentence was 
earlier presented about Person A and the “L” key to indicate that a sentence was 
not earlier presented about Person A. Three practice questions were provided to 
familiarise participants with the response interface, and in these practice 
questions participants were informed of how long they took to respond to each; 
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the purpose of this timing feedback was to reinforce to participants the timed 
nature of the exercise. 
 After the test phase of the recognition task participants completed a PANAS, 
which again served as part of the cover story for the study and as a source of data 
for the undergraduate participants. The questionnaire also included another open 
ended response field asking participants what they perceived the study to be 
about, and the same debrief as was made available in session one. 
Manipulation checks. Two permutations of Aron, Aron and Smollan’s 
(1992) Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) Scale were used to monitor the 
effectiveness of various manipulations (see Figure 6.2 for an example). First, to test 
whether selected SOs were indeed people close to participants, an IOS Scale was 
administered in the session one questionnaire immediately after the irrelevant 
characteristics selection task. There participants were asked to indicate the level of 
closeness between oneself and the person they nominated. Next, to test whether 
the interclass distance manipulation affected the experienced relationship 
between Person A and Person B (i.e., that smaller interclass distance led to Person 
A and Person B being experienced as closer), a modified IOS Scale was 
administered in the session two questionnaire immediately after the test phase of 
the recognition task. There participants were asked to indicate the level of 
closeness between Person A and Person B. After this participants were also asked 
to indicate on a separate sliding scale how similar they thought Person A and 
Person B were, where the scale anchors were “not at all similar” and “extremely 
similar”. 
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Figure 6.2. The IOS Scale as presented to participants in the first experimental 
session. In the second experimental session another modified IOS scale was 
presented with the labels “Person A” and “Person B”. 
 
Dependent measures. There were four dependent measures used in the 
present study, the first of which being the classic false positive recognition 
measure. As per the standard transference methodology, in the 20 sentences 
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presented to participants during the test phase six of those sentences were not 
presented in the learning phase but were paraphrased descriptors of participants’ 
SOs (the remaining four sentences were constructed using the irrelevant 
descriptors selected in session one). As part of the test phase, immediately after 
the timed recognition task, participants were asked to indicate their level of 
confidence that each sentence was presented about Person A. The sentences were 
presented together in a randomised order, and participants were asked to respond 
on a sliding scales where the scale anchors were “I am very confident that this 
statement was NOT presented about Person A” and “I am very confident that this 
statement was presented about Person A”. Responses toward the was presented 
scale anchor for the SO sentences not presented during the learning phase indicate 
the greater presence of a false positive response style and evidence of 
transference. 
The second dependent measure was a response time measure. Specifically, 
participants’ response times during the test phase for the SO sentences not 
presented during the learning phase were recorded and compared across 
conditions, where longer response times were taken as evidence of transference. 
This follows the reasoning of Smith and Henry (1996), themselves following Aron, 
Aron, Tudor and Nelson (1991), who argued that responding to social stimuli will 
be more difficult when there is an inherent inconsistency to those stimuli. Here 
transference generates inconsistencies for participants because the SO sentences 
not presented during the learning phase are true of participants’ SOs but are not 
true of Person A. Thus, much like the Stroop effect, in comparison to participants 
who are only answering in the context of Person A, transference should make it 
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more difficult to quickly establish whether a sentence was or was not presented 
about Person A. 
The third dependent measure was participants’ error rates for the timed 
responses, which again follows the reasoning of Smith and Henry (1996) and Aron, 
Aron, Tudor and Nelson (1991). More frequent errors were taken as indicative of 
transference based on the expectation that the contradiction created by the role of 
SOs in generating an impression will increase the difficulty of the recognition task. 
The final dependent measure was another permutation of the IOS scale. 
Here participants were asked to indicate the level of closeness between oneself 
and Person A, where higher closeness ratings were taken as evidence of 
transference. This was based on the expectation that newly encountered targets 
who are experienced as akin to a close SO are also likely to be experienced as close 
to the self. This is consistent with the finding that transference can generate 
congruencies in patterns of interpersonal motivations and interaction between SOs 
and newly encountered targets (Andersen et al., 1996; Baum & Andersen, 1999; 
Berenson & Andersen, 2006; Berk & Andersen, 2008; Brumbaugh & Fraley, 2006; 
Hinkley & Andersen, 1996; see Chapter 2). 
Results 
Participant attrition 
Many of the 682 session one participants could not be included in session 
two because their responses could not be used to generate the necessary stimuli 
for the recognition task. This was often due to participants not providing a full 12 
SO characteristics, or exiting the questionnaire before selecting the 10 irrelevant 
characteristics. On other occasions participants’ session one responses were 
simply not suitable for the present purposes (e.g., the characteristics of one 
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participant’s SO, “the Lord”, did not translate well), which also prohibited inclusion 
in session two. Attrition across the two experimental sessions for these and similar 
reasons was more of an issue for those participants recruited through social media. 
In terms of those recruited through the undergraduate research participation 
program, for pedagogical reasons all participants were invited to complete the 
second questionnaire irrespective of their session one responses, where stimuli for 
these participants was generated using other participants’ session one responses. 
With regard to attrition within experimental session two, of the 100 
participants who were included in both experimental sessions, 10 were excluded 
from the analysis because they did not complete the questionnaire, five were 
excluded at the request of the participant, and one was excluded because they had 
become suspicious as to the true purposes of the study. In the end approximately 
12% of the total participant pool, or 84 participants, could be included in the 
analysis, with some further reductions for particular dependent measures. This 
high attrition rate creates challenges for any subsequent analysis, as in the present 
field of study a six cell design with only 84 participants is likely to be 
underpowered. Nonetheless, given that data collection avenues had been largely 
exhausted for the immediate timeframe, the analysis proceeded with the potential 
power limitations in mind. 
Manipulation checks and integrity of study pretence  
 For ease of interpretation responses on the modified seven point IOS scale 
were coded such that -2 corresponded to a response with greatest distance 
between the relevant two figures, 0 corresponded to a response where the two 
figures were only just in contact, and 4 corresponded to a response where the two 
figures overlapped completely. In this way responses greater than 0 could be taken 
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as indicative of a degree of felt closeness between the two entities being 
represented. Thus, in session one participants reliably indicated that they indeed 
felt close to their nominated SO, M = 2.21, SD = 1.14, t (83) = 17.78, p < .001, 95% 
CI [1.97, 2.46]. Indeed, only one participant indicated that they felt distant from 
their SO, and only three participants selected the just in contact option. 
 With regard to session two, the interclass distance manipulation had a 
significant effect on the speculated closeness between Person A and Person B, t 
(81) = 3.17, p < .01, 95% CId [0.28, 1.23], where participants in the low interclass 
distance condition suggested that Person A and Person B were closer (M = 1.08, SD 
= 1.06) than participants in the high interclass distance condition (M = 0.32, SD = 
1.09). The interclass distance manipulation also had a significant effect on the 
perceived similarity between Person A and Person B, t (81) = 3.32, p < .01, 95% CId 
[4.81, 19.23], where participants in the low interclass distance condition perceived 
Person A and Person B to be more similar (M = 44.47, SD = 16.51) than those in the 
high interclass distance condition (M = 56.49, SD = 16.04)6. Finally, in the allocated 
open ended response field provided, the vast majority of participants did not 
indicate that they had detected the true nature of the study or the nature of the 
connection between experimental session one and two. 
 Bivariate correlations among the four dependent measures were 
investigated. False positive confidence was found to be correlated with false 
positive errors, r (82) = .62, p < .001, and no other significant correlations were 
observed. This can be taken as evidence of convergent validity among these two 
variables, although ideally all four variables would have been correlated with one 
another, with negative correlations between response times and the other three 
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dependent measures. That being said, it was also the case that no correlations 
were observed that ran opposite to expectations. 
Main analysis 
 A 3 × 2 MANOVA was used to test for the predicted main effect of intraclass 
distance (H1) and the predicted interaction effect between intraclass distance and 
interclass distance (H2) on the four dependent measures. As per the convention 
for time response data of this kind (Coats, Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000), prior 
to this analysis, and all other analyses in this thesis, all values smaller than 300ms 
and greater than 5,000ms were excluded from the timed response data (Ratcliff, 
1993). 
The predicted main effect for intraclass distance was not observed, F (8, 
142) = 0.41, p > .90; Wilk's Λ = 0.41, partial η2 = .02, and nor was the predicted 
interaction effect between intraclass distance and interclass distance, F (8, 142) = 
0.22, p > .90; Wilk's Λ = 0.98, partial η2 = .06. The main effect for the interclass 
distance manipulation was also not significant, F (4, 71) = 1.18, p > .90; Wilk's Λ = 
0.98, partial η2 = .01. 
 The null result for the main effect of intraclass distance occurred despite 
this being essentially a direct replication effort of a purportedly robust effect. This 
may be interpreted further evidence that the MANOVA analysis was indeed 
underpowered. Consequently, the main analysis was followed up with a post hoc 
search for possible non-significant but interpretable trends within the data. While 
certainly not reportable as supporting evidence for our hypotheses, the presence 
of interpretable trends would be relevant to follow up empirical efforts. 
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Post hoc trend analysis  
In terms of the intraclass distance manipulation the pattern among means 
was not readily interpretable using the above theorising for any of the dependent 
variables (Table 6.1). In fact, in a number of cases the relationship among means 
ran directly counter to expectations. Specifically, increasing intraclass distance 
(i.e., fewer shared characteristics between the SO and target) corresponded to 
greater indications of transference for both the false positive confidence and the 
false positive error measures: participants in the high intraclass distance condition 
had the most false positive confidence (M = 3.04, SD = 1.88) and most false positive 
errors (M = 1.46, SD = 1.32), participants in the medium intraclass distance 
condition had less false positive confidence (M = 2.81, SD = 2.22) and fewer false 
positive errors (M = 1.07, SD = 1.23), and participants in the low intraclass distance 
condition had the least false positive confidence (M = 2.40, SD = 1.94) and the 
fewest false positive errors (M = 0.81, SD = 1.58). 
With regard to the interclass distance manipulation, there was an 
interpretable trend for the response time measure only. Although not significant in 
light of the MANOVA, taken in isolation the participants took longer to respond to 
SO sentences not presented during the learning phase in the low interclass 
distance condition (M = 1.36, SD = 0.56) in comparison with the high interclass 
distance condition (M= 1.12, SD = 0.33), F (1, 74) = 4.44, p < .05; partial η2 = .06. 
This would make sense if the presence of more shared characteristics between 
Person A and Person B created an additional categorisation scheme that included 
both people (i.e., a salient Person A and Person B category) that participants were 
using to understand the situation presented to them. The longer response would 
be attributable to this additional categorisation scheme consuming processing 
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resources. There were no interpretable patterns among means for the interaction 
between the two experimental manipulations. 
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Discussion 
 The obtained results did not support either HI or H2. The anticipated main 
effect of intraclass distance was not found among any of the dependent measures, 
and nor was the anticipated interaction effect found between intraclass distance 
and interclass distance. This means that the classic transference finding that 
shared characteristics between a SO and a newly encountered target would lead to 
false positives, where SO characteristics are perceived to also be true of the target, 
was not replicated. Nor was there evidence of transference in the form of delayed 
response times or the anticipation of emotional closeness between SOs and the 
target. There was also no evidence that transference can be manipulated in 
accordance with the principle of comparative fit; the extent of transference was 
not shown to be also influenced by the presence or absence of shared 
characteristics between the target and other people in the frame of reference. 
These null results make sense in the context of the limited power of the 
present study, which was a consequence of the substantial 88% attrition rate 
between experimental session one and the final analysis. This attrition rate reflects 
the co-occurrence of a comparatively complex methodology and the limited 
participant engagement to be expected from participants recruited through social 
media and later year undergraduate courses. A large number of participants did 
not choose to return for the second experimental session, while others did not 
complete the questionnaires in the very particular way that would allow for the 
use of their data (e.g., they listed fewer than 12 characteristics in session one, or 
the characteristics listed were facetious). 
 Because of the reduced power levels the main analysis was followed up 
with a post hoc, and strictly exploratory, trend analysis. Two patterns of note 
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emerged in this follow up analysis. First, there was some further indication that the 
interclass manipulation was functioning as intended: in addition to the 
manipulation check evidence, where low interclass distance led to increased 
perceived closeness and similarity between Person A and Person B, there were 
signs that participants in the low interclass distance responded more slowly to SO 
characteristics that were not present as Person A descriptors. One plausible 
interpretation is that the presence of a cognitive resource consuming 
categorisation scheme, comprising of Person A and Person B, essentially distracted 
participants from the task of discerning whether characteristics were or were not 
present in the Person A descriptors. 
More critically, among the dependent measures there was no evidence of 
trends in the anticipated direction in relation to the intraclass distance 
manipulation. Indeed, if anything the pattern of means was in opposition to 
predictions, with increasing false positive confidence and false positive errors as 
intraclass distance increased. Because we have good reason to believe that 
participants were engaged in processing the potential relationship between Person 
A and Person B, a further possible explanation for the null result becomes 
apparent. It is possible that the mere presence of a second person in the session 
two scenario distracted participants from processing in terms of SOs across all 
experimental conditions. When it came to understanding Person A, the available 
perceptual lens of like Person B versus unlike Person B, may have been sufficient to 
lead participants away from an understanding based on like my SO versus unlike 
my SO. This would also explain the null result for the interaction effect between 
intraclass distance and interclass distance; intraclass distance cannot moderate a 
transference effect if there is no effect to be moderated. 
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 This alternative explanation for the null results requires the classic 
transference effect to be more easily interrupted than previous research suggests. 
That is, transference could not be the inferential process of choice that it has been 
suggested to be elsewhere in the social psychology of transference. This is a largely 
empirical question, but there is some reason to believe that the transference effect 
should be robust in the presence of a second person during the learning phase of 
the experiment. Specifically, Andersen and Cole (1990), Andersen and colleagues 
(1995), and Brumbaugh and Fraley (2006) have all obtained results suggestive of 
transference using methodologies where more than one person was present 
during learning trials. Nonetheless, the notion that in this study the mere presence 
of person B was enough to interrupt transference raises possibilities in terms of 
further empirical directions, particularly with regard to perceiver readiness, and 
more specifically the present processing goals of perceivers. 
 If participants did indeed unconsciously choose not to use SOs in forming 
impression of people, instead choosing to explore comparisons between Person A 
and Person B, then this would suggest that in Study 1 we have unintentionally 
presented participants with a novel implicit task. That is, without our knowledge, 
and indeed without necessarily the knowledge of the participants, we may have 
presented stimuli which suggest that participants should be comparing Person A 
with Person B. This follows the same logic as has been fruitfully applied to the 
illusory correlation paradigm; there is evidence that the illusory correlation effect 
is at least partly attributable to a differentiation task that is implicit to participants 
in the classic methodology (Haslam, McGarty, & Brown, 1996; McGarty, Haslam, 
Turner, & Oakes, 1993). Specifically, and again without necessarily the conscious 
awareness of participants, presenting students with positive and negative 
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behavioural instances of two groups without further context leads participants to 
try and distinguish between the two groups in terms of positivity/negativity. The 
logic of this is perhaps best seen when phrased from the perspective of 
participants (see also Berndsen, Spears, van der Pligt, & McGarty, 2002; McGarty, 
1999): why present us (i.e., the participants) with positive and negative 
information about these two groups, and little else, if the exercise is not about 
figuring out which is better? Applying the same perspective to the present study, 
this would translate to something like: why would Person A and Person B be 
presented together if not to learn something about the relationship between the 
two? 
 The influence of a particular tasks falls within the domain of perceiver 
readiness because perceiver readiness includes perceivers’ current motives and 
goals. Here the implicit task may be seen as introducing a current motive or goal 
for participants (i.e., to discern the relationship between Person A and Person B). 
Because discerning the relationship between Person A and Person B is not helped 
by information about one’s SO, we would expect little to no use of SO information 
in forming an impression of either of the two people presented to participants. In 
short, we would not expect transference. Overall then we can think of this 
explanation for our null results as a consequence of an inadvertent alteration of 
the perceiver readiness of participants. This, of course, is entirely consistent with 
our social identity based account of transference. In fact, if we had been able to 
manipulate perceiver readiness through experimental manipulation, and then 
observe predicted effects on transference, this would be another pathway by 
which the additional utility of our categorisation based account of transference 
may be demonstrated empirically; the social cognitive model of transference does 
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not include a perceiver readiness like component. Indeed, this is the very avenue 
pursued in Study 2 and Study 3 of the present empirical program. 
 
Notes 
1. Three social media tools were used for recruitment. These were Facebook and 
two online psychological research participation websites. In terms of those 
websites, one was hosted by In-mind Magazine (http://www.in-
mind.org/content/online-research) and the other was hosted by Psychological 
Research on the Net (http://psych.hanover.edu/Research/exponnet.html). 
 
2. Four participants declined to provide information about their age, and 16 
participants were excluded from analysis (see participant attrition, this chapter). 
This means that the sample’s age characteristics were calculated on the basis of 
data from 80 participants. 
 
3. Five participants declined to indicate whether or not English was their second 
language, and 16 participants were excluded from analysis (see participant 
attrition, this chapter). This means that the sample’s linguistic characteristics were 
calculated on the basis of data from 79 participants. 
 
4. Because 16 participants were excluded from analysis (see participant attrition, 
this chapter) the sample’s gender distribution was calculated on the basis of data 
from 84 participants. 
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5. Due to the absence of a clear theoretical rationale for doing so, no tests for 
gender differences were made in the present analysis, nor were any such test 
conducted in relation to Study 2 or Study 3 (Baumeister, 1988; see also Spears, 
1994). 
 
6. The sliding scale was coded as a 100 point scale, where 0 corresponded to “not 
at all similar” and 100 corresponded to “extremely similar”. 
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CHAPTER 7 
STUDY 2 AND STUDY 3:  TRANSFERENCE AND PERCEIVER READINESS  
 
 
In the social categorisation account of transference that we have advanced, 
perceiver readiness is one of the three constraining factors that interact to 
determine whether a SO and target social category becomes salient. Perceiver 
readiness encompasses a perceiver’s past experience, present expectations, 
current motives, values, goals, and needs. It is the relationship between 
transference and perceiver processing goals specifically that is investigated in 
Study 2 and Study 3 of the present empirical program. In Study 2 we set out to test 
whether the extent that SO information is used in impression formation may be 
attenuated by processing goals where SO information is unlikely to be relevant, 
while in Study 3 we set out to test the converse prediction, that the use of SO 
information in social perception may be encouraged when the social context is one 
where SO information is likely to be relevant. 
The breadth of perceiver readiness means that much of what is studied in 
social psychology falls within the bounds of the concept. Despite this, within the 
social psychology of transference it is comparatively uncommon that empirical 
work touches directly upon perceiver readiness concerns. This can be attributed to 
the emphasis on chronic accessibility that has been a central theme in the 
transference literature. Recall from Chapter 2 that in the social cognitive model of 
transference SO representations are chronically accessible and that there is 
“considerable readiness” to apply these representations to newly encountered 
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people. This follows from the first social psychological forays into transference, 
where SO representations were anticipated to be particularly powerful sources of 
social inference (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Andersen et al., 1995), which has 
remained a recurring theme to this day in transference studies. Kraus and Chen 
(2010), for example, recently sought to empirically demonstrate that facial feature 
resemblance can generate transference effects, which they viewed as consistent 
with the expectation that “SO representations are among the first social constructs 
to be activated and used when forming impressions of new others” (p. 519). 
The anticipation that SO representations are chronically accessible 
naturally limits interest in perceiver readiness concerns. It suggests that there will 
be little to no variability in relation to perceiver readiness factors. This is because 
if SO representations are indeed chronically accessible then there should be no 
expectation that the use of SOs as a basis for perception will vary as a function of 
the current state of the perceiver. This can be thought of as a kind of ceiling effect, 
where the impact of particular aspects of perceiver readiness (i.e., past experience 
and present expectations) negates any possible role for other aspects of perceiver 
readiness (i.e., current motives, values, goals, and needs). This is actually 
inconsistent, to some extent, with other influential areas of the social cognition 
approach. It is a recurring point within the social cognition literature that the 
processing goals of perceivers will play a large part in determining what lens those 
perceivers use to make sense of social stimuli (Bargh, 1989, 1994; Higgins & King, 
1981; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000), where associated empirical work has shown, 
for example, that a perceiver’s current information processing concerns can 
moderate the use of particular social stereotypes in impression formation (e.g., 
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Blair & Banaji, 1996; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997; Pendry 
& Macrae, 1996; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Duinn, 1998). 
The expectation that transference would not be substantially affected by the 
present goals of the perceiver is also, of course, inconsistent with the social 
identity approach’s emphasis on the adaptability and utility of social 
categorisation. In Chapter 3 we saw that within the social identity tradition the 
adaptability of the social categorisation process rests in large part on the idea that 
social categories draw our “attention to differences, and similarities, which are 
relevant for the purposes at hand” (Oakes & Turner, 1986b, emphasis in original). 
The notion that in social perception we first and foremost anticipate that new 
social targets will be predictable on the basis of our knowledge of those close to us, 
irrespective of our present purposes, jars with that adaptability theme. At the very 
least the alternative seems worth entertaining: that the use of SO information in 
social perception is variable to a similar extent as other sources of inference. 
Here we take the social identity and social cognition traditions together 
then, and question the implicit position within the social cognitive model of 
transference that perceiver factors are a proverbial closed door for investigation. 
Instead, it is reasonable to expect that transference will vary in response to the full 
array of perceiver factors, including, for instance, perceiver processing goals. Here 
no ceiling effect would be present and variability would be expected as a function 
of the different experiences and expectations of perceivers, as well as the different 
motives, values, goals, and needs that perceivers bring with them into the 
perceptual process. 
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Study 2: The role of processing goals in transference 
Study 2 can also be thought of as an attempt to address a methodological 
limitation of Study 1. Specifically, it can be thought of as an attempt to follow up a 
post hoc explanation with an a priori experimental investigation. The post hoc 
explanation, as introduced in Chapter 6, was that the obtained null results could be 
attributed to a methodological quirk whereby the perceiver readiness of 
participants to use SO information in impression formation was reduced by the 
introduction of an implicit task where SO information is unlikely to be helpful. In 
short, without intending it we changed the goal of the perceivers in impression 
formation in a way that reduced the likelihood of transference occurring. Thus, the 
a priori investigation is an attempt to deliberately introduce a novel processing 
goal for participants with the intention of reproducing, within predicted 
experimental conditions, similar null results. Consequently, Study 2 largely adopts 
the same design and methodological form as Study 1. 
With regard to the specific hypotheses, the first can be retained verbatim; 
here too we predict that, in accordance with the existing social psychology of 
transference, memories of SOs will play a role in the perception of newly 
encountered people who share characteristics with those SOs (H1). Or once again 
phrased in terms of the social categorisation model of transference, reduced 
intraclass distance will increase the likelihood that a SO and target category will 
become salient and that consequent within class accentuation effects will lead to 
the perception that a greater number of SO characteristics are shared by the target. 
With regard to the second hypothesis, in the present study we replaced H2 
from Study 1, concerning interclass distance, with a hypothesis concerning 
perceiver readiness, and in particular the present goals of a perceiver. Within the 
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context of perceiver goals we chose to focus on a comparatively straight forward 
pattern of moderation. That is, although the present goals of a perceiver may be 
sensibly anticipated to affect transference in a variety of ways, here we simply aim 
to moderate the impact of the classic intraclass distance manipulation with an 
orthogonal perceiver goals manipulation. Specifically, we anticipate that a 
processing goal that is unrelated to participants’ SOs will reduce the likelihood that 
in a low intraclass distance condition memories of SOs will play a role in the 
perception of newly encountered people (H2). This is because the use of SO 
information in social perception through categorisation is expected to be 
constrained by a variety of perceiver factors, including current goals, motives, and 
needs. Again, no such expectations are reflected in the social cognitive model of 
transference, which instead suggests that SO representations will be at all times 
chronically accessibly. 
Method 
 Procedure overview. In line with the idiographic-nomothetic experimental 
procedure introduced in Chapter 2, and also outlined in the context of Study 1, 
participants were recruited for involvement in two ostensibly unrelated laboratory 
sessions. In this procedure the first experimental session requires participants to 
nominate and describe a SO of theirs, while in the second experimental session 
participants are required to perform a recognition test. As with Study 1 it is the 
second experimental session where the methodology is altered to accommodate 
our particular novel hypothesis (i.e., H2). Here an additional manipulation with 
two experimental conditions is introduced. In one experimental condition the 
session two questionnaire is introduced in exactly the same manner as in Study 1, 
which follows Andersen and Glassman (1996) and the bulk of empirical research 
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into transference within social psychology; in this condition session two is 
introduced as an impression formation task, where participants are told that the 
researchers are interested in the way people form impressions. In the other 
experimental condition, the session two questionnaire is still introduced as an 
impression formation task, however, an additional processing goal is introduced 
that is unrelated to participants’ SOs. Specifically, participants are also asked to 
attempt to determine whether the target person is a fellow student of their 
university, or a student at another local university. 
 Participants and design. In an attempt to help avoid the substantial 
participant attrition rates experienced in Study 1, participants were not recruited 
through social media and instead were only recruited through an undergraduate 
research participation program. Through that medium 127 first year 
undergraduate psychology students at the Australian National University 
volunteered to participate. Of these, 119 participants completed the session one 
questionnaire such that they could be included in second phase of the study. Of 
those who were included in the second phase of the study, 100 returned to 
participate. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental 
conditions in a three (intraclass distance: low/medium/high) by two (processing 
goal: control/irrelevant) between subjects factorial design. Participants ranged in 
age from 17 to 29 with an average age of 20, approximately 26% of participants 
had learned English as a second language, and 69% of participants were female1. 
 Procedure. The differences between the present procedure and the 
procedure for Study 1 pertain to only participant recruitment and particular 
aspects of the second experimental session. In terms of recruitment, participants 
were recruited from within a first year psychology course rather than from within 
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a third year psychology course. This reflected an attempt to further mitigate 
participant attrition; it was hoped that first year students would be less cynical 
about research participation and thus more likely to complete the questionnaires 
in good faith, as well as return for the second experimental session. 
 In terms of the second experimental session, reflecting the processing goal 
experimental manipulation, one half of the participants were randomly selected to 
be provided with instructions for the recognition task that were largely identical to 
those that were presented to participants in Study 1, with two exceptions: First, in 
this control condition the 10 descriptors for Person A were more vaguely said to 
have been generated from a “pilot study”, rather than specifically a “community 
sample”, and second, in the present study there was no reference in the 
instructions to a second person (i.e., Person B). The other half of participants were 
presented with instructions that introduced a processing goal where SO 
information was unlikely to be relevant. Here participants were told that the 10 
descriptors for Person A were generated after having students from the Australian 
National University (participants’ own university) and the University of Canberra 
(another local university) engage in some self-description tasks. Participants were 
then told that, in addition to the brief memory test, they would be asked to identify 
which university Person A was a member of; they were told they would be asked 
“are they a UC student or are they an ANU student?” This question was located 
toward the end of the questionnaire so that all dependent variables completed 
before participants were asked to complete this task. Those four dependent 
variables again were: false positive confidence, response time, false positive errors, 
and Person A to self closeness. Naturally all manipulation checks relating to the 
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interclass distance manipulation in Study 1 were excluded from this study (i.e., 
questionnaire items relating to Person B). 
Results 
 Participant attrition. Of the 127 session one participants, 8 could not be 
included in session two because their responses during session one could not be 
used to generate the necessary stimuli for the recognition task. Of the 100 session 
two participants, four were excluded from the analysis because they did not 
complete the questionnaire, while three were excluded because they had become 
suspicious as to the true purposes of the study. In the end approximately 73% of 
the total participant pool, or 93 participants, could be included in the analysis. 
 While the 27% overall attrition rate was a substantial improvement on the 
88% attrition rate experienced in Study 1, the final sample size is still smaller than 
might be desired for a six cell design. On the other hand, the obtained sample size 
is larger, and in at least one case twice as large, than that used for numerous 
studies that were able to successfully replicate the classic transference finding 
using a comparable methodology (Berk & Andersen, 2008; Kraus & Chen, 2010; 
Kraus et al., 2010; Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008; Pierro & Kruglanski, 2008; Pierro et 
al., 2009). As such, it was decided to proceed with the analysis. 
 Manipulation checks and integrity of study pretence. As was the case 
with Study 1, responses on the modified seven point IOS were coded such that 
responses greater than 0 could be taken as indicative of a degree of felt closeness 
between the two entities being represented. In session one participants reliably 
indicated that they indeed felt close to their nominated SO, M = 2.14, SD = 1.19, t 
(92) = 17.41, p < .001, 95% CI [1.90, 2.38]. Only three participants indicated that 
they felt distant from their SO, and only five participants selected the just in 
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contact option. The vast majority of participants did not indicate that they had 
detected the true nature of the study or the nature of the connection between 
experimental session one and two. 
 Bivariate correlations among the four dependant measures were 
investigated. False positive confidence was found to be correlated with false 
positive errors, r (91) = .76, p < .001, and false positive errors were in turn 
correlated with Person A to self closeness, r (91) = .26, p < .05. While ideally the 
correlation between False positive confidence and Person A to self closeness 
would also have been significant, r (91) = .147, p < .20, but this was an 
improvement on Study 1 and it is possible to interpret these results as evidence of 
convergent validity among these three measures. Contrary to expectations, 
response times were not negatively correlated with the other three dependant 
measures, however, it was also the case that no significant positive correlations 
were observed. 
 Main analysis. A 3 × 2 MANOVA was used to test for the predicted main 
effect of intraclass distance (H1) and the predicted interaction effect between 
intraclass distance and processing goal (H2) on the four dependent measures. As 
was the case in Study 1, the predicted main effect was not observed, F (8, 168) = 
1.09, p > .35; Wilk's Λ = 0.90, partial η2 = .05, meaning we did again not replicate 
the classic transference finding. The predicted interaction effect also was not 
observed, F (8, 168) = 1.34, p > .20; Wilk's Λ = 0.88, partial η2 = .06, nor was any 
main effect for the processing goal manipulation, F (4, 84) = 0.96, p > .50; Wilk's Λ 
= 0.96, partial η2 = .04. As was the case in Study 1, the present main analysis was 
followed up with a post hoc search for interpretable trends. 
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 Post hoc trend analysis. In contrast to Study 1, on this occasion the pattern 
among means was somewhat in line with the expectations of H1 (Table 7.1.). 
Specifically, within the control condition for processing goal there were greatest 
indications of transference in the low intraclass distance condition: participants in 
the low intraclass distance condition displayed more false positive confidence (M = 
2.60, SD = 3.03) than participants in the medium and high intraclass distance 
conditions (M = 0.96, SD = 0.94, and M = 1.67, SD = 1.53, respectively), had longer 
response times (M = 1.17s, SD = 0.40s) than participants in the medium and high 
intraclass distance conditions (M = 1.09s, SD = 0.24s, and M = 1.12s, SD =  0.32s, 
respectively), made more false positive errors (M = 1.18, SD = 1.89) than 
participants in the medium and high intraclass distance conditions (M = 0.57, SD = 
0.85, and M = 0.73, SD = 1.01, respectively), and indicated greater Person A to self 
closeness (M = 0.77, SD = 1.48) than participants in the medium and high intraclass 
distance conditions (M = 0.50, SD = 1.23, and M = 0.45, SD = 1.29, respectively). 
Indeed, with regard to the latter, felt closeness, the pattern of means was such that 
decreasing intraclass distance consistently corresponded to greater indications of 
transference. 
 Overall the means within the control condition differed as anticipated when 
comparisons were made between the low intraclass distance condition and the 
medium and high intraclass distance conditions taken together. Consequently, a 
further post hoc MANOVA was conducted within the control condition for 
processing goal, with the medium and high intraclass distances combined into a 
single condition. The aim of this additional analysis was to test whether any of 
these trends reach traditional standards of statistical significance. That MANOVA 
was not significant, F (4, 42) = 0.07, p > .95; Wilk's Λ = 0.993, partial η2 = .01. 
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 Within the irrelevant condition for processing goal the pattern among 
means was not readily interpretable. Here, following H2, in comparison with the 
control condition we would have anticipated greater homogeneity among means 
due to the processing goal that rendered SO information likely irrelevant; here the 
processing goal was expected to lessen the impact of the intraclass distance 
manipulation. Instead, we observed greater mean differences than obtained in the 
control condition, where the nature of those mean differences was not consistent 
across the dependent measures. 
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Discussion 
In our main analysis the results mirrored those obtained in Study 1; neither 
H1 nor H2 were supported. The anticipated main effect of intraclass distance was 
not found among any of the dependent measures, and nor was the anticipated 
interaction effect between intraclass distance and processing goal. 
 The failure once again to replicate the classic transference finding occurred 
despite successful efforts to reduce attrition and therefore maintain statistical 
power. That is, although attrition was reduced from 88% to 27% and the study’s 
sample size exceeded that of numerous other comparable studies, null results were 
still obtained. Moreover, the null result for the classic transference finding was 
observed despite the elimination of the potential confound introduced in Study 1; 
the additional target person was not present and therefore there is no reason to 
speculate that a distracting implicit task was introduced to perceivers. Instead, the 
processing goal control condition followed the classic transference methodology 
without meaningful alteration. This suggests that the study was indeed 
underpowered. Thus a strictly exploratory post hoc exploratory trend analysis was 
conducted. 
 In that trend analysis results were marginally more in line with 
expectations. Within the control condition for processing goal, the pattern among 
the means for all four dependent measures was such that the greatest indications 
of a salient SO and target category were present in the lowest intraclass distance 
condition. Or put in the language of the social psychology of transference, the 
condition of where he SO and target shared the most characteristics, or were most 
similar, was consistently the most indicative of transference. Of course, in the 
context of the null results this cannot be taken as evidence that the classic 
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transference finding was in fact replicated, particularly given other inconsistencies 
present among the means; specifically, for three out of the four dependent 
measures the high intraclass distance condition resulted in more indications of 
transference than the medium intraclass distance condition, rather than the 
expected converse pattern. Nevertheless, it does marginally increase the 
probability that the changes to the methodology between Study 1 and Study 2 
were indeed working in the right direction. It is mildly suggestive that the minor 
improvement to the power of the study did indeed increase the chances of 
detecting a transference effect that, while small, is nonetheless present. 
 In terms of the manipulation of processing goals, the absence of detectable 
signs of transference in the control condition negated the opportunity to observe 
the attenuation of transference when a processing goal was introduced where SO 
information is unlikely to be relevant. As such, Study 2 does not serve as a suitable 
test of the notion that the salience of SO and target categories will be subject to 
perceiver readiness constraints in the same way that other social categories have 
been demonstrated to be. In other words, further empirical investigation is 
required, which brings us to Study 32. 
 Although introduced at the outset of the chapter as a parallel investigation 
to Study 2, in reality this period of the research program also unfolded 
sequentially, where the impetus behind Study 3 was to address the methodological 
limitations identified in the course of running that former study. There were two 
such limitations. The first, of course, is the statistical power limitation discussed 
immediately above, which we were not able to resolve between Study 1 and Study 
2. The intention with Study 3 therefore was again attempt to replicate the classic 
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transference finding, and again investigate the possible constraining role of 
perceiver readiness factors, under conditions of still greater statistical power. 
 The second limitation pertains to the nature of our introduction of a 
perceiver readiness factor to the methodology. With twenty-twenty hindsight it 
was recognised that, although introducing a specific processing goal is an 
appropriate way in which the constraining role of perceiver readiness on 
transference might be demonstrated, introducing a processing goal expected to 
attenuate the extent of transference is only going to produce weak evidence for 
that role. This is because attenuating transference by way of a processing goal 
lends itself to the alternative explanation that the processing goal simply served as 
a distraction for participants. In other words, rather than leading participants to 
form an impression of the target by way of alternative categorisation schemes, the 
introduced processing goal might distract participants from the target entirely, or 
alternatively consume the cognitive resources that would otherwise be used to 
drive transference. In short, the addition of a processing goal might lead to 
alternative categorisation of the stimuli, but it might also lead to the cessation of 
categorisation of the stimuli, where both of these mechanisms would result in 
reduced transference. Study 3 resolves this by seeking to demonstrate that 
processing goals can intensify transference from a baseline level; an observed 
intensification of transference does not lend itself to an alternative explanation in 
terms of distraction or cognitive resource limitations. 
Study 3: The role of processing goals in transference, mark two 
 To recap, a SCT based social categorisation model of transference would 
suggest that the salience of SO and target categories should be constrained by 
perceiver readiness factors, such as the processing goals of the perceiver. 
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Perceivers should thus be expected to categorise newly encountered people in 
relation to their SOs to a greater extent when there are contextual cues present 
that suggest to perceivers that understanding social stimuli through that lens 
would be useful. This is the expectation to be tested in the present study. That is, in 
addition to once again attempting to replicate the basic transference finding that 
memories of SOs play a role in the perception of newly encountered people who 
share characteristics with those SOs (H1), the present study tests the prediction 
that the extent of transference will be greater when processing goals are more 
relevant to SO memories (H2). Or put in the language of our SCT based model, an 
inclusive SO and target category will be likely to become salient if that 
categorisation scheme is deemed likely to be useful in the present context. 
 But how is one to introduce processing goals that are known to be relevant 
to each participant’s distinctive SO? To introduce a unique processing goal that 
corresponds to each SO is likely to introduce confounds, while on the other hand 
identifying a processing goal that is relevant to all SOs would seem on the face of it 
implausible. A clue toward a possible solution is provided in the following example 
of goal driven social perception: 
 An alluring individual in a white coat can variously be categorised as a 
doctor or a dream date depending on whether one is seeking medical 
attention for a persistent throat infection or looking for a partner to take to 
the end of semester wine and cheese party. Interactional goals clearly affect 
one’s conception of others. (Pendry & Macrae, 1996, p. 249) 
Pendry and Macrae describe the search for a romantic partner as a potential 
processing goal for social perception. Romantic partners are also a common choice 
for participants in transference studies when they are asked to nominate a SO. It is 
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this commonality that provides the opportunity needed to introduce a single 
processing goal that is likely to be uniformly relevant across multiple SOs. What is 
required is simply to be mildly selective about what type of SOs are of interest in 
the present study, to further access that romantic partner commonality, and then 
to identify a suitably plausible processing goal relating to romantic partners; one 
that does not expose the nature of the study to participants. This is the 
methodological intention of the present study, which otherwise follows the classic 
transference methodology. In the first experimental session participants were 
asked to nominate five SOs, and then indicate whether any of those were a current 
romantic partner. If a romantic partner was nominated, participants were then 
asked provide information about that particular SO. In the second experimental 
session processing goals are manipulated by either introducing the questionnaire 
in the standard fashion (i.e., as an impression formation task) or by introducing the 
questionnaire as a mock online dating exercise, where a romantic partner is more 
relevant to a dating exercise than to general impression formation. 
 Introducing a processing goal that is expected to facilitate transference, via 
a mock dating exercise, creates an opportunity for a further test of the social 
categorisation model of transference. Under this model not only would we expect a 
mock dating exercise to increase the relevance of SOs who are romantic partners, 
but we would also expect a mock dating exercise to increase the relevance of 
particular memories of those SOs. This is because the social categorisation model of 
transference rejects the idea of SO representations that are static entities that are 
stored in memory to be subsequently applied in a unitary fashion. Instead, and also 
in line with connectionist theorising, we anticipate that there is a fluid 
dimensionality to SO memories (see Chapter 5) and that those memories can 
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consequently be drawn upon in any number of ways. This means that it should be 
possible for SO memories of greater situational relevance to be able to be 
leveraged with some independence from less relevant SO memories. This idea is 
perhaps better understood from the perspective of the output of the categorisation 
processes, the salient social category. Because we are departing from the social 
cognition approach’s category activation and application model, in favour of an 
online category formation perspective, we can get away from thinking about a 
social category as a pre-prepared answer. Instead, the expectation would be that 
the salient SO and target social category is a highly bespoke cognitive creation; one 
that “is not a set of fixed attributes applied in an all or none manner, but is shaped 
selectively by the context of its application" (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 123). Said 
otherwise, in addition to expecting the extent of transference to be greater under 
conditions of relevance, we may sensibly expect the specific nature of that 
transference to be affected by relevance. Translating this into a testable hypothesis 
for the present study, we predict that, within the same romantic SO source, 
stereotypically romantic SO characteristics will be more likely to be used in 
transference than non-stereotypically romantic SO characteristics (H3). 
 The final unique contribution of the present study concerns the statistical 
techniques utilised, which is a response to the need to conduct a test of the social 
categorisation model of transference under conditions of greater statistical power 
than achieved in either Study 1 or Study 2, where small and unequal cell sizes were 
experienced. While participant recruitment of course remains a key area of focus, 
in the present study this issue is further addressed by leaving behind aggregate 
comparisons and ANOVA as the analysis tool for hypothesis testing. Instead, a 
mixed logit model analysis (i.e., multilevel logistic regression) is adopted, which 
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has been shown to have more power than traditional ANOVA analysis, as well as be 
better equipped to avoid identifying spurious effects (Jaeger, 2008). 
 A mixed logit model analysis also introduces the opportunity to perform a 
signal detection analysis (SDT) (Wickens, 2001), which would be infeasible under 
the sample size constraints that were experienced in Study 1 and Study 2 (see also 
DeCarlo, 1998; Van Rooy, Vanhoomissen, & Van Overwalle, 2013). SDT provides a 
more rigorous test of the underlying memory construct in play during 
transference. Transference is theorised to occur due to the heightened activation 
of SO information, which is complicated by the fact that one would expect to find in 
most circumstances a memory advantage for items that are part of a SO 
description, regardless of any additional context manipulation. By using SDT 
analysis it is possible to identify genuine enhanced item-memory. SDT achieves 
this by measuring participants’ ability to distinguish between “signal” and “noise”. 
This is operationalised in terms of the difference between hits (correct ‘yes’ 
responses) and false positives (incorrect ‘yes’ responses), also referred to as d’. 
This measure, d’, is well established as a reliable measure of genuine item-
memory: The higher d’, the more accessible the signal, or memory construct, that is 
driving the responses. In typical transference studies, d’ is not used. The presence 
of transference is typically determined on the basis of false positive confidence, the 
occurrence of false positives, or, at best, the sum of hits and false positives. In order 
to rule out experimental priming of SO characteristics the transference literature 
has thus far relied solely on the two-week delay between SO feature listing and the 
memory test (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1995). As such, it is 
premature to claim, based on those results, that it is in fact SO information in 
memory that is driving the transference effect. For instance, perceivers may simply 
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be more willing to say ‘yes’ to particular types of information that might be related 
to a SO, because that information is more familiar (Labiouse, 2004). In other 
words, transference might be due to a general bias rather than enhanced item-
level memory for SO information. Thus, the claims that perceivers “misremember” 
target information or that “false memories” are created when a new person 
resembles a SO might be unsubstantiated. 
Method 
 Procedure overview. Once again the present study follows idiographic-
nomothetic experimental procedure introduced in Chapter 2 and utilised for Study 
1 and Study 2, with specific alterations to reflect particular hypotheses. Broadly 
speaking the specific alterations were a) in session one to screen out participants 
that did not nominate a romantic partner as a SO, b) in session one to ask 
participants to rate how stereotypically romantic each nominated SO characteristic 
was, c) in session two to include a processing goal experimental condition where 
the questionnaire is introduced as a mock online dating exercise, and d) to further 
tailor the dependent measures to suit. 
 Participants and design. Although we were wary of the challenges 
experienced in Study 1, the timing of the present study was such that social media 
was the most appropriate recruitment method available. Through that medium 
258 individuals volunteered to participate, and those individuals were directed to 
an online screening survey. Individuals who did not nominate a significant current 
or previous romantic partner as a SO, or who did not fully complete the screening 
procedure, were excluded from further participation. The remaining 108 
individuals were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions in a 
two (intraclass distance: low/high) by two (processing goal: control/relevant) 
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between subjects factorial design. Of those who were included in the second phase 
of the study, 64 returned to participate. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 28 
with an average age of 22, all participants were native English speakers, and 50% 
of participants were female3. 
 Procedure. On this occasion the first survey session was introduced as a 
survey about “significant people in your life” and participants were informed that 
they would be asked to provide personal information about their relationships. 
After collecting demographic information (i.e., native language, gender, age, 
nationality, and occupation), participants were asked to list fives SOs, or “persons 
who may be living or dead but who are currently significant and important to you”, 
and then rank those SOs in order of their current significance. To screen out 
persons who did not nominate a romantic SO, participants were then asked if they 
shared a romantic relationship (current or previous) with one of these five SOs. 
Participants whose list of five SOs did not include anyone with whom they had a 
romantic relationship were thanked, debriefed and instructed to close their survey 
window. 
 Participants who did share a romantic relationship with one of their five 
SOs were asked to generate a list of eight “characteristics, qualities or faults” that 
describe that person. These eight descriptors were then re-presented to 
participants who were asked to assess on a three-point scale the degree to which 
each descriptor was stereotypical of a romantic role4. Participants were then asked 
to choose 12 traits from the usual list of 95 adjectives that they felt were neutral or 
irrelevant to their SO5. As per the Study 1, participants were thanked and asked if 
they would be interested in participating in a second, largely unrelated study, 
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relating to “how we encode information about people we meet for the first time”. 
Participants who were interested were asked to provide an email address. 
 In session two, reflecting the processing goal experimental manipulation, 
one half of the participants were randomly selected to be provided with 
instructions for the recognition task that were similar to those that were presented 
to participants in Study 1. This was the control condition and here the 
questionnaire was introduced as an impression formation survey where “a 
number of characteristics of an individual will be presented. You will be asked to 
memorize this information, and will be asked to retrieve the information in a 
memory test later on.” The other half of participants were presented with 
instructions that introduced a processing goal where SO information was likely to 
be relevant. In the task relevant condition the following more elaborate cover story 
was presented: 
 This person has made their information available anonymously via a 
recruiting website to help with the current research into how people 
process information about new acquaintances. This person is a member of 
an online dating service and has provided us with a brief description of 
themselves. This personal description is posted on their profile page and is 
included in all emails to prospective dating partners. We want you to 
imagine you are approached by this person via email. Read the personal 
description as if you were seriously considering whether or not to meet this 
person in a romantic/dating capacity. Do they seem attractive to you? We 
want your opinion of them as a person hypothetically available to you as a 
potential romantic partner. 
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Following this introduction to the task, or the control introduction, all participants 
were then presented with a short statement presumably written by the target 
person. This statement was comprised of eight randomly ordered characteristics. 
For participants in the low intraclass distance condition, four of those 
characteristics were drawn from their session one descriptors of their SO, while 
for participants in the high intraclass distance condition, as per the yoking 
procedure, those four characteristics were drawn from another participant’s 
session one SO descriptors. The remaining four characteristics of the target were 
randomly selected from among those characteristics identified as irrelevant to a 
SO in the session one survey. On such statement, for example, read “Hello. I am a 
romantic, smart, yet disorganised person. At times I can be a bit of a perfectionist 
yet generally I am a normal, lucky person even if I am a little inexperienced. I 
would also describe myself as tall”. The eight characteristics were then restated in 
list form and participants were instructed to commit the characteristics of the 
target to memory in preparation for the recognition task.  
 That recognition task was presented after the usual distractor. In that task 
each participant was given essentially the same instructions as for Study 1 and 
Study 2, and then was sequentially presented with 24 randomly ordered 
characteristics. Those 24 characteristics comprised of the eight characteristics 
presented during the learning phase, as well as 16 characteristics that were not 
presented during the learning phase. Of those not presented during the learning 
phase, at least four were characteristics from the participants own SO descriptions 
(with eight own SO characteristics included for participants in the high interclass 
distance condition), while the remaining distractor items were drawn from the 
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participants own nominated irrelevant items and where necessary another 
participant’s SO descriptions.  
 In the interests of managing Type I error risk (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011), here the dependent measures for the present study were 
limited to those that were most appropriate given the mixed logit model analysis. 
These were all based on the participant choices made during the recognition task 
(e.g., the false positive rate and d’). The IOS manipulation check was excluded from 
the present study in the interests of brevity and in light of the consistent results 
across Study 1 and Study 2, however, participants were still asked to offer their 
best guess as to the purpose of the research to ensure that they had not become 
suspicious as to the true nature of the study and the connection between 
experimental session one and two. 
Results 
 Participant attrition. Of the 258 session one participants, 150 could not be 
included in session two either because they did not sufficiently complete the 
session one questionnaire, because their responses during session one could not 
be used to generate the necessary stimuli for the recognition task, or because they 
did not nominate a SO who was a current or previous romantic partner. Of the 108 
participants invited to participate in session two, 64 participants returned. Of 
these, 12 participants were excluded from the analysis because they did not 
complete the questionnaire. In the end approximately 20% of the total participant 
pool, or 52 participants, could be included in the analysis. 
 While the 80% overall attrition rate is a return to the challenging attrition 
rate experienced in Study 1, which once again raises questions in terms of 
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statistical power, on this occasion the planned mixed logit model analysis means 
that the obtained sample size was far more likely to be sufficient. 
 Integrity of study pretence. None of the participants indicated that they 
had detected the true nature of the study or the nature of the connection between 
experimental session one and two. 
 Main analysis. The main analysis is reported below in three sections. The 
first reports the outcome of the comparably straight forward mixed logit model 
analysis of false positive rates as they pertain to H1, the classic transference 
finding, and H2, the impact of a relevant processing goal. In the second we report 
the outcome of the signal detection analysis pertaining to HI, which provides a test 
of whether the classic transference finding does indeed involve enhanced item 
memory. Finally, the third section reports our test of H3, that which specific SO 
characteristics are transferred is also shaped by processing goals. 
 Traditional transference false positive rate analysis. Multilevel modelling 
analyses usually are conducted via a series of model-building and comparison 
exercises, typically starting with a restricted model (for instance, an intercepts-
only model) and then adding predictors according to the analyst’s requirements. A 
Chi-square test is used to determine whether adding predictors significantly 
increases a model’s ability to fit the data at hand. We will follow that approach 
below, beginning first with a test for the basic transference effect using the 
traditional analysis. 
Our primary hypothesis was that the probability of a false positive would be 
greater in the low as opposed to the high intraclass distance condition. Consistent 
with traditional transference analyses, a false positive was operationalised as an 
incorrect response of ‘Yes’ to a recognition task item that was not presented as 
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part of the target in the learning task (i.e., a distractor, see Table 7.2). 
 
Table 7.2 
Response outcomes for different item types 
Item type 
Response 
 
‘No’ ‘Yes’ 
Target (1) Miss Hit 
Distractor (2) Correct rejection False positive 
 
Note. Numbers within parentheses indicate dummy coding used the models. 
 
We start with a simple, restricted model that tests the linear relationship 
between the logit probability of a participant saying ‘Yes’ to a distractor item (i.e., a 
false positive) and intraclass distance (Distance; High intraclass distance = 0, Low 
intraclass distance = 1) and item source (SO; whether the item was taken from the 
participant’s SO [SO = 1], or another source such as an irrelevant item or a yoked 
SO [Non-SO = 0]). Importantly, the beta coefficients reported for each variable are 
logits, which indicate the odds of a particular event (more details follow below), 
while the numbers reported in figures and tables are not logits and instead the 
average probability of a ‘Yes’ answer, which is more intuitive. As mentioned, we 
will start with a restricted model:  
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1SOij + β2Distanceij + eij 
 
A significant main effect of item source was found β1= .52, p < .05, which indicates 
that participants were more likely to say ‘Yes’ (i.e., a false positive) to SO items. 
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More specifically, we can conclude that the odds of an incorrect answer for SO 
items is approximately .52 times (or e0.52) higher than for non-SO items. There was 
no significant main effect of intraclass distance (p > .1); we therefore removed the 
term from the model. Instead, an intraclass distance by item source interaction 
term was added, which allows us to determine whether the probability of a false 
positive specifically among SO items (i.e., SO = 1) was moderated by intraclass 
distance, the basic prediction of transference:  
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1SOij + β2(SO:Distance)ij uj + eij 
 
As expected, including the intraclass distance by item source interaction term 
increased the model fit with the data; X2 (1) = 3.68, p < .001. The interaction was 
significant, β2 = 1.03, p < 0.05, and the main effect for item source became non-
significant (p > .7). As can be seen from Table 7.3., this significant interaction 
reflects a greater probability of a false positive in the low intraclass distance 
condition among SO items as opposed to non-SO items. This was not the case in the 
high intraclass distance condition. This supports H1 and is consistent with 
previous transference studies that claim participants make extra, SO-consistent 
attributions about a target when that target shares characteristics with a SO. 
Further, as the main effect of item source became non-significant when the 
interaction term was included, we can safely infer that the impact of item source 
was moderated by intraclass distance. 
 
  
 229 
Table 7.3. 
Probability of false alarm as a function of intraclass distance and SO 
Item source 
Intraclass distance 
 
High (SD) 
[0] 
 
Low (SD) 
[1] 
Non-SO item [0] 0.11 (0.31) 0.08 (0.28) 
SO item [1] 0.10 (0.30) 0.14 (0.34) 
 
Note. Numbers within square brackets are values of dummy codes in model. 
 
 The next stage in the analysis was to test whether processing goal 
moderated the probability of a false positive, and if so, among which items. Adding 
a term for processing goal to the model (Goal; Control = 0, Goal relevant = 1) did 
not improve the fit of the model (p > .7). However, adding the interaction between 
processing goal and SO did improve the fit of the model, X2 (1) = 5.1702, p < .05: 
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1SOij + β2(SO x Distance)ijuj + β3(SO x Goal) + eij 
 
The interaction was significant, β3 = 0.96, p < 0.05 and Figure 7.1 shows that 
within the goal relevant condition the probability of false positives was higher for 
SO items than for non-SO items. It also shows that between processing goal 
conditions false positives among SO items were higher in the goal relevant 
condition. This is consistent with our hypothesis that SO derived false positives 
would be more likely when the SO is in some way relevant to the task at hand. 
Within the processing goal control condition almost no difference in error between 
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items of varying sources was found; without the dating exercise task, information 
relating to the romantic SO was no more important than other information. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Average probability of a false positive as a function of goal relevance 
and item source. 
 
Adding the three-way interaction between SO, goal relevance and intraclass 
distance did not improve the fit of the model, p > .1. However, a trend was present 
suggesting that the relative difference between SO item false positives and non-SO 
item false positives was largest in the low intraclass distance by task relevant 
condition (Figure 7.2). 
 
 231 
 
Figure 7.2. Average probability of a false positive as a function of processing goal, 
item source, and intraclass distance. 
 
Signal Detection Analysis. Turning to our signal detection analysis, we 
investigated whether discriminability was reduced within the low intraclass 
distance condition among SO items compared to non-SO items. As mentioned 
previously, discriminability, as measured by d’, provides a reliable measure of 
genuine item-memory. If SO information in memory is indeed used in the low 
intraclass distance condition then participants should be less able to distinguish 
between target items and distractors when the item is from a participant’s own SO 
in comparison to when it is not. This is in line with schema research where higher 
false positive rates are attributed to memory confusion between inferences from 
data and traces of observed stimulus features (e.g., Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; 
Locksley, Stangor, Hepburn, Grosovsky, & Hochstrasser, 1984). As previously 
explained, the coefficient of interest for the logistic model is the log of the odds 
ratio, ln(OR). Conceptually, ln(OR) can be thought of in a very similar way to d’. 
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While d’= z(hit rate) - z(false positive rate), ln(OR) = ln(odds of a hit) - 2 ln(odds of 
a false positive). An approximate relationship between them is ln(OR) ≈ 1.6d’. As 
with the previous analysis, the units for all the β values we report are logits, 
though for graphing the data we use the probability of participants responding 
with ‘Yes’. 
As above, the analysis begins with a comparably simple model, with 
variables for item category (Target; Target = 1, Distractor = 0) and item source 
(SO; OwnSO consistent = 1, OwnSO inconsistent = 2) included. 
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1Targetij + β2SOij + eij 
 
A main effect of target was found, β1= 3.95, p <.001 reflecting a higher rate of hits 
overall than false positives. That is, participants recognised target items more than 
distractor items and were not responding ‘yes’ to everything. A main effect for item 
source was significant, β2= 0.58, p <.05, reflecting a general bias to respond with 
‘Yes’ to SO items (which is in line with the preceding analysis of false positives). 
The addition of a processing goal variable to this model did not significantly 
improve the model fit, p >.1, and was thus removed from further analysis. The next 
model included the interaction between item type (Target) and item source (SO): 
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1Targetij + β2SOij + β3(Target x SO)ij + eij 
 
Including the interaction term significantly increased the model’s fit to the data, X2 
(1) = 3.74, p < .053, which indicated that item source significantly moderated the 
difference between the probability of hits and false positives. The main effect of 
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item source still significantly moderated accuracy, β2 = -1.15, p < 0.05, but now 
acted in the opposite direction. Critically, in support of our primary transference 
hypothesis, this suggests that participant’s ability to distinguish target items from 
distractor items was reduced when they were descriptive of a participant’s SO in 
comparison to terms that were not. These findings are the first of their kind to 
indicate that SO characteristics are truly experienced as an aspect of the new 
person. 
 Measuring the use of romantically relevant characteristics. As per H3, it 
was our expectation that presenting target persons during a task that related to 
romantic relationships would increase the use of SO information pertaining to that 
task in particular. On average, 22% of the terms generated to describe SOs were 
classified by participants to be highly stereotypical of romantic roles (e.g., “loving”, 
“caring”, “honest”), while 45% were rated as highly non-stereotypical (e.g., 
“worldly”, “organised”, “intelligent”) (the remainder of representation-consistent 
items were not rated strongly in either direction and were not included in this 
particular analysis). An increased false positive or hit rate among romantically 
relevant terms served as a measure of the use of romantically relevant information 
from amongst SO memories. In order to explore whether processing goal affected 
all SO items equally, or more so those that were stereotypically romantic, an 
analysis was performed on the probabilities of responding ‘Yes’ to all items 
sourced from a SO. Filler items were not rated for stereotypicality, and were thus 
also left out of this analysis. A basic model was built including a term for item type 
(Target; Target = 1, Distractor = 0) and item source (SO; OwnSO consistent = 1, 
YokedSO consistent = 0): 
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Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1Targetij + β2SOij + eij 
 
This model produced a significant main effect for item type, β1= 4.57, p <.001, 
reflecting a greater overall hit rate than false positive rate (Mtarget = 0.84, SDtarget = 
0.37 > Mdistractor = 0.09, SDdistractor = 0.30). No main effect of item source was found, 
which could be a statistical artifact of the absence of “OwnSO” items within the 
target person descriptions in the high intraclass distance condition. Hence, we 
removed SO from the model. Next, a term was added for the degree to which items 
were stereotypical of a romantic role (Stereotype; Stereotypical = 1, Non-
stereotypical = 0): 
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1Targetij + β2Stereotypeij + eij 
 
Including stereotype in the model increased its fit to the data, X2 (1) = 10.621, p < 
.001. We found a significant main effect for the stereotypicality of SO items, β2= 
0.86, p <.001, showing that participants were more likely in general to respond 
‘Yes’ when an item was highly stereotypical of a romantic role (Mstereotypical = 0.30, 
SDstereotypical = 0.46 > Mnon-stereotypical = 0.26, SDnon-stereotypical = 0.44). In this model, the 
β1 coefficient for item type remained relatively unchanged. In the next model, we 
added the interaction term between target and stereotype: 
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1Targetij + β2Stereotypeij + β3(Target:Stereotype)ij +eij 
 
The fit of the model improved significantly, X2 (1) = 9.10, p < .001, and the 
interaction effect was significant, β3 = -1.6212, p <.01. Table 7.4. shows that 
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stereotype only affected false positive rates, which were higher for stereotypical 
(M = .12, SD = 0.32) in comparison to non-stereotypical items (M = .07, SD = 0.25). 
This is in line with the preceding false positive analysis, which showed strong 
effects for processing goal, as well as in line with our analysis of discriminability in 
the low intraclass distance condition, which did not show a similar effect, perhaps 
due to the inclusion of hits which were not as affected by processing goal. The 
main effect β value for stereotype did not change significantly. 
 
Table 7.4. 
Average probability of a ‘Yes’ response as a function of item type and stereotype 
Item type 
Stereotype 
 
Non-stereotypical (SD) 
[0] 
Stereotypical (SD) 
[1] 
Distractor [0] 0.07 (0.25) 0.12 (0.32) 
Target [1] 0.84 (0.37) 0.84 (0.36) 
 
Note. Numbers within square brackets are values of dummy codes in model. 
 
 Next, we added a main effect for processing goal, which did not improve the 
fit (p >.6), and then an interaction term between stereotype and processing goal.  
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1Targetij + β2Stereotypeij + β3(Target:Stereotype)ij + 
β4(Stereotype:Goal)ij + eij 
 
Adding this interaction did improve the model fit, X2 (1)= 5.15, p < .05, with a term 
coefficient β4 = 0.87, p < .05, reflecting increased probability of false positives in 
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the goal relevant condition among terms that were stereotypically relevant of 
romantic roles (Figure 7.3). This provides evidence that SO information relevant to 
romantic contexts was used more when participants were performing a romantic 
task. Adding this interaction term marginally reduced the main effect of 
stereotype, but the model still maintained that across processing goal conditions 
participants exhibited a general response bias towards items which were 
stereotypical of a romantic role, β2 = 1.01, p < .05. The addition of a three-way 
interaction (Target:Stereotype:Goal) did not improve model fit, p > 0.72, and was 
thus not included in the model. 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Average probability of a false positive as a function of processing goal 
and item stereotypicality. 
 
Discussion 
In the present study the obtained results supported our prediction that 
memories of SOs would play a role in the perception of newly encountered people 
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who share characteristics with that SOs (H1). We observed a significantly higher 
rate of false positives in the low intraclass distance condition for SO items; 
participants declared non-present SO characteristics to be present for a target 
person more often as the intraclass distance between the SO and the target person 
decreased. Said otherwise, in this our third attempt we were able to replicate the 
classic transference finding. Moreover, the signal detection analysis showed that 
when there was comparably low intraclass distance (i.e., when there were shared 
characteristics between the SO and the target person) participants’ ability to 
distinguish between target and non-target items was reduced. Thus, the presence 
of cues toward the SO affected the accuracy of recognition memory for target 
persons, strongly suggesting that the impression formation of a new target person 
was guided by memories of participants’ SOs. 
Regarding the first of our novel hypotheses, our prediction that the extent of 
transference would be moderated by processing goal (H2) was partially supported. 
Although the predicted three-way interaction was not significant, the observed 
trend was consistent with our expectations. The difference between the rate of 
false positives for SO characteristics and false positives for non-SO characteristics 
was highest when there was both low intraclass distance (i.e., resemblance) 
between the target person and the SO and the processing goal made the SO more 
relevant. In light of the complexity of the hypothesised pattern of results, we 
tentatively suggest that this is evidence that participants determined their use of 
SO information not just on the basis of SO to target feature congruence, but also on 
the basis of whether the SO is relevant to what the participant is presently doing. 
In addition, and not as part of our predictions, our processing goal manipulation 
also significantly affected SO item false positives regardless of intraclass distance, 
238  
or resemblance level; the mock dating exercise increased the false positives rate 
for SO characteristics in general. This suggests that perceivers may invoke SO 
information in judgements of targets because aspects of the social context, like the 
perceiver’s task, makes a SO a potentially useful source of information for that 
target. Although this could easily be confused for target specific transference, this 
effect would operate independently of baseline SO to target feature congruence 
and thus not be deemed transference in the traditional sense. Or alternatively, it 
might be said that the target’s presence in a particular social context creates a 
point of feature congruence between the SO and the target such that transference 
subsequently occurs. 
Our prediction that the specific content of transference would be 
moderated by perceiver goals and motivations (H3) was supported. SO 
characteristics rated as stereotypically romantic were more likely to be 
misattributed to the target person when participants were given a processing goal 
where romantic characteristics were more likely to be relevant. In other words, 
participants were more likely to invoke memories of a SO that were contextually 
relevant in informing their understanding of the newly encountered person. This 
finding is similar to the observation in a number of other empirical studies of 
varying likelihood of transference for different SO characteristics (Andersen & 
Cole, 1990; Pierro & Kruglanski, 2008; Pierro et al., 2009). However, while in those 
other studies such differences have been attributed to the varying centrality of the 
characteristics to stored SO representations (i.e., characteristics more central, or 
core, to the representation), here the moderating role of the perceiver’s task 
renders that explanation insufficient. Instead, these results are suggestive of a 
cognitive process that is highly responsive to the present state of the perceiver and 
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the perceiver’s experienced context, such as online category formation. 
Overall the present study provides two key empirical contributions to 
transference research. Firstly, we were able to show that the ability of participants 
to recognise target information was significantly impeded when a SO was made 
relevant; suggesting that targets were actually encoded in terms of a SO. While it 
has long been posited that SOs serve as a source of inference for others (Andersen 
& Cole, 1990; Secord & Jourard, 1956), this study is the most robust demonstration 
to date that SOs are involved in memory processes relating to newly encountered 
individuals. These results strongly suggest that more sensitive approaches to the 
measurement of transference are available and should be used whenever possible. 
The second key empirical contribution is that we were able to obtain initial 
evidence that transference behaves in accordance with the social categorisation 
model of transference. The primary aim of this study was to demonstrate that 
perceiver readiness factors, including the current goals and motivations of the 
perceiver, play a role in constraining transference. Our predictions that processing 
goals would play a role in determining both the extent of transference and the 
content of transference were largely born out. Our data has shown that, in addition 
to SO-to-target resemblance, processing goals also moderate the extent that 
memories of a SO are used to understand a newly encountered person, as well as 
showing that processing goals also help determine which aspects of a SO are likely 
to be brought to bear in transference. As articulated above, the moderating role of 
perceiver goals is not anticipated in the social-cognitive model of transference and 
instead the message is that SOs are chronically accessible and consequently that 
there will be little to no variability transference due to perceiver readiness factors. 
This is not to say that Study 3 was without opportunities for improvement. 
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For one, our application of signal detection analysis was necessarily limited. 
Although an investigation of discriminability between representation-consistent 
items and representation-inconsistent items was possible within the low intraclass 
distance condition, comparison of discriminability for SO generated items between 
intraclass distance conditions was impeded by traditional transference 
methodology. This is an artefact of the competing goals of signal detection analysis 
and that methodology. To elaborate, the usual goal of a memory recognition task is 
to investigate the ability of participants to correctly distinguish old information 
(learned information) from new information. A transference study’s goal, in 
contrast, is to investigate a perceiver’s ability to distinguish between old and new 
information when it is of a particular type; that which is related to a SO. The 
challenge arises because transference studies therefore include a control condition 
wherein the recognition task is performed without the influence of a SO construct. 
This is, of course, important theoretically, but methodologically it is a difficulty for 
signal detection. The high intraclass distance condition in the present study 
contains no SO information in the list of terms that are learned; terms that become 
targets in the recognition task. Thus, there are no representation-consistent 
targets in the recognition task, only representation-consistent distractors. This 
makes an investigation of discriminability between conditions impossible. In order 
for transference studies to truly compare discriminability of targets and 
distractors of the same source between conditions in which a SO construct is and is 
not active, an as yet unknown revision of the traditional transference paradigm 
would be required.  
There are also limitations in terms of what we can infer from our signal 
detection analysis. Signal detection analysis is not able to determine exactly how 
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SO memories affect the relative movement of signal and noise distributions, or the 
movement of a response criterion. While it can now be stated that discrimination is 
reduced by the involvement of SO memories, it is ambiguous whether 
discrimination changed because of a shift in the position of the familiarity 
distribution for old items, or because of a shift in the position of the distribution 
for new items, or because of a shift in both (Locksley et al., 1984). Said otherwise, 
recognition memory data can show only whether subjective familiarity 
distributions for new and old schematic information are closer (reflecting poorer 
discrimination) or farther apart (reflecting better discrimination) than the 
distributions for old and new aschematic information. It cannot show how the 
distributions neared or departed each other. 
  
Notes 
1. Seven participants were excluded from analysis (see Study 2, participant 
attrition, this chapter), which means that the sample’s age characteristics were 
calculated on the basis of data from 93 participants. 
 
2. Study 3 was conducted as part of Ashlee Riorden’s undergraduate honours 
project. While the design of the study was a collaborative effort, much credit 
should go to Ashlee, particularly regarding the development of the romantic 
partner manipulation and the leg work involved in conducting the study. Analysis 
of was conducted with support of Dirk van Rooy, and the interpretation of results 
is unique to the present thesis. 
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3. Twelve participants were excluded from analysis (see Study 3, participant 
attrition, this chapter), which means that the sample’s age characteristics were 
calculated on the basis of data from 52 participants. 
 
4. The three scale points were “This comment is not related to my significant 
other's role as a romantic partner”, “I would expect to apply this comment to some 
romantic partners”, and “This comment is true of all individuals when assessed in a 
romantic partner role. This is a characteristic or behaviour that most people expect 
or require of their romantic partners.” 
 
5. In the interests of clarity, on this occasion further instructions were given to 
participants for the irrelevant trait selection. For instance, participants were told 
that “this is a tricky question that is often misinterpreted. It is important that you 
check items which are actually irrelevant to your partner and not items which help 
describe them”. Also, through an administration error “clownish” was once again 
included in the list of 95 adjectives at the expense of “systematic”. 
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CHAPTER 8 
REFLECTIONS ON THE EMPIRICAL PROGRAM AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
DIRECTIONS  
 
 
In this chapter we begin by reflecting on the empirical program of this 
thesis as a whole and assessing the program against its aims. Over the course of 
three studies, each involving a somewhat complex and arduous two session 
experimental design1, we achieved mixed success in providing empirical support 
for a social categorisation based account of transference. Specifically, while in 
Study 1 and Study 2 our predictions were not borne out, in Study 3 our key 
predictions were supported. Evidence that the basic transference effect had been 
successfully replicated was found using both a traditional false positive rate 
analysis and signal detection analysis; the latter of which suggests that 
transference does indeed involve the use of SO information in understanding 
newly encountered people, rather than just reflecting a primed response bias for 
SO characteristics. Study 3 also demonstrated that both the extent of transference 
and the content of transference are constrained by the processing goals of 
perceivers. Systematic variation in transference as a function of processing goals is 
not something that one would expect on the basis of the social cognitive model of 
transference. Study 3 thus provides critical preliminary evidence that there is 
indeed added utility in a social categorical understanding of transference.  
We then turn to possible future empirical directions for transference 
research, proposing a number of possible future studies that may serve to extend 
what has been achieved thus far. Finally, in the last section of this chapter, we 
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again look to future research directions, but beyond the immediate context of 
transference. One theoretical thrust of this thesis has been to bring the 
transference phenomenon back into the fold of general social categorisation 
processes. It is therefore only natural that we turn our attention to some of the 
questions that remain unanswered in that broader research space. If transference 
is best understood as a par-for-the-course instance of social categorisation, and 
indeed cognitive categorisation, then what are some key areas where our 
knowledge of cognitive categorisation processes need development? 
Review of the empirical program 
The aim of the empirical program reported in this thesis was to 
demonstrate the utility of the social categorisation model of transference, in 
comparison to the currently dominant social cognitive model of transference. To 
achieve this, the intention was to look to the additional constraints on transference 
proposed by the social categorisation model; that is, those not also part of the 
social cognitive model. These are perceiver readiness and normative fit, as well as 
the other half of the comparative fit, interclass distance. If novel hypotheses can be 
developed on the bases of these added constraints, and then supported 
empirically, then it may be concluded that the social categorisation model of 
transference has predictive advantages as an account of the phenomenon. 
Study 1 and Study 2: Initial setbacks 
Study 1 was an attempt to show that the extent of transference can be 
manipulated by making changes to the perceiver’s frame of reference and leaving 
the SO and newly encountered target untouched; or in social identity terms, by 
keeping intraclass distances stable while altering interclass distances. In doing this 
we were careful to keep the manipulation as simple as possible to avoid the 
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accidental introduction of confounds; the manipulation involved the addition of a 
single person across conditions who shared varying degrees of characteristics with 
the target. 
The results of Study 1 did not bear out our predictions. Despite 
manipulation checks suggesting that the interclass distance manipulation did 
operate as intended, we did not observe the moderation of the extent of 
transference in line with the comparative fit principle. Indeed, we did not observe 
transference at all; there were no significant results for any of the dependent 
variables (i.e., false positive confidence, response time, false positive errors, and 
felt closeness) in the anticipated direction. The most likely explanation for this was 
the limited statistical power of the study, which arose due to a very high attrition 
rate across the two experimental sessions. To look at the issue of statistical power 
more specifically, while keeping in mind the limited utility of post hoc power 
analyses, the approximate statistical power of Study 1 was calculated using 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Presuming the desire to detect a 
small effect as demarcated by traditional social science standards (i.e., F2 = 0.02)2 
(Cohen, 1988), the statistical power for the initial 3 × 2 MANOVA was very low (β = 
.19). The follow up post hoc 2 × 2 MANOVA did not meaningfully improve 
statistical power: noting the unbalanced cell sizes, the statistical power was 
essentially equivalent at best (β = .19). 
Low statistical power is therefore a highly plausible explanation for the 
obtained null results. Nonetheless, there was another possible explanation. The 
introduction of an implicit processing goal may have been an unintentional 
consequence of our introduction of a second person to the traditional transference 
methodology; that goal being to determine the relationship between the first and 
246  
second person being presented. If such a goal was introduced for participants, then 
the likelihood of those participants using SO information in social perception may 
have been reduced because SO information is unlikely to be relevant. This follows 
the principle of perceiver readiness, which states that, inter alia, social perception 
will be driven by perceivers’ current motives and goals. This appeared particularly 
plausible in light of the absence of any of the expected trends among the means in 
the obtained results.  
The aim of Study 2 was to deliberately manipulate the presence of a 
processing goal that would have the same effect as that which may have been 
accidentally introduced in Study 1. Study 2 thus became a deliberate investigation 
of the role of perceiver readiness in constraining transference.  
To pull off an intentional manipulation of processing goals, the recognition 
task in Study 2 was introduced in two different ways. In a control condition the 
recognition task was introduced in a manner identical to Study 1, minus the second 
target person. In the experimental condition the recognition task was introduced 
as requiring participants to make a determination as to whether the target was a 
student at participants’ own university or a student at another local university; this 
being a task unlikely to be assisted by a comparison with participants’ SOs. The 
second target person was not present in this second study, as comparative fit was 
no longer the focus of empirical investigation. The manipulation of intraclass 
distance remained, of course, as that manipulation corresponds to the standard 
manipulation of SO to target characteristic overlap. Indeed, on the back of the null 
results obtained in Study 1, we were particularly interested in this Study as a 
replication attempt of the basic transference finding. 
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The results of Study 2 also did not conform to predictions. Critically, 
reduced intraclass distance did not reliably increase signs of transference among 
any of the dependent measures, meaning that the basic transference finding was 
not replicated. This meant that the predicted moderating effect of the processing 
goal manipulation could not be observed; a processing goal irrelevant to SOs could 
not reduce a transference effect that was there in the first place. This was the case 
despite efforts to address the statistical power limitations present in Study 1, and a 
resulting sample size on par with other contemporary transference studies. What 
instead was observed in Study 2 were two non-significant trends among means 
partially in line with predictions. Specifically, among all of the dependent measures 
the lowest intraclass distance condition resulted in the greatest indications of 
transference, and for one dependent measure the pattern among means was such 
that reducing intraclass distance consistently increased signs of transference. 
These interpretable trends raises some hope that an improvement in statistical 
power across Study 1 and Study 2 increased the likelihood of detecting a 
transference effect that was indeed present. A post hoc power analysis, however, 
suggests otherwise. Again presuming the desire to detect a small effect, the 
statistical power for the 3 × 2 MANOVA was still very low (β = .21), meaning that 
Study 2 was also unlikely to detect the predicted main effect and interaction effect. 
Although low statistical power remained a serious limitation of Study 2, it is 
still of value entertain the possibility that the null results did indeed reflect reality. 
It could be that in Study 1 and in Study 2 the shared characteristics between SOs 
and newly encountered targets to not make participants any more likely to see SO 
characteristics as present in the targets. We were particularly cognisant of this 
latter possibility in light of the current “replication crisis” in social psychology. The 
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replication crisis refers to the concern that vast swathes of the social psychological 
research output may in fact be built upon type 1 errors (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 
2012). Otherwise known as false positive psychology, the specific concern is that 
many of the purportedly robust, and often influential, effects in social psychology 
are instead false positives that are the result of unsuitable research practices (Kerr, 
1998; Simmons et al., 2011), which are themselves partly caused by a long 
standing blinkered focus on significant results in social psychology publications 
(Dunnette, 1966; Rosenthal, 1979). Replicating the basic transference finding thus 
became even more imperative in the third study in the empirical program. 
Study 3: Support of the social categorisation model of transference 
In order to further increase the chances of successfully detecting signs of 
transference a mixed logit model analysis was planned for Study 3. A mixed logit 
model analysis has more statistical power than traditional aggregate comparisons 
and ANOVAs. This more complex analysis also introduced the opportunity to apply 
signal detection analysis to transference. Signal detection analysis allows 
researchers to distinguish genuine enhanced item-memory from a general memory 
advantage for familiar information (Wickens, 2001). In the context of transference 
this would mean distinguishing between a general memory advantage for SO 
characteristics and an impression of newly encountered targets that is truly 
imbued with SO information. To our knowledge this was the first occasion that this 
more diligent test of the transference phenomenon had taken place. Therefore, not 
only was Study 3 an important attempt to replicate the transference effect, Study 3 
was also an effort to rule out alternative explanations more thoroughly. 
Study 3 was also an attempt to address a potential criticism of Study 2. In 
Study 2 the intention was to attenuate transference via the introduction of a 
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processing goal that was irrelevant to participants’ SOs. Should predictions have 
been supported, a valid concern would have been that the introduced processing 
goal simply distracted participants from impression formation entirely, or 
consumed cognitive resources to the same effect. The aim in Study 3 was, 
therefore, to instead intensify transference by way of an introduced processing 
goal. If transference could be shown to be intensified from a baseline level, then it 
follows that processing goals can influence the extent of transference in a way that 
is not otherwise explicable in terms of distraction or cognitive resource 
exhaustion. To achieve this it was necessary to identify and introduce a processing 
goal that was particularly relevant to participants’ SOs. To this end, a mock dating 
exercise was used. By introducing the recognition task in a romantic context, while 
simultaneously including in the analysis only those participants who had 
nominated a SO who is, or was, a romantic partner, an experimental condition was 
created where the processing goal was one where the use of SO information would 
be more likely to be useful. 
This experimental manipulation of the processing goal also afforded us the 
opportunity to conduct a further test of the social categorisation model of 
transference. That model rejects the social cognition approach notion that 
transference is the application of stored SO representations, and instead adopts an 
online category construction approach to social perception. We should therefore 
expect the SO and target categories that become salient to be highly bespoke 
entities, shaped by the perceiver’s particular social context. This led us to expect 
that certain facets of SO information would be more likely to be used to 
understand newly encountered targets. Specifically, we expected SO characteristics 
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that are stereotypically romantic to be more likely to be involved in transference 
when the processing goal was a mock dating exercise. 
Key predictions from Study 3 were supported. Critically, the basic 
transference effect was replicated. Participants made significantly more false 
positive errors for SO characteristics when the target was made to resemble 
participants’ SOs. In terms of the signal detection analysis, participants’ ability to 
recognise target information was significantly impeded more for SO characteristics 
than non-SO characteristics. This suggests that SO characteristics are indeed bound 
up in the impression formation of newly encountered people. Study 3 therefore 
provides key independent verification of the basic transference effect, as well as 
evidence via signal detection analysis that transference does involve the use of SO 
information in the development of our understanding of others. Given the present 
social psychology research environment, where scepticism abounds concerning 
the authenticity of long taken for granted empirical findings, Study 3 makes a 
substantial contribution to the social psychological study of the transference 
phenomenon. 
Study 3 also served its purpose of providing initial evidence that there is 
added value in the social categorisation model of transference. Both the extent of 
transference and the content of transference were shown to be predictable on the 
basis of the present goals, motivations, or needs, of the perceiver. In terms of the 
former, the extent of transference, there was some evidence that the presence of a 
processing goal relevant to the SO increased the extent to which false positives for 
SO characteristics were more likely than false positives for non-SO items. In terms 
of the latter, the content of transference, the presence of a romantic processing 
goal increased the likelihood of false positives for particular SO characteristics 
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relevant to that goal. Neither pattern of results is readily explicable on the basis of 
the social cognitive model of transference, for two reasons. First, the social 
cognitive model has instead emphasised the chronic accessibility of SO 
representations, which would naturally limit expectations of variability in 
response to different processing goals. And second, that model posits that SO 
representations are fixed cognitive structures that are applied to newly 
encountered targets, which does not prompt us to consider that, within the same 
SO, particular information may be used more readily on the basis of its likelihood 
of being useful for present perceiver purposes. 
Reanalysis of Study 1 and Study 2 data 
Given the success of the multilevel modelling analyses applied to the Study 
3 data, the decision was made to reanalyse the Study 1 and Study 2 data using 
those same techniques; the intention being to take advantage of the heightened 
statistical power that such analyses provide. Adopting a similar structure as that 
adopted for the Study 3 analysis, below we first report the outcome of the 
comparably straight forward mixed logit model analysis of false positive rates as 
they pertain to H1, the classic transference finding. In the second we report the 
outcome of the signal detection analysis pertaining to HI, which provides a test of 
whether the classic transference finding does indeed involve enhanced item 
memory. 
Study 1 multilevel modelling. Recall that our primary hypothesis was that 
the probability of a false positive, or an incorrect response of ‘Yes’ during the 
recognition task, would be greater in a low as opposed to the high intraclass 
distance condition. Here, to assist with the interpretation of regression equations, 
and also to marginally increase statistical power, the Study 1 three level 
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manipulation of interclass distance was reduced to a two level manipulation by 
combining the medium and high intraclass distance conditions3. 
The first modelling tested the linear relationship between the logit 
probability of a participant saying ‘Yes’ to a distractor item and intraclass distance 
(Distance; High intraclass distance = 0, Low intraclass distance = 1) and item 
source (SO; SO = 1, Non-SO = 0). As before, we began with a restricted model:  
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1SOij + β2Distanceij + eij 
 
A marginally significant main effect of item source was found β1= .40, p < .07, 
which indicates that participants were potentially more likely to say ‘Yes’ to SO 
items. More specifically, we can conclude that the odds of an incorrect answer for 
SO items is approximately .40 times higher than for non-SO items. There was no 
significant main effect of intraclass distance (p > .2); we therefore removed the 
term from the model. Instead, an intraclass distance by item source interaction 
term was added, which allows us to determine whether the probability of a false 
positive specifically among SO items was moderated by intraclass distance:  
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1SOij + β2(SO:Distance)ij uj + eij 
 
Contrary to the Study 3 results, including the intraclass distance by item 
source interaction term reduced the model fit with the data. The interaction was 
not significant, β2 = 1.03, p < 0.05, and the main effect for item source also became 
non-significant (p > .7). This means that at this point the basic transference 
prediction was not observed. 
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The possibility remained, however, that the basic transference effect was 
being masked by the moderating effect of the interclass distance manipulation. To 
test this possibility, interclass distance (Interclass distance; High = 0, Low = 1) was 
introduced into the modelling. First, introducing a main effect for interclass 
distance reduced the fit of the model. Adding the interaction between interclass 
distance and SO also reduced the fit of the model, as was the case when adding the 
three way interaction between intraclass distance, item source, and interclass 
distance. In sum, no signs of transference were evident using the traditional 
measure of false positive rate for SO items. 
In terms of the signal detection analysis, we investigated whether 
discriminability was reduced within the low intraclass distance condition among 
SO items compared to non-SO items. This analysis began with a comparably simple 
model, with variables for item category (Target; Target = 1, Distractor = 0) and 
item source (SO; OwnSO consistent = 1, OwnSO inconsistent = 2) included. 
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1Targetij + β2SOij + eij 
 
As in Study 3, a main effect of target was found, β1= 3.71, p <.001, reflecting a 
higher rate of hits overall than false positives, as well as a main effect for item 
source, β2= 0.32, p <.05, reflecting a general bias to respond with ‘Yes’ to SO items. 
The addition of an interclass distance variable to this model reduced model fit, and 
was excluded from further analysis. The next model included the interaction 
between item type (Target) and item source (SO): 
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1Targetij + β2SOij + β3(Target x SO)ij + eij 
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This also failed to improve the model fit, meaning that unlike in Study 3 no 
evidence of transference was found using a signal detection analysis. 
Study 1 multilevel modelling. Here too we begin with a restricted model:  
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1SOij + β2Distanceij + eij 
 
A significant main effect of item source was found β1= 1.72, p < .001, which as 
usual indicates that participants were more likely to say ‘Yes’ to SO items. There 
was also no significant main effect of intraclass distance (p > .7); we once again 
removed the term from the model. The intraclass distance by item source 
interaction term was added, allowing us to test the basic prediction of 
transference:  
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1SOij + β2(SO:Distance)ij uj + eij 
 
Again contrary to the Study 3 results, including the intraclass distance by item 
source interaction term reduced the model fit with the data. The interaction was 
not significant (p > 0.8), although on this occasion the main effect for item source 
retained significance, β1= 1.61, (p < .001). Thus, the basic transference prediction 
was not observed. 
As with the Study 1 reanalysis, we explored the possibility that the basic 
transference effect was being masked by the moderating effect of the second 
manipulation: in this case, goal relevance. To test this possibility, goal relevance 
was introduced into the modelling. First, introducing a main effect for goal 
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relevance (Goal; Relevant = 0, Irrelevant = 1) reduced the fit of the model. Adding 
the interaction between goal relevance and SO also reduced the fit of the model, as 
was the case when adding the three way interaction between intraclass distance, 
item source, and goal relevance. In sum, no signs of transference were evident 
using the traditional measure of false positive rate for SO items. 
The signal detection analysis began as above, with variables for item 
category and item source included: 
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1Targetij + β2SOij + eij 
 
A main effect of target was found, β1= 4.94, p <.001 again reflecting a higher rate of 
hits overall than false positives. The same main effect for item source was 
significant, β2= 0.94, p <.05, in line with the preceding analysis of false positives. 
The addition of an interclass distance variable to this model again reduced model 
fit, and was excluded from further analysis. The next model included the 
interaction between item type (Target) and item source (SO): 
 
Logit (p[SaysYesij])= β0 + β1Targetij + β2SOij + β3(Target x SO)ij + eij 
 
The result of this inclusion was somewhat paradoxical. The interaction effect was 
significant, β3 = -1.24, p < 0.05, as well as both main effects (Target, β1= 5.55, p 
<.001; SO, β1= 1.53, p <.001), yet overall the model’s fit to the data reduced 
significantly, X2 (1) = -76.70, p < .01. In any case, the significant interaction was 
counter to expectations, suggesting that participant’s ability to distinguish target 
items from distractor items was increased when they were descriptive of a 
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participant’s SO in comparison to terms that were not. There is no readily available 
interpretation for this finding4. 
 Overall then the application of multilevel modelling to the Study 1 and 
Study 2 data did not result an observations of transference, either in terms of 
traditional false positive rates, or using a signal detection analysis. This exercise 
was not without value, however, as it increase the credibility of our above 
speculation that something beyond low statistical power led to the null results 
obtained in both those studies. 
Key limitations of the empirical program 
Although Study 3 is by far the most successful study, by classic measures, it 
still has its limitations.  Most challenging for the purposes of advancing the central 
message of this thesis, Study 3 is limited when it comes to demonstrating the social 
categorical nature of transference. Empirically connecting transference with 
perceiver readiness, via the processing goals of perceivers, demonstrates the 
utility of including perceiver readiness factors in a model of transference. The 
results of Study 3 can still, however, be reconciled with a general social cognitive 
account of transference. Looking first at the extent of transference, in Chapter 7 we 
saw that broadly speaking the social cognitive tradition does anticipate that 
processing goals will constrain impression formation. It is therefore 
uncontroversial from that perspective to find that SO information was more likely 
to be utilised in the presence of a processing goal relevant to SOs. In fact, this could 
also be interpreted as a heightened readiness to apply SO representations on the 
basis of the processing goal, where the processing goal acts akin to a contextual 
cue toward the relevance of those SO representations. This would be similar to our 
explanation for the additional observation in Study 3 that a relevant processing 
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goal increased the likelihood of false positives for SO characteristics irrespective of 
the intraclass distance, or resemblance, condition. We suggested that a mock 
dating exercise could have acted as a cue as to the relevance of a SO 
representation, either directly or indirectly, because that social context created 
congruence between the target and the SO. 
The Study 3 results pertaining to the content of transference can also be 
reconciled with the social cognition approach, although this is more complex. We 
observed that in the presence of the mock dating exercise participants were more 
likely to make false positive errors for stereotypically romantic SO characteristics. 
This was interpreted as consistent with online category formation and the social 
identity notion that the construction of social categories is highly responsive to the 
social context, as well as the needs, goals, and motives of perceivers. It certainly is 
inconsistent with the social cognitive model of transference’s description of SO 
representations as stored unitary cognitive structures that are largely applied in 
their entirety. In that model, if some SO characteristics are more likely than others 
to be transferred, this is attributed to the degree of centrality of those 
characteristics to the stable SO representation ((Andersen & Cole, 1990; Pierro & 
Kruglanski, 2008; Pierro et al., 2009; see Chapter 5). To reconcile this Study 3 
result with the social cognition approach more generally, a storage space with a 
large number of dimensions of accessibility must be conceptualised. While the 
semantic content contained within SO representations would be accessible via 
cueing of that SO representation, that semantic content would also need to be 
accessible via cues that do not relate to the SO. For example, if a SO representation 
entails the characteristics ‘short’, ‘blond’, and ‘Australian’, then those 
characteristics must also be able to be cued without involving the SO 
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representation in its entirety. Australian, for instance, would need to be able to be 
cued directly by a social context involving cricket, beaches, and beer. What is 
needed is a multidimensionality of accessibility, which would no doubt be accepted 
by social cognitive researchers. 
Raising the idea of a multidimensionality of accessibility further illustrates 
the challenge for the social cognitive model of transference with respect to stored 
unitary SO representations. Multidimensionality suggests that SO representations 
should be embedded within a rich interconnected architecture of semantic 
content. If this were not the case then the semantic content corresponding to each 
SO representation would need to be isolated and unique, or if not unique, 
necessarily duplicated elsewhere (e.g., what is Australian within a SO 
representation could not be used to also inform what is Australian for other 
representations). This would appear prima facie inefficient to the point of 
implausibility. Instead, semantic content corresponding to SO representations 
should be able to be also used when necessary as semantic content for other 
representations (e.g., what is Australian for a SO representation can also inform 
what is Australian for other representations). This would avoid the need for 
duplication and allow semantic content to be accessible via any number of cueing 
avenues. Under these conditions, however, the notion of a stored n-of-one SO 
representation loses its meaning. This is because those representations become as 
bound up in the anticipated interconnected architecture as any other proposed 
cognitive representation, such as the representations for social groups. Whether 
the SO is a single individual or not has little bearing on the cognitive qualities of 
any corresponding representation; all representations can be expected to share 
 259 
large amounts of semantic content with one another and operate in the same 
fashion. 
The above brings us close to our earlier discussion, in Chapter 5, about the 
competition within social psychology at present between symbolic models and 
distributed connectionist models as sources of insight on human cognition. While 
we favour the latter, which goes hand in hand with the social identity approach’s 
online category formation view of impression formation, it is difficult to make a 
strong empirical case for this. Our argument, for instance, rests heavily on the 
greater theoretical coherence and neurological plausibility of the distributed 
connectionist approach. The reality is that both the symbolic solution proposed 
above in social cognitive terms (i.e., a rich interconnected architecture of semantic 
content), and the distributed connectionist approach, are able to account for our 
obtained data. We must therefore admit that Study 3 is limited if the intention is to 
demonstrate relevance of connectionism and online category formation to 
transference, which is part of our overall goal. Study 3’s results speak more to the 
practical utility of the social categorisation model of transference over the social 
cognitive model of transference, by introducing perceiver readiness factors. 
Demonstrating the social categorical nature of transference is where the 
principle of comparative fit becomes very useful. We have explained in Chapter 6 
how the often surprising and counterintuitive observations related to comparative 
fit help make the case for the practical utility of SCT’s model of social 
categorisation. Those surprising and counter intuitive observations can also help 
make a strong case for the social categorical nature of social perception. This is 
because those observations often suggest the presence of novel salient social 
categories; novel salient social categories being those where there is little to no 
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chance that a comparable social category had been formed by the perceiver 
previously. Novel salient social categories thus rebut the potential argument that 
what is being witnessed is actually the application of a stored schema. One of the 
earliest SCT studies is a good example of this. In the third study in their empirical 
program, Hogg and Turner (1987b) asked participants to engage in a group task in 
which themselves and six others would need to indicate on a nine point Likert 
scale how socially approved a series of personality traits were. In reality the six 
other participants did not exist and instead participants received a series of pre-
prepared responses that created a natural ingroup and outgroup distribution. In 
this study the ingroup was that group where one of the responses corresponded to 
the normatively established “correct” response (i.e., the presumed response 
participants would give without knowledge of others’ responses), and the 
outgroup varied in the direction that they differed from the ingroup; outgroup 
responses were either consistently higher or lower than the ingroup on the Likert 
scale, as illustrated in Figure 8.1. The results were such that participants’ 
responses reliably conformed away from the correct response and toward what 
was ingroup normative based on metacontrast ratio. For instance, in Scenario A 
participants’ responses shifted away from the outgroup norm of approval toward 
the ingroup norm of disapproval, while in Scenario B participants responses 
shifted away from the outgroup norm of disapproval toward the ingroup norm of 
approval. This effect was strengthened when the categorisation scheme was made 
explicit for participants, but critical for our purposes is that neither the implicit 
categorisation scheme based on approval rating, nor the explicit categorisation 
scheme, were familiar to participants. Rather, this was the first time that 
participants were exposed to the stimuli. There is no reason to suspect that 
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participants would have previously considered how socially approved the 
particular personality traits in question were, let alone formed an inclusive social 
categorisation scheme on the basis of that information. Thus, the possibility that 
participants were acting in terms of a familiar categorisation scheme, or schema, 
that had been cued and applied to the situation can be ruled out. Instead, in this 
example it is clear that participants are using the stimuli presented to construct 
novel social categories that imbue those stimuli with meaning, and then 
responding in terms of the implications of those social categories for the self. 
 
Figure 8.1. Hogg and Turner’s manipulation of the comparative context for Study 3, 
adapted from their Figure (1987b, p. 166). The numbers correspond to possible 
responses on the nine point Likert scale used by participants to indicate the level 
of social approval for personality traits. The asterisk indicates the response 
established prior to the study as the one most commonly selected outside the 
context of the study, the figures indicate responses provided by the six other 
fictitious “participants” in the study, and ‘I’ and ‘O’ denote whether those fictitious 
participants are ingroup or outgroup members for the participants, based on 
whether each group’s responses include the “correct” response. 
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 The presence of a novel salient social category would have been part of our 
explanation for Study 1’s results, should they have played out in line with 
predictions. Given that our participants were presented with a newly encountered 
target person it seems safe to assume that a SO and target social category would 
not be a social category that they would have stored in memory ready for 
activation and application. It is thus in this first study that we hoped to begin 
making a strong case for the social categorical nature of transference. By 
manipulating comparative fit it was hoped that we would see participants respond 
to the changing frame of reference in a way that clearly suggests categorisation 
processes were in operation; if a reduced number of shared characteristics 
between Person A and Person B (i.e., increased intraclass distance) increased 
accentuation effects between the SO and the target, then the natural implication 
would be that the encountered stimuli were driving the formation of a novel SO 
and target category. Of course, it would still be possible that the reduced number 
of shared characteristics between Person A and Person B simply facilitated the 
application of a stored SO representation for some reason, but without an a priori 
rationale for such an effect, the default explanation should be that transference is 
indeed social categorical in nature. 
 The value of the comparative fit principle for demonstrating the social 
categorical nature of social perception has implications for the future research 
directions. As will be seen in the next chapter section, a number of permutations 
on this theme that are attractive for the reason that, if results are consistent with 
predictions, they would make it difficult to maintain the standpoint that the 
cognitive process underpinning transference a) should be considered distinct from 
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other social perceptual processes, and b) involves the activation and application of 
stored SO representations. 
Further transference research from a social identity perspective 
In the present chapter section we describe a number of possible research 
directions that would advance the social psychological understanding of the 
transference phenomenon. These directions can, broadly speaking, be classified 
into two types. First, we will describe an additional way in which the comparative 
fit principle may be brought to bear on the transference phenomenon. Second, we 
will look at possible direct investigations of SO representations; the intention 
being to interrogate the proposed unique qualities of that construct. 
Transference and comparative fit 
The first port of call for a continuation of this empirical program would 
make further efforts to demonstrate the relevance of comparative fit to 
transference. While in Study 1 our interest largely lay in possible moderation 
within the low intraclass distance, or high resemblance, condition, it is also 
theoretically possible to see moderation of transference in a high intraclass 
distance, or low resemblance, condition. Following the principle of comparative fit, 
the idea here would be to introduce an interclass distance condition where 
interclass distance is sufficiently high that the SO and target come to be classed 
together in the absence of any effort toward increasing intraclass distance. In other 
words, the intention would be to elicit transference in the absence of the 
traditional induced similarity between the SO and the target, instead using a 
shared dissimilarity between those two social stimuli and other social stimuli in 
the frame of reference to drive the effect. This type of moderation is depicted in 
Figure 8.2, which is an adaptation of Figure 6.1 to the present discussion.
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Figure 8.2. Moderated SO and target category salience within high interclass 
distance conditions as a function of changes to interclass distances. 
 
A manipulation along these lines is particularly attractive due to the 
counterintuitive nature of the prediction, particularly in light of the social cognitive 
model of transference. That model emphasises similarity as the key predictor of 
transference, yet based on a social categorisation model of transference we have 
identified an opportunity to produce the same perceptual outcome in a way that 
circumvents similarity as it is understood in social cognitive terms. This would 
speak to the comparative utility of the social categorisation model of transference, 
as such a prediction could not be derived from the social cognitive model of 
transference intraclass distance. Nor could it be intuitively derived from the social 
cognition approach more generally. Because transference would be elicited 
without low intraclass distance, it would be difficult to understand transference as 
requiring the “cueing” of a stored SO representation; instead the necessary 
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requirement would be that the SO and target are classed together, which naturally 
implicates the social categorisation process. 
This is not to downplay, however, the challenge of operationalising an 
interclass distance manipulation sufficiently potent to produce a salient SO and 
target category in the absence of reduced intraclass distance. Although the 
possibility of such a circumstance is a natural derivation from the theory, the 
practicalities may well be difficult to navigate. This is especially true given the key 
characteristics of the classic transference methodology. In that methodology great 
importance is placed on the two week delay between nominating and describing a 
SO, and then being introduced to the target person; the intention being to ensure 
that it is shared characteristics between the SO and the target that prompts 
transference, rather than observed false positives being a residual artefact of the 
session one task. This ostensibly rules out the obvious pathway to introduce a 
clear shared interclass difference, which is to place the SO and the target aside one 
another in contrast to others in the frame of reference. While this would not 
involve the SO and target sharing characteristics, the reasonable criticism would 
be that the presence of the SO in session two is essentially cueing itself, meaning 
that any false positives for SO characteristics within the impression of the target 
would be attributable to that ancillary SO cueing. In terms of that criticism, the 
results of such a study might naturally address that concern. This would be the 
case if no signs of transference were detectible in the high intraclass and low 
interclass distance condition. If this did occur, and if without any shared 
characteristics between the SO and target, and without shared dissimilarity with 
others in the frame of reference, there were no false positives for SO 
characteristics, then it may be said that the presence of the SO in session two is 
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insufficient to induce transference by itself; therefore, in the high interclass 
distance condition any signs of transference should not be attributed to that 
repeated SO presence. 
There is, of course, every likelihood that the obtained pattern of results for a 
study along those lines would not be so neat and tidy; the mere presence of the SO 
in session two may well result in some characteristic misattribution between the 
SO and the target. Fortunately, there is another manner in which the presence of 
the SO in a second experimental session may be made methodologically sensible. 
This would entail changing the chief dependent measure for the study. In all other 
transference studies to date the dependent measure has revolved around false 
positives for SO characteristics within the impression of the target. Here we see 
utility in a reversal of that focus, instead investigating false positives for target 
characteristics within the SO. In Chapter 5 we saw that the social categorisation 
model of transference raised the possibility that, under the right conditions, the 
characteristics of a newly encountered target may come to be seen as present in a 
SO. Applying this idea to the present methodological challenge, the empirical 
hypothesis would be that within a high intraclass distance condition false positives 
for target characteristics within an impression of a SO will be increased under 
conditions of high, as opposed to low, interclass distance. 
Should a hypothesis along those lines be supported, this would be evidence 
toward the existence of a salient SO and target social category. This would not be 
because SO to target similarity had been circumvented. In fact, a parallel criticism 
about the target essentially cueing itself would remain valid. Instead, the reversal 
of the direction of accentuation would support a social categorical account because 
the perception of the SO is now bound up in the nature of the social stimuli it is 
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encountered amongst. Rather than SO representations being strictly a long term 
memory phenomenon, SO representations would be malleable as a function of who 
they are compared with, which may involve a perceived equivalence with other 
social stimuli or a perceived distinctiveness; equivalence and distinctiveness being 
lawfully predictable as a function of, inter alia, comparative fit. Once again though, 
the practicalities of a study along these lines may pose challenges. The 
asymmetries we discussed in Chapter 5, where presumably SOs are richer sources 
of semantic content than newly encountered targets and, therefore, are more likely 
to be a source of accentuated content, may mean that transference from a target to 
a SO will only occur under limited set of circumstances. Nevertheless, with the 
right recognition task we anticipate that such effects may be elicited. In particular, 
by increasing the difficulty of the recognition task, or turning again to reaction 
time measures, subtle but systematic changes to the perception of SOs as a 
function of their comparative equivalence, or distinctiveness, with a newly 
encountered target should be observable. 
Investigating SO representations in and of themselves 
 Immediately above we have discussed variations on the classic transference 
methodology. These included introducing the SO into the second experimental 
session, as well as changing the type of dependent measure of interest; specifically, 
attempting to detect false positives for target characteristics within the SO, rather 
than false positives for SO characteristics within the target. There is another 
critique that such changes may elicit; that these changes would substantially 
reduce the ecological validity of the proposed studies. After all, is transference not 
defined as the use of SO information in social perception, not the use of target 
information? And surely seldom would a SO actually be present in instances of “real 
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life” transference? These observations are correct, but the intention of such an 
investigation would not be to generalise directly from laboratory experimentation 
to the phenomenon at large. Instead, as is often the case with laboratory 
experimentation, the intention would be to examine certain aspects of theory 
aimed at explaining the phenomenon (Turner, 1981; see also Haslam, Jetten, & 
Waghorn, 2009; Haslam & McGarty, 2001). In this instance that aspect is the social 
categorical process as it relates to perception involving SOs. 
 Here we propose empirical efforts directed not at the potential relationship 
between SO representations and newly encountered targets, but rather 
investigations of SO representations themselves. This is because stored n-of-one 
SO representations are a critical element of the social cognitive model of 
transference. In fact, they are critical to the case for the uniqueness of transference 
as a psychological phenomenon (see Chapter 2). As such, here we propose an 
investigation of SO representations as described in that currently dominant model 
of transference. Specifically, we outline some potential tests of the distinctiveness 
of those representations from other types of cognitive categories. Should they 
prove to be not distinct, that aspect of the social cognitive model of transference 
would need to be amended, with implications for our understanding of the 
cognitive processes underpinning transference. 
 To briefly recap, the social cognitive model of transference posits that the 
process underlying transference is the activation and application of SO 
representations that are stored in memory as comparatively static cognitive 
fixtures. These structures are distinguishable from social categories as a function 
of their n-of-one status, which is to say that they correspond to the collection of 
knowledge about a single person only. Social identity theorists, however, are 
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sceptical about the existence of social representations that are stored as stable 
cognitive structures. Instead, where there is consistency in perception, social 
identity theorists attribute this to both the stability in the perceiver and stability in 
the environment in which the perceiver is categorising (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner 
et al., 1994). Moreover, the social identity approach subscribes to the view that a 
social categorisation process is at the heart of all perception, regardless of whether 
these categories pertain to a single person or a collection of people. 
 The above can be translated into an empirical question. On the basis of a 
social identity understanding of social perception, it should be possible to 
demonstrate the social categorical nature of SO representations, where SO 
representations are formed online and in context as a function of an interaction 
between perceiver readiness and fit, with the latter comprising of both 
comparative and normative elements. Once again (see this Chapter, and Chapter 
6), of particular interest is the possible responsiveness of SO representations to 
changes in comparative fit. If our perceptions of SOs are shown to lawfully change 
as a function of changes in the frame of reference in which they are encountered, 
then this would suggest that SO representations are indeed social categorical in 
nature. As was the case with SO and target categories, there are many ways in 
which comparative fit maybe brought to bear on SO representations. Here we will 
provide examples of two such possibilities, both of which pertain to the issue of 
extending, or restricting, a perceiver’s frame of reference. 
 SO representations and gender categories. In the social identity 
approach an extension to a perceiver’s frame of reference refers to an increase in 
the number of stimuli present. The simplest example of this was actually provided 
in Chapter 3, during our introduction of comparative fit. In Figure 3.2 we saw that 
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the addition of point C to the frame of reference changed the observed relationship 
between points A and B; once point C was included it became clear that points A 
and B were apart from one another. The same principle applies to social stimuli, 
and Haslam and colleagues (2011) provide a useful example of how social 
categorisation can change as a function of changes to the breadth of the frame of 
reference with a resulting impact to comparative fit. In their Figure 3.4, or in our 
Figure 8.3, they present two contexts. In context 1, which is a comparatively 
restricted frame of reference, there exists two females only. In that context the 
most fitting categorisation scheme is therefore one that accentuates differences 
between those females. In context 2 the frame of reference is extended to include 
both males and females. There the fitting categorisation scheme is one that 
accentuates the differences between females and males and accentuates the 
similarities within each gender group. Such a categorisation scheme is not 
meaningful in context 1 because there are no males to compare females to and the 
category ‘females’ would have no meaning or utility. It is this principle that 
explains the results obtained by Abrams, Thomas and Hogg (1990) in their study 
conducted in the context of gender. They found that participants in mixed gender 
groups spontaneously mentioned gender reliably more that groups comprised of 
only one gender, suggesting that the introduced gender diversity with the group 
prompted social categorisation along those lines. 
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Figure 8.3. Changing salient social categorisation as a function of the breadth of the 
frame of reference. The circles represent salient self-categories, while the arrows 
represent the direction of accentuation (Haslam et al., 2011, p. 67). 
 
 Using examples along the lines depicted in Figure 8.3., social identity 
theorists often argue that frame of reference extensions should result in more 
inclusive, or more abstract, social categorisation schemes (e.g., Haslam et al., 
1997). Strictly speaking this is an approximation. While the average level of 
inclusiveness must logically increase as more people are categorised, increasing 
asymmetry could also mean that, for example, one social category actually 
becomes less inclusive. Nonetheless, the idea of extending a frame of reference in 
order to increase category inclusiveness may well be fruitfully applied to the issue 
of SO representations. That is, it may be possible to extend a frame of reference in 
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such a way that SOs become categorised in a more inclusive manner, resulting in 
predictable and detectible shifts in the perception of those SOs. We will outline two 
such possibilities presently. 
 Perceptions of SOs may be shown to change as frame of reference is 
extended as it relates to gender. In fact, a manipulation of frame of reference 
following closely the example provided by Haslam and colleagues may well be the 
most appropriate. In a restricted frame of reference condition participants could 
be presented with their own SO and another person of the same gender as their SO 
(e.g., if a participant’s SO is female then the other person would also be female), 
while participants in an extended frame of reference condition could be presented 
with their own SO and another person of a different gender to their SO (e.g., if the 
participant’s SO female then these additional people would be male). The 
expectation here would be that in the restricted condition the SO will be 
categorised as apart from the second person and social categorisation in terms of 
gender is not made salient. Meanwhile, in the extended condition, the introduction 
of members of the opposite gender would increase comparative fit for gender and 
therefore make that categorisation scheme salient. This can be converted into 
testable hypotheses because gender stereotyping receives regular research 
attention. Within an English speaking western context, a reliable trend is for 
females to be perceived as comparatively dependent while males are perceived as 
comparatively independent (Antill, Cunningham, Russell, & Thompson, 1981; Bem, 
1974). Indeed, Onorato and Turner (2004) used this fact to test for shifts in self-
conception on the basis of whether gender categorisation is salient or not. They 
found support for their prediction that under conditions of gender salience male 
participants would endorse more independent traits as self-descriptive while 
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female participants would endorse more dependent traits as self-descriptive. We 
may therefore make predictions along the same lines, but for SOs; in the extended 
frame of reference, where salient gender categorisation is expected, we may expect 
more endorsement of independent traits for male SOs and more endorsement of 
dependent traits for female SOs. 
 SO representations and self-categorisation. The second context in which 
we may make predictions about how perceptions of SOs will change as frame of 
reference is extended relates to self. Here, rather than relying on a normative 
understanding of gender category content to generate predictions, we may turn to 
participants’ understanding of themselves. The aim in this instance would be to 
affect the salience of a self and SO social category by way of a frame of reference 
manipulation. Here the expectation would be that a salient self and SO social 
category would accentuate the similarities between the SO and the self. That 
accentuation may be detected by measuring perceived trait congruence between 
the SO and the self, which once again connects the present research with the 
inclusion-of-other-in-self model. Recall that Aron, Aron and colleagues’ research 
contributed to our Study 1 methodology by providing us with the concise IOS 
Scale. Here we can further draw upon that body of work. That research 
demonstrated that close others, as opposed to strangers and disliked others, are 
treated more like a self in terms of resource distribution and that close others, as 
opposed to non-close others and celebrities, are viewed as more similar to the self 
(Aron et al., 1991). It has also been shown that responses to the IOS Scale correlate 
positively with trait overlap between a target and the self (Aron et al., 1992; Aron 
et al., 1991; Aron & Fraley, 1999). These findings can be taken together as 
empirical precedent that within the domain of the self and close others, including 
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SOs, classing those entities together does result in changes to the perceived 
similarity of those entities. This is, of course, consistent with the expectations of 
the social identity approach, which is to be expected given that the inclusion-of-
other-in-self model is informed by SCT (Aron et al., 1992; Aron et al., 1991). The 
extension in this proposed study would simply be to demonstrate the contextual 
responsiveness of these interpersonal, or dyadic, social categories. 
The challenge of implicit outgroups. In these two potential studies, both 
aimed at leveraging the comparative fit principle to demonstrate the social 
categorical nature of SO representations, a potential complication is the 
inadvertent introduction of implicit outgroups into the experimental context. 
Implicit outgroups are those that are not obviously apparent to the experimenter 
as present in the frame of reference, but nonetheless have a psychological impact 
for the perceiver. To explain, in Haslam and colleagues’ illustration of frame of 
reference effects within the context of gender, the two females in isolation was 
viewed as a restricted frame of reference and gender self-categorisation was not 
expected to be salient. However, although no males were in the vicinity, the two 
females may still have a sense that it is a male dominated environment (e.g., within 
setting of a male dominated business). Under these conditions the prior memories 
of other males within that environment may come to the fore. Said otherwise, prior 
memories of other people may be psychologically introduced to the frame of 
reference by the perceivers. The result would be a frame of reference that once 
again includes both females and males and therefore is still comparatively fitting 
for a gender categorisation scheme. A similar mechanism has been described in 
adaption-level theory (Helson, 1964). In that theory the “residual” are stimuli 
which are remembered from previous experience and that affect present 
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judgements. Applied to social stimuli, the residual may be prior experiences with 
people that may be either similar or dissimilar to those who are presently being 
judged (see also Mascaro & Graves, 1973). 
If the methodological issue of implicit outgroups can be managed, and the 
predictions of studies along these lines are supported, then SO representations 
would have been shown to be responsive to the comparative fit principle. This 
would suggest that SOs, rather than being stored representations that are unique 
in their n-of-one quality and thus distinct from social categories, are intimately 
bound up in social categorisation processes. The implication of this is that SO 
representations are also highly fluid cognitive phenomena that are responsive to 
the experienced social environment. Applying this back to the social cognitive 
model of transference, as articulated above, empirical findings along these lines 
would bring into question a critical source of distinctiveness for that model. 
Without the distinctiveness of special n-of-one SO representations, the case for a 
separate social cognitive model of transference would be further weakened. 
Further social categorisation research from a social identity perspective 
In Chapter 5 we pointed to similarity based cueing, SO representation 
storage, and SO representation application, as areas where a social categorical 
approach either resolves theoretical impasses or otherwise adds some further 
clarity. In that same chapter we also identified a number of additional constraints 
on transference that may be used to better predict transference. Our focus on the 
advantages offered by the social categorisation model, and our overall advocacy 
for that model, could give the impression that we consider the social categorisation 
model of transference to be a magic bullet for our understanding of the 
phenomenon. That is not our assessment. While bringing transference back into 
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the fold of general social categorisation processes does answer some questions, 
many unknowns remain. We would still consider transference to be a phenomenon 
where continued social psychological research will further extend our 
understanding. What the present integrationist perspective does change, however, 
is the manner in which that research would be logically pursued. 
Rather than undertaking transference research in comparative isolation 
and treating it as a special case of social perception, an integrated perspective 
would suggest that the most efficient way to advance our understanding of 
transference would be to advance our understanding of social categorisation 
processes in general. In this chapter section we therefore give some examples of 
ongoing research issues in social categorisation. We briefly introduce a number of 
known gaps in our understanding of social categorisation processes; the intention 
being to provide a sense of where further research into social categorisation might 
be directed. The two example research areas to be discussed are types of categories 
and the influence of theories on categorisation. Should research relating to either of 
these social categorisation issues prove fruitful, then our understanding of 
transference would necessarily also be advanced. 
Types of social categories 
 The integrationist theme of this thesis has been largely inherited from the 
social identity approach. That approach stands out in its ability to lend explanatory 
power to a plethora of social phenomena (e.g., attraction, empathy, group 
polarisation, leadership, altruism, collective action) by way of what can arguably 
be boiled down to two cognitive mechanisms: self-categorisation and positive 
distinctiveness. Our interest in integration is also a response to long standing 
concerns in psychology about over-specialisation within the field (Branscombe & 
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Spears, 2001, Campbell, 1956; Fowler, 1990; Jacoby, 1983; Koch, 1993; Staats, 
1983, 1991), as well as social psychology’s long term memory loss when it comes 
to the research outputs of prior decades (Billig, 1996a; Tajfel, 1981). These 
concerns have helped spark our interest in looking for an explanation for 
transference is not unnecessarily predicated upon unique cognitive processes. 
 This focus on integration does not, however, mean that we are confident 
that there are no distinctive cognitive processes for particular social phenomena. 
Nor does it mean that we are closed to the idea that there may be different types of 
social categories corresponding to different social entities. It is simply the case that 
the degree of inclusiveness of social categories (i.e., whether social categories 
pertain to single individuals or collections of individuals) does not in-and-of-itself 
necessitate a separation of processes. Other category characteristics may well form 
the basis of meaningfully differentiations in terms of cognitive processes. 
Exploring these possibilities may be one valuable area of ongoing social 
psychological research. In other words, whereas in the present thesis we have 
primarily concerned ourselves with paring back superficial distinctions among 
social categories, this may be complemented by other research that is aimed at 
identifying a more foundational taxonomy of social category types. 
 An investigation of types of social categories would likely build on the 
already underway investigation of types of cognitive categories. Research has 
explored possible distinctions among categories that may determine the effects 
that those categories have on perception, and determine how those categories 
interact with one another. Wisniewski, Clancy, and Tillman (2005), for example, 
posit that when it comes to multiple entity categories there are likely four types. 
These are unindividuated groups, individuated groups, semi-individuated groups, 
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and abstract individuals. Broadly speaking, these types of groups are said to differ 
in the types of inferences that can be made to category members on the basis of 
category membership. Gentner and Kurtz (2005) offer another possible distinction 
among cognitive categories. In their research they argue for a distinction between 
entity categories and relational categories, where entity categories convey common 
properties while relational categories convey a common relational structure. They 
give the example of ‘bridge’ as a relational category, where bridge conveys a 
connection between two other entities or points. The examples given for entity 
categories are ‘tulip’ and ‘camel’, which both instil members with multiple intrinsic 
properties. Markman (2005) suggests similar typology of categories, but one that 
entails four category types: Property-based categories, relational categories, goal 
derived categories, and role-governed categories. 
 It may be that distinctions along similar lines can be established for social 
categories. In fact, with some regularity social categories are given as examples for 
category typologies. Gentner and Kurtz give the examples of ‘brother’, ‘uncle’ and 
‘person in a coma’ as entity categories, while ‘friend’, ‘social parasite’ and ‘escapee’ 
are given as examples of relational categories. Similarly, Wisniewski and 
colleagues include ‘family and ‘team’ among their examples of abstract individual 
categories. The frequent use of social categories to explore possible distinctions 
among cognitive categories makes sense from the perspective of the social identity 
approach, which considers social categories as simply cognitive categories relating 
to social stimuli. In other words, social categories are cognitive categories that deal 
with a particular type of content; the consequence being that any distinction 
identified among cognitive categories should be expected to be present among 
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social categories, which is after all a deeply rich context in which categorisation 
takes place. 
 The full array of implications for a strongly justified typology of cognitive 
categories, and thus social categories, are as yet unknown. One suggested area of 
impact is in developmental psychology, where certain types of categories are more 
easily learned than others during developmental stages (Gentner & Kurtz, 2005). 
One may wonder then whether differential patterns of learning may also be 
present in adulthood, which may in turn have implications for learning as it 
pertains to social categories and social attitude change. Here we see potential 
relevance to transference, where understanding the types of cognitive categories 
involved in transference may allow further insight into how clinicians may be able 
to encourage, mitigate, or otherwise shape transference. The goal of this discussion 
is not, however, to look to the current categorisation literature for specific 
advances to our understanding of transference. Instead our goal is to emphasise 
the ongoing nature of social categorisation research, and if anything to point out 
areas of unknown when it comes to cognitive categorisation processes. As stated 
above, we anticipate that our understanding of the cognitive processes unpinning 
transference will be naturally advanced whenever we advance our understanding  
of cognitive categorisation generally. 
 It is yet to be established whether the proposed distinctions among 
different types of cognitive categories reflect true cognitive process distinctions. 
While we have no doubt that the cognitive category typologies being developed are 
of value, it may be that these remain content distinctions and that it is still a single 
cognitive process that underpins these different category types. Gentner and Kurtz 
(2005), for instance, consider it likely that their own relational category versus 
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entity category distinction actually reflects a continuum; one where cognitive 
categories should be expected to contain varying degrees of both relational and 
entity information. This would suggest that both relational and entity categories 
are produced by the same cognitive categorisation process. 
Another reason not to presume that distinctions among category types 
reflect distinctions among cognitive processes relates to the invariably symbolic 
nature of the supporting analyses. Evidence for the existence of different types of 
categories is generally grounded in observations of language use. For example, it is 
argued that category types can be seen in the different roles that categories play in 
sentence structure (e.g., nouns versus verbs) or in the different ways in which we 
describe entities (e.g., mass nouns versus count nouns). Such observations may be 
considered to be symbolic in the sense that we introduced in Chapter 4 because 
the lens being applied is one that is tied up in the communicable meaning of 
categories. This means that evidence along these lines, as far as we can know, 
largely reflects the products of cognitive categorisation processes. Based on what 
we know about cognitive categorisation thus far, and in particular what we know 
about the potential role of connectionist networks in cognitive categorisation (see 
Chapter 5), we expect that if distinctions among categorisation processes exist 
then they will exist at the sub-symbolic level; they will operate prior to, and at 
times independent of, symbolic cognitive activity. This, of course, sets a reasonably 
high bar for what constitutes a distinction among categorisation processes. It is a 
benchmark that is necessary, however, if social psychology is to avoid attributing 
permanence to processing phenomena that actually only exist in response to the 
processing environment of a perceiver, including for instance the perceiver’s 
culture and experiences in learning. Misattributions of permanence, which could 
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also be described as the reification of content as process, carry potential costs 
because, among other things, they blind us to opportunities to change attitudes 
and behaviour. If observed processing on the part of perceivers is presumed to 
reflect a distinction among cognitive processes that is ever present and essentially 
innate, then one would hold out little hope of making changes to the structure of 
that processing. Perceiver processing that reflects the perceiver’s environment and 
other experiences, in contrast, are naturally viewed as more malleable. 
Recognising malleable processing as malleable is important if one is to remain 
open minded to the full range of possibilities for shaping the beliefs and 
behaviours of others, where shaping the beliefs and behaviours of others is the 
chief concern of social psychology (whether social psychology is upfront about this 
or not). 
The influence of theories on categorisation 
The role of perceiver theories in social categorisation is critical to the social 
identity approach. For social identity theorists, perceiver theories are an ever 
present aspect of social categorisation, and indeed categorisation is impossible 
without them. In line with the esteemed work of Medin and colleagues (Medin, 
1989; Medin, et al., 1993; Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987; G. L. Murphy & Medin, 
1985), perceiver theories are argued to constrain the categorisation process and 
allow perceivers to increase the interest or relevance of certain dimensions and 
bootstrap themselves out of the otherwise infinite relativism of social stimuli. In 
other words, faced with the choice of a practically infinite series of social 
categorisation schemes that might be constructed, it is perceiver theories that 
narrow those down to a manageable handful, and in the end help determine the 
particular categorisation scheme that becomes salient (see Chapter 5). 
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Having established that perceiver theories play a critical role in the 
categorisation process, the natural next step is to further extend our 
understanding of perceiver theories themselves. This represents a critical research 
challenge for the fields of cognitive and social psychology. Why critical? The role of 
perceiver theories in categorisation is a chief point of weakness in the predictive 
power of models of cognitive categorisation. This is because, as it stands, 
understanding the theories of particular perceivers rests almost entirely on asking 
perceivers to describe their theories, or observing the impact of perceiver theories 
on categorisation. Said otherwise, perceiver theories are only accessible 
retrospectively; once they have been formed and after they have been indirectly 
observed. This means that there is a very inductive quality to the way in which we 
can engage with perceiver theories. Where one might wish to deduce the theories 
that perceivers hold in advance, instead the best one might hope to achieve is to 
observe perceiver theories in action at time one and then make the prediction that 
the same theories will influence perception at time two. 
A good example of research efforts geared toward understanding the 
theories that perceivers bring to perception comes from social psychology. Fiske 
and colleagues’ work on competence and warmth as dimensions of impression 
formation can be described as an attempt to identify fundamental structures of 
perceiver theories (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 
2002). Under the banner of the stereotype content model, that body of work argues 
that the dimensions of competence and warmth are privileged in impression 
formation and that the way in which we engage with others is disproportionately 
affected by where perceivers position people on those two dimensions (Fiske et al., 
2007, for review). Fiske and colleagues mount an evolutionary argument for the 
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primacy of competence and warmth as dimensions of social perception and 
accordingly argue that all humans bring to social perception an innate readiness to 
classify others in those terms. Although the stereotype content model work is not 
generally articulated as an attempt to identify innate perceiver theories, this 
research is exactly that. By arguing that our perception of people is naturally 
geared toward two dimensions, Fiske and colleagues are taking a position within 
the social domain on the types of theories that people will hold; their suggestion is 
that we should always expect perceivers to hold theories of whether people are 
competent or not and whether people are warm or not. 
Innate perceiver motivations is another research area where progress might 
be made in developing our understanding of perceiver theories, despite the study 
of perceiver motivations not generally being considered in relation to perceiver 
theories. Here we refer to efforts to identify the array of psychological needs that 
are “pre-programmed” into us as part of our make up as humans. The connection 
to perceiver theories is that these psychological needs are presumed to guide what 
we determine is important and how we see the world (e.g., what things are helpful, 
what things are a hindrance). Psychological needs thus can be thought of as a 
framework upon which perceiver theories will be built. Or put conversely, 
psychological theories should make sense in light of the psychological needs they 
are serving; once again, social perception is for the sake of our doing (James, 
1890/1950, see Chapter 5). 
The potential connection between psychological needs and perceiver 
theories can be illustrated by looking at one of the archetypal needs theories, 
Maslow’s theory of human motivation (1943). Although in scholarly circles 
Maslow’s theory has been abandoned (K. R. Murphy, 2008), and indeed Maslow 
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himself later distanced himself from his theory (Maslow, 1972), the well-known 
theory does show how assumptions about individuals’ innate motivations may be 
used to make deductions about the types of theories they will hold. The 
hierarchical nature of Maslow’s needs theory for instance, where physiological 
needs and safety needs take comparative primacy, might lead one to expect that 
perceivers will devote cognitive resources toward developing and holding theories 
about whether things are nourishing or not, and whether things may increase 
safety or decrease safety. Alternatively, on the basis of Maslow’s theory one might 
expect that those who reliably have their “basic needs” met will cease to structure 
their understanding of the world in terms of physiological demands and safety 
concerns; those persons may instead be expected to develop theories concerning 
higher needs (i.e love, esteem, and self-actualisation) and use those as the basis of 
cognitive category formation.  
These loose predictions are, of course, not intended to be serious 
theoretical propositions. The use of Maslow’s largely abandoned needs hierarchy is 
intended to underscore the hypothetical nature of this exercise. The aim, once 
again, is simply to make clear that an improved understanding of psychological 
needs may, in turn, help develop a more predictive understanding of perceiver 
theories. We came in contact with a number of proposed innate human needs in 
Chapter 2 during the introduction of Andersen and Cole’s theory of the relational 
self (see also Chapter 5). These included fundamental needs for autonomy, 
competence, meaning, security, and belonging. The idea we are proposing is that 
one or a number of these needs may be used to anticipate the kinds of theories that 
perceivers will hold about the world without resorting to the measuring the 
theories themselves. 
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In a sense this is a longer term version of the anticipated role of short term 
goals in driving cognitive categorisation (Barsalou, 1983). The classic example in 
relation to short term goals and cognitive categorisation is ‘things to remove from 
an ablaze household’. The observation here is that perceivers are quickly and 
easily able to identify appropriate class members for that ad hoc category (e.g., 
children, pets, photo albums, medical records). To achieve this perceivers are 
presumably able to leverage a range of theories that allow for the construction of 
such obviously goal dependent cognitive categories. To continue the present 
example, these theories would encompass an understanding of what fire does to 
property, what things are difficult to replace, and what things may be easily 
carried; thus, the immediate goal of the perceiver provides clues as to the kinds of 
theories that are needed to respond appropriately to that goal. We are applying the 
same principle to innate, or ongoing, psychological needs. If it can be established 
that we humans all come with innate goals such as autonomy, competence, 
meaning, security, and belonging, then we may be able to find clues as to the kinds 
of theories that we must hold in order to respond to those goals appropriately. 
It may also be the case, however, that we are not born with a plethora of 
established psychological needs that manifest in information processing. In fact, it 
may be that we have far fewer innate psychological needs than the current social 
psychological literature might suggest. At present, arguments for the presence of 
innate psychological needs tend to rely heavily on evolutionary arguments and the 
observation of adult and child behaviours. Missing from this body of research is the 
kind of neurological evidence or experimental developmental evidence that would 
help make the definitive case that such needs are indeed akin to instinct. The 
alternative explanation thus remains that the observed needs are not innate, and 
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instead are acquired through socialisation. In fact, needs acquisition is the more 
parsimonious account. For one, social psychology has made substantial advances 
in understanding influence, or the way in which the beliefs, behaviours, and goals 
of others can efficiently become our own beliefs, behaviours and goals (Turner, 
1982, 1985, 1991). For psychological needs to be established as innate one would 
need evidence that clearly shows that influence processes cannot explain their 
proliferation. Additionally, psychological needs may emerge only in response to 
certain environmental conditions. So called belonging needs, for example, have 
been posited to help explain group behaviour and group commitment (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995). From the perspective of the social identity approach, however, an 
apparent need to belong can be understood simply as response to a salient self-
category. Here belonging behaviours are in effect driven by particular social 
circumstances; that is, the presence of subjectively real social groups (e.g., Oakes et 
al., 1994). 
Technically speaking whether a psychological need is innate or acquired is 
not of direct relevance. If needs are acquired by enough people, or provoked by 
environmental circumstances regularly enough, they may be reliably used to draw 
inferences about the types of perceiver theories that will inform categorisation. 
The real concern is that if these needs are not innate, then they might not be 
acquired or provoked regularly enough to allow for sufficient predictive power. 
Indeed, even if the exceptions are rare, the possibility that those exceptions may be 
encountered at critical occasions is what makes distinguishing between acquired 
needs and innate needs germane to this discussion. Even then, that distinction 
between acquired and innate needs may prove to be insufficient to make this a 
genuinely useful line of enquiry. Although identifying psychological needs as 
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innate may mean that we can sensibly expect their omnipresence (leaving aside for 
the moment the complex manner in which innate needs may interact with the 
environment), this wouldn’t necessarily translate into meaningful predictive 
power. Meeting innate needs might still be a very small part of what drives human 
behaviour and cognition. Said otherwise, the role that innate needs have in 
underpinning the perceiver theories that go on to inform cognitive categorisation 
might pale in comparison to the role of acquired needs in doing the same (cf. 
Pickett & Leonardelli, 2006). This would be in line with the general expectation of 
many researchers that it is fundamentally impossible to meaningfully understand 
people outside of the societies in which they exist; the expectation that humans are 
inexorably social beings (Onorato & Turner, 2004; Reynolds & Turner, 2006; 
Stolorow, 1991; Turner & Onorato, 1999). 
To sum up, it is a fair assessment that social psychology has not progressed 
far in developing a functional understanding of perceiver theories as a component 
of the cognitive categorisation process (G. L. Murphy, 2005), nor is it clear that 
social psychology will ever be able to do so. In terms of innate psychological needs 
as a pathway to predicting perceiver theories, little progress has been made in this 
domain. Further, the likely substantial role of acquired needs may well trivialise 
any progress that may be made in the future. The same may be said of attempts to 
identify fundamental structures of understanding more directly, as in the example 
of the stereotype content model. Here too research is in its infancy and here too 
practical utility may be an unrealistic goal; it may be that focusing attention on the 
competence and warmth dimensions, for instance, is too reductionist and distracts 
from critically important content and context for impression formation 
judgements. This is not to say that ongoing research in these directions is not 
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warranted; indeed, the entire point of this chapter section is that it is cognitive 
categorisation research of exactly this kind that may advance our understanding of 
phenomena like transference. Our departing message here is only that we should 
also be prepared for a reality where perceiver theories are only something that we 
can engage with at face value. That is, it may be that we will only ever be able to 
engage with the perceiver theory component of the categorisation process after 
perceiver theories have been formed and after they have been observed in action. 
It may be that a functional psychological approach to cognitive categorisation will 
always need to be complimented by something akin to a sociological study of 
perceivers and the societies they inhabit (e.g., Turner & Reynolds, 2001). 
Summary 
In the present chapter we have discussed three topics that follow naturally 
from the empirical program reported in this thesis. First, we assessed the 
empirical program against its aims and made a number of reflections on that 
program. Overall we found that Study 3 made some headway into establishing 
empirical support of the social categorisation model of transference. That being 
said, Study 3 was not without its limitations. In particular, although the results of 
Study 3 are in opposition to the expectations of the social cognitive model of 
transference, those results are still able to be reconciled with the social cognition 
approach more generally. This limitation brought us back to the importance of 
implicating comparative fit in transference. We suggested that a strong case could 
be made for a social categorical understanding of transference, as opposed to a 
social cognitive understanding of transference, if transference could be shown to 
be predicted on the basis of comparative fit manipulations that aimed to make 
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novel social categories salient. Returning to comparative fit manipulations would 
therefore be one obvious avenue for future transference research. 
In terms of additional avenues for future transference research, also 
discussed was the possibility of transference research concentrating on SO 
representations themselves. Specifically, we proposed research aimed at testing 
the tenet of the social cognitive model of transference that SO representations are 
stored in memory as comparatively static cognitive fixtures. 
In the final section of this chapter we took a brief look at additional avenues 
for future cognitive categorisation research outside of the context of transference. 
This makes sense in light of our proposed theoretical approach. We view 
transference as a par-for-the-course instance of social categorisation, which 
therefore makes it a par-for-the-course instance of cognitive categorisation. As 
such, the best way to advance our understanding of transference, from a social 
psychological perspective, is to advance our understanding of cognitive 
categorisation in general. The two additional avenues for future categorisation 
research that we explored were types of categories and the influence of theories on 
categorisation. Each of these represents a key area of unknown for our 
understanding of cognitive categorisation. 
 
Notes 
1. The classic transference methodology is laborious mostly due to the need to 
individually vet every SO descriptor volunteered by participants. Over this 
empirical program well over 4,300 SO descriptors were checked for 
appropriateness and paraphrased as necessary. 
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2. Where effect sizes are reported in transference studies, the main effect for the 
resemblance conditions is generally in the small to medium range according to 
traditional social science standards (d = 0.30, Berenson & Andersen, 2006; d = 
0.13, Brambaugh & Fraley, 2006; η2 = .07, Kraus & Chen, 2010; η2 = .13, Kraus et 
al., 2010). Because our investigations targeted presumably small perceptual effects 
acting in interaction with main effects of comparable size, detection of small effect 
sizes would be the natural ambition. 
 
3. The decision to combine the medium and high intraclass distance conditions was 
made on the basis of the observed means for Study 1, as reported in the post hoc 
trend analysis. Given the generally null results obtained in the below analysis, a 
parallel analysis was performed using the converse grouping (i.e., low and medium 
intraclass distance vs. high intraclass distance). Results were nigh identical, and 
are not reported here in the interests of brevity. 
 
4.  Consistent with the Study 1 reanalysis, a parallel analysis was performed using 
the converse grouping for the intraclass distance manipulation (i.e., low and 
medium intraclass distance vs. high intraclass distance). On this occasion the only 
difference was an unanticipated significant interaction between SO and goal 
relevance, β = 1.45, p <.05, when attempting to replicate the basic false positive 
transference finding. This again coincided with a reduced overall model fit and was 
also not readily interpretable.
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CHAPTER 9 
IMPLICATIONS  
 
 
Here, in the final chapter of this thesis, we reflect back on the social 
psychology of transference and explore ways in which a social categorical 
understanding of transference changes how we think about the phenomenon. In 
particular, we return to three areas of inquiry that have featured earlier in this 
thesis. These are a) transference and other social psychological phenomena, b) the 
relational self, and c) transference in the clinical domain. In terms of transference 
and other social psychological phenomena, and also the relational self, our general 
observation is that a great number of disparate empirical findings can be explained 
by way of a single cognitive process that operates quite happily, and indeed highly 
efficiently, across social contexts. 
In terms of transference in the clinical domain, here we return to the topic 
raised at the very outset of this thesis: the management of transference through 
social psychology. Here the social categorical account of transference leads us to 
think differently about how therapists might determine the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of a particular instance of transference. That model also 
changes our expectations about when transference will be attenuated, as well as 
how one might go about manifesting attenuation.  
Transference and other psychological processes 
The social psychology of transference has made connections between 
transference and cognitive resources, as well as connections between transference 
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and the perception of group members; that is, processes relating to intergroup 
relations. The social categorisation model of transference has implications for both 
of these. In terms of the former, the proposed model would have us question the 
reportedly straight forward relationship between reduced availability of cognitive 
resources and increased transference. In terms of the latter, the proposed model 
would suggest that transference may be more seamlessly integrated into the 
intergroup relations literature than is presently the case. 
Transference and cognitive resources 
Kruglanski and Pierro (2008) reasoned that transference would be relied 
upon less in impression formation when perceivers have the cognitive resources 
and motivation to go beyond heuristic processing of social stimuli. This flowed 
naturally from the social cognitive model of transference, which posits 
transference as an instance of memory based, or top down, impression formation. 
Transference is thus contrasted with data driven, or bottom up, impression 
formation, leading to the prediction that under conditions of reduced cognitive 
resource availability perceivers will rely more on transference in impression 
formation, in line with the cognitive miser and motivated tactician concepts of the 
social cognition approach. Those authors reported data consistent with that 
theorising: participants undertaking an impression formation task during a less 
optimal period in the day for cognitive processing (based on an assessment of 
participants’ circadian rhythms) showed more signs of transference. Similar data 
was obtained by Pierro and Kruglanski (2008) who found that participants who 
were higher in NfCC were more likely to use transference in impression formation. 
In their studies higher NfCC can viewed as a reduced dispositional willingness to 
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commit cognitive resources to impression formation of newly encountered people; 
NfCC is thus akin to the reduced availability of cognitive resources. 
The social categorisation model of transference does not look at 
transference as an instance of memory based processing. Indeed, the proposed 
social categorical understanding of transference rejects the assertion that 
impression formation can be usefully understood as driven by separable memory 
based and data based processes. This perspective is inherited from the social 
identity approach, which views impression formation as always founded on an 
interaction between perceiver based elements and stimuli based elements; 
specifically, perceiver readiness and comparative and normative fit (see Chapter 
3). Indeed, social identity theorists have argued at length against dual process 
models of impression formation on a number of grounds (see Chapter 5). As part 
of this they have also argued against the idea that the social categorisation process 
exists as a resource saving device, serving to allow impression formation without 
substantial expenditure of effort. They instead make the case for an active social 
categorisation process; one that uses cognitive resources to imbue otherwise 
meaningless stimuli with meaning 
This changes the way one might expect cognitive load to interact with social 
categorisation. From this perspective, reduced availability of cognitive resources 
can be expected to interrupt social categorisation, or otherwise make it more 
difficult. Put in terms of transference, a social identity understanding of the 
relationship between cognitive resources and social categorisation would suggest 
that reduced cognitive resource availability may sometimes reduce the occurrence 
of transference. This is because reduced cognitive resources are argued to at times 
impede the social categorisation process, reducing the ability for perceivers to 
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detect a comparatively small conceptual distance between a SO of theirs and a 
newly encountered target person. This can also be phrased in the opposite 
manner. A social categorical understanding of transference would suggest that an 
increase in cognitive resources may increase transference via an increased 
capacity to detect a comparably small conceptual distance between a SO and a 
target person, and subsequently construct a salient SO and target social category. 
The idea that increased cognitive resources may increase transference runs 
directly counter to the predictions of Kruglanski and Pierro (2008), and Pierro and 
Kruglanski (2008). More critically, it runs counter to the results that those authors 
were able to obtain. Thus there is an impasse here, where the predictions of the 
social categorisation model of transference are apparently inconsistent with the 
empirical data obtained to date. Fully resolving this inconsistency is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but we believe there is good reason to remain open to the idea 
that the relationship between cognitive resources and transference is more 
nuanced than has been suggested in the social psychology of transference thus far. 
More specifically, we believe that the understanding of the role of cognitive 
resource availability in transference may in the end follow a similar trajectory to 
the understanding of the role of cognitive load and social categorisation. In terms 
of that trajectory, Spears and Haslam (1997) provided a critical review of the 
evidence in favour of the generally accepted negative correlation between 
cognitive resources and social categorisation. Their review introduced good reason 
to question a cognitive miser or motivated tactician conclusion. By looking closely 
at the role of fit in relevant studies, the types of social categories investigated, 
inconstancies among obtained results, as well as possible subtle confounds in 
experimental manipulations, the authors were able to make a case that what is 
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being witnessed as a far more active and “data sensitive” categorisation process 
than was otherwise assumed. Moreover, they reported a number of studies 
generally supportive of their proposed curvilinear relationship between cognitive 
resource availability and social categorisation. 
It may be that something akin to a curvilinear relationship better captures 
the relationship between cognitive resource availability and transference. Looking 
back at the research described at the outset of this chapter section, it is notable 
that, as far as is reported, Kruglanski and Pierro only investigated linear 
relationships. We also consider it well within the realm of possibility that the 
suboptimal processing time experimental condition (Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008), 
and measurements of higher NfCC (Pierro & Kruglanski, 2008), actually both 
correspond to moderate availability of cognitive resources; moderate availability of 
cognitive resources, rather than low availability of cognitive resources, being the 
state in which Spears and Haslam predicted that social categorisation would be 
most apparent. 
The idea that the availability of cognitive resources is not negatively 
correlated with transference has practical implications for those invested in the 
occurrence of transference outside the laboratory. A quick reading of Pierro and 
Kruglanski’s work, and indeed the social psychology of transference in general, 
may lead one to believe that transference may be interrupted or attenuated if one 
were to encourage the application of more cognitive resources to impression 
formation. In a clinical setting, for example, one might direct a patient to look more 
carefully at the “true” characteristics of people, or simply encourage people to take 
more time for their impressions. A social categorical understanding of transference 
gives us reason to doubt the efficacy of such an approach, where increasing 
296  
cognitive resources would not be expected to interrupt or attenuate transference. 
We will come back to this point in the below discussion of transference and the 
clinical domain, but suffice to say here that a clinician’s attempts at intervention 
may have effects quite opposite to those that are intended. 
Transference and intergroup relations 
Kraus and colleagues (2010) investigated whether social category 
memberships may interrupt the transference of content from a SO to a newly 
encountered person. In their research transference was shown to occur 
irrespective of whether or not a newly encountered target person shared a 
political affiliation (Study 1) or an ethnicity (Study 2) with participants’ SOs. The 
results of these two studies were interpreted as suggesting that transference may 
have a role in mitigating intergroup biases. The second study was argued to be 
particularly relevant to intergroup relations issues; it included a behavioural 
measure of social attraction, and measured the involvement of collective self-
esteem in evaluation, showing that transference interrupted the role of collective 
self-esteem in determining evaluations of others. A key advance of this work was 
to connect transference with the study of intergroup relations. 
At the beginning of this chapter section we stated that a social categorical 
understanding of transference creates the opportunity to more seamlessly 
integrate the transference phenomenon into the intergroup relations literature. In 
actuality the social categorisation model of transference would suggest stronger 
language than that. Rather than more seamless integration, an implication of the 
proposed model is that really there should be no seams at all between transference 
and the social psychology of intergroup relations. This is because, from our 
perspective, transference is an intergroup, or at least intragroup, process. 
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In Kraus and colleagues’ paper a bridge is able to be built between 
transference and intergroup processes because in the social psychology of 
transference the phenomenon is an interpersonal rather than intergroup cognitive 
process. Moreover, as per the social cognitive model of transference, the 
phenomenon is a distinct interpersonal process that is uniquely characterised by 
the use of stored SO representations. This process is thus argued to run separately, 
perhaps in parallel, with cognitive processes concerning group based perception, 
and indeed separately to other cognitive processes concerning interpersonal 
perception. Using this conception of separate cognitive processes, it makes sense 
to ask the question, does one influence the other? Or in terms of the authors’ 
specific questions, does intergroup processing have the capacity to interrupt 
transference? And conversely, does transference have the capacity to affect 
intergroup processing? The answers being no, and yes, respectively. 
These questions can be rephrased in line with the proposed social 
categorical understanding of transference. The first of Kraus and colleagues’ 
questions essentially becomes, does one salient social categorisation scheme have 
the capacity to interrupt the salience of another social categorisation scheme? 
Meanwhile, rephrasing the second question gives us something highly similar: 
does one salient social categorisation scheme have the capacity to affect the 
salience of another social categorisation scheme? The overall thrust of the enquiry 
then is one of questioning whether categorisation schemes influence one another, 
and further, whether they can interrupt one another. Across social psychology the 
answer to both these questions has clearly been yes. Indeed, the idea that social 
categorisation schemes have the capacity to influence one another is a 
fundamental assumption of the social categorisation literature. More specifically, it 
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has long been assumed that social categorisation schemes may at times inhibit one 
another, inform one another, and at times do neither. 
In terms of inhibition, within SCT this is most obviously captured in the 
assumption of functional antagonism, which states that, in broad terms, the 
salience of one social category will mean that other alternative possible social 
categories will not be driving perception or behaviour. In SCT the idea that social 
perception involves a choice between categorisation schemes can also be 
understood in terms of the constraints on salience, where the perceiver readiness 
by fit interaction determines which categorisation scheme among alternatives 
becomes salient. Applying this to the questions above, if changes to the fit 
conditions, or changes to the state of the perceiver, occur in such a way that leads 
to the salience of one particular categorisation scheme, then we would naturally 
expect that the salience of alternative categorisation schemes may be diminished. 
After all, it is the one social categorisation process being employed to navigate the 
social environment. This need not always occur, and as discussed in Chapter 5 
social identity theorists have always anticipated that social perception is best 
understood as underpinned by multiple categorisation schemes, where these 
multiple categorisation schemes may at times operate independently to one 
another. Indeed, the knowledge partitioning literature has shown that our mental 
structures are well prepared to maintain isolation between even ostensibly closely 
linked knowledge domains (e.g., Kalish, Lewandowsky, & Kruschke, 2004; 
Lewandowsky, Kalish, & Griffiths, 2000; Lewandowsky, Kalish, & Ngang, 2002). 
Nevertheless, it is uncontroversial to state that the salience of social categorisation 
schemes will at times have an inverse relationship with one another. 
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In terms of categorisation schemes informing one another, we encountered 
this in Chapter 3. In that chapter we noted SCT’s expectation that social 
categorisation at one level of abstraction can influence social categorisation at 
other levels of abstraction. Reynolds and Oakes’s (1999) research was a useful 
example for us; categorisation at a higher level of abstraction was shown in their 
data to influence the dimensions on which accentuation occurred at a lower level 
of abstraction. Again, this need not always occur, and one categorisation scheme 
may operate independent of other categorisation schemes. However, key to social 
categorisation theorising is the assumption that categorisation schemes have the 
capacity to shape the salience of other categorisation schemes. 
Overall the social categorisation literature gives great flexibility to social 
categorisation, allowing categorisation schemes to inform, inhibit, or not. Kraus 
and colleagues’ obtained results can be understood in these terms. In their first 
study they manipulated whether a newly encountered target person did or did not 
share their political orientation (i.e., the target was described as either 
“conservative” or “liberal”). This manipulation of political orientation did not 
interact with the traditional SO resemblance manipulation, where both influenced 
the perception of the target in the expected manner. These results can be viewed 
as a simple case of multiple categorisation schemes acting largely independent of 
one another, yet simultaneously driving impression formation. These 
categorisation schemes are, of course, we liberals or conservatives (or not, in the 
outgroup target condition), and SO and target (or not, in the low resemblance 
condition). In Kraus and colleagues’ second study they manipulated whether a 
newly encountered target person did or did not share their ethnicity. Here too both 
the group status manipulation and the resemblance manipulation both influenced 
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the perception of the target. Moreover, on this occasion there was an interaction 
between the two manipulations: the resemblance manipulation appeared to 
partially interrupt the impact of the group status manipulation on target 
perception; specifically, in the high resemblance condition the role of collective 
self-esteem in driving the perception of the target appeared to diminish. Put into 
social categorical terms, what appears to be taking place here is that multiple 
categorisation schemes are simultaneously, but this time not entirely 
independently, driving impression formation. This is an unremarkable observation 
of social perceptual processes in action. The manipulation of the social 
environment in a way that cues one social categorisation scheme, the SO and 
target, appears to have partially diminished the salience of another social 
categorisation scheme, we ethnic group members, in the relevant experimental 
condition. 
It is clear that by taking a social categorical perspective the apparent 
novelty of Kraus and colleagues’ results is lessened. Changes to the salience of 
multiple categorisation schemes as a function of stimulus changes is not an 
eyebrow raising event in social psychology. Yet even if transference was 
understood to be a separate cognitive process to social categorisation, the novelty 
of the findings would remain somewhat subjective. From our perspective the 
natural assumption to flow from the social cognitive model of transference would 
still be that the transference process would inform social categorisation, inhibit 
social categorisation, or do neither, depending on complex perceiver and stimulus 
factors. It is for this reason that Kraus and colleagues introduced their own 
additional theorising on this topic. They argued that the political and ethnic social 
categories that they investigated represent a type of “core” dimension of social 
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perception. Group status cues, along with certain personality traits, were posited 
to heavily guide impression formation in a way that excludes or overpowers other 
possible sources of social inference. It is this additional assumption that allowed 
the authors to pitch their findings as an advance on our understanding of 
transference. However, the notion that political and ethnic social categories are 
core social perceptual dimensions is not generally accepted across social 
psychology. In fact, it is largely antithetical to the social identity approach, which 
emphasises, and has frequently demonstrated empirically, the context dependence 
of social categorisation. To give a “real world” example, any sports fan will know 
that a powerfully impactful social categorisation scheme in one context (e.g., state 
level sporting affiliation) can mean next to nothing in another (e.g., a sporting 
event between nations). 
In sum, the results reported in Kraus and colleagues’ paper are fully 
explicable by way of the general social psychological understanding of multiple 
social categorisation. Moreover, the chief claim to novelty of those findings, that 
transference may occur across core dimensions of impression formation, such as 
social groups, rests on an assumption that does not accord with what is known 
about the context dependence and fluidity of social categories. In fact, if one looks 
back on the past two decades of experimental research into transference, it is 
apparent that transference has already been shown to occur across social groups 
on a number of occasions: transference has been shown to occur across university 
year groups (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1996; Berenson & 
Andersen, 2006; Saribay & Andersen, 2007), as well as across genders 
(Brumbaugh & Fraley, 2006). Really, there is nothing to stop one from fully 
integrating transference into the psychology of intergroup phenomenon. In line 
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with our own theorising, transference may be seen as a phenomenon of social 
categorisation that may occur within a complex system of social categorisation 
processes. In other words, transference is, from a cognitive process perspective, 
equivalent to stereotyping, social projection, self-anchoring, etc. Accordingly, it 
should be unsurprising that Pierro and Kruglanski (2008), while retaining the 
banner of transference and essentially the same methodological paradigm, actually 
moved away from SOs as a source of transferred content; in their second study 
participants were asked to nominate a “current significant leader” of theirs from 
the workplace and demonstrated transference to a newly encountered target from 
memories of that individual. The ease of moving away from SOs as part of the 
transference story, in our view, speaks to the largely artificial divide between 
transference and other social categorisation phenomena. 
The Relational self 
Revisiting the theory of the relational self is an opportunity for us to 
continue to articulate an argument that transference represents an opportunity to 
better integrate interpersonal and intergroup psychology. Here the rationale is the 
same: the distinction between transference processes, taking the form of relational 
selves, and other self-category processes reflects an artificial divide in the social 
psychological literature; one that social psychology should move past. 
To recap, the relational self was viewed by Andersen and Chen (2002) to be 
a natural extension of the social psychology of transference. Those authors 
proposed that relational selves are cognitive–affective units that contain both 
idiographic and nomothetic content, and that relational selves develop as a 
reflection of the importance of SOs to our development and indeed to our everyday 
lives. Relational selves are said to play a substantial role in impression formation 
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and our subsequent response to others, to the extent that relational selves can be 
thought of as a basis for an interactionist model of personality. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, that theory largely comprises of the same tenets 
as the social cognitive model of transference. The unique contribution of the theory 
is to argue that relational selves are a key facet of a person’s personality, owing to 
the rich and important nature of the particular if-then relations that correspond to 
our SOs. These relational selves are contrasted with personal selves and social 
identities, where personal selves reflect the self as an independent and 
autonomous entity, and social identities reflect the self as experienced though 
group memberships. Andersen and Chen (2002) view their theory of the relational 
self as integrative (see also Andersen & Saribay, 2006). They suggest that 
positioning relational selves as akin to personal selves and social identities, as 
three disparate sources of personality, allows the field achieve a fuller account of 
personality in general. They further argue that by viewing these three sources of 
personality as distinct, but also sharing some equivalence, the potential 
interactions among those sources may be better appreciated. 
Our appraisal would be that the opposite is true: the proposed theory of the 
relational self actually further fragments the psychology of the self. Similar to the 
work of Kraus and colleagues, Andersen and Chen are only able to build a bridge 
between the relational self and other sources of personality because prior work 
has been done to create an ostensive gulf between them. 
The clearest way to unpack the distinction between relational selves and 
other sources of personality is to begin with the proposed distinction between 
personal selves and social identities. In Chapter 3 we saw that the social identity 
approach moved away from an initial understanding of personal selves, or 
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“personal identities”, as the realm of individual difference, or in the language of 
Andersen and Chen, as the realm of independence and autonomy. Within the social 
identity approach personal identities are now understood to also be an outcome of 
the self-categorisation process, albeit at a lower level of abstraction. From this 
perspective personal identities are an outcome of that same meaning making 
process applied to social stimuli, where the self is a type of stimuli, and what 
becomes salient is a comparatively exclusive categorisation scheme: ‘I’ or ‘me’ as 
can be contrasted with relevant others. These ‘I’ or ‘me’ self-categories are thus 
similarly fluid and responsive to any changes to the goals or motivations of the 
perceiver, as well as changes to the frame of reference. Just as inclusive social 
identities generate their meaning through a social comparison process, so to do 
exclusive personal identities. This is, of course, a marked departure from other 
conceptualisations of the personal self as found elsewhere in social psychology. We 
mentioned a couple of these in Chapter 2, and in general terms the key difference 
is that, unlike the social identity approach, alternative approaches often 
conceptualise the personal self as existing apart from comparison processes, 
capturing what many would approximate to a traditional understanding of the self; 
something that is stable, idiosyncratic (i.e., that which is special and unique about a 
person), and internal (i.e., existing irrespective of the social environment). 
The existence of personal selves apart from comparison processes is 
generally presumed, rather than supported theoretically or empirically. In contrast, 
there is evidence that personal selves are bound up in social categorisation 
processes (Onorato & Turner, 2004) and the social identity approach offers a 
coherent theoretical account of personal selves as outcomes of social 
categorisation (e.g., Reynolds & Turner, 2006; Turner & Onorato, 1999). That 
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theoretical account is, of course, the same account used to understand social 
identities, which are simply comparably more inclusive self-categories. An 
understanding of personal selves as also outcomes of social categorisation 
processes is thus the more parsimonious perspective. Looking back at a proposed 
distinction between personal selves and social identities then, it is apparent that 
from a social identity perspective there is already an unnecessary fracturing of the 
psychology of the self. In Chapter 4 we suggested that this fracturing reflects a 
tendency to presume that the processing of different types of stimuli requires 
different cognitive systems, as well as exploring some potential reasons that 
psychology may be attracted to theorising along those lines. 
With this as a starting point, the addition of relational selves to the self 
system can be seen to further disintegrate the psychological of the self. Andersen 
and Cole’s theory of the relational self argues that relational selves are distinct 
from both social identities and personal selves because they are bound up in our 
experiences with our SOs. This argument is simply a continuation of the tenets of 
the social cognitive model of transference, which posits that transference is best 
understood as a distinct cognitive process, largely due to the special characteristics 
of SO representations. As is the case with personal selves, however, from the social 
identity perspective one would not expect perception involving SOs to require a 
separate cognitive process. This is, of course, what we have argued in Chapter 5, 
and in fact a large part of our central thesis: transference can be situated very 
happily within what is known about social categorisation processes; what is 
different is merely the stimuli involved in categorisation and the resulting salient 
social categories. We would thus also expect that relational selves may be similarly 
situated within a social categorisation framework. This is indeed the case, and this 
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can be demonstrated by revisiting the empirical work associated with the 
relational self theory. 
The research of Saribay and Andersen (2007) was a distinct follow up to the 
proposed relational self theory. Those authors theorised that because relational 
selves and social identities, or collective selves, are closely related, content relating 
to social identities may be part of content transferred to a target person. They 
went on to suggest that if the SO shares a social identity with the perceiver then 
that social identity may increase in salience for that perceiver, with implications 
for intergroup behaviour. The results of their two studies supported these 
predictions. In resemblance conditions SO information concerning social identities, 
specifically ethnicity, did indeed become part of impression formation for the 
target. Further, when the SO shared their ethnicity with the perceiver that 
ethnicity did appear to become salient for the perceiver, as measured though signs 
of ingroup favouritism under appropriate conditions. Saribay and Andersen’s 
research taps into the central premise of the theory of the relational self. The key 
assumption of their work is that the processes underpinning relational selves 
should be closely related to the processes underpinning collective selves; that is, 
there are two distinct but closely related processes at play in social perception of 
this nature.  
It is possible to also understand the above results in terms of a single social 
categorisation process. Firstly, that information relating to ethnicity, or 
information about any group affiliation for that matter, may be part of category 
content is clearly unexceptional for a social categorisation account. Group based 
information is, after all, the bread and butter of the social categorisation literature. 
If a SO and target social category becomes salient then we would naturally expect 
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that ethnic information about that SO may influence the perception of the target. 
Similarly, it also poses no problem for a social categorisation account that the 
introduction of stimuli that are conceptually related to a perceiver’s own ethnicity 
subsequently makes that ethnic identity salient to them. Here a simple multiple 
categorisation scheme deals with this neatly. The salient SO and target social 
category imbues the available social stimuli with ethnic meaning for the perceiver. 
Those ethnically charged social stimuli then, in turn, make salient for the perceiver 
another social category; this time an inclusive self-category, or social identity, that 
is built around ethnicity (i.e., ‘we’ members of our ethnicity). Here the salience of 
one social category makes salient a second social category, this time a self-category 
(cf. secondary transfer effects; Harwood, Paolini, Joyce, & Arroyo, 2011). 
The findings of Saribay and Andersen can thus be fully explained using a 
social categorisation, and specifically a multiple categorisation, framework. Here 
no additional cognitive processes are required. In fact, as was the case with the 
findings of Kraus and colleagues’, one might now question the novelty of these 
findings. Through a social categorisation lens it becomes apparent that the case for 
novelty rests almost entirely on the proposed distinction between a cognitive 
process dedicated to interpersonal stimuli and content (i.e., transference) and a 
cognitive process dedicated to intergroup stimuli and content (i.e., social 
categorisation). Without that distinction the simpler multiple social categorisation 
model may be applied. Bringing this explicitly back to the concept of relational 
selves, it is not apparent that the relational self concept adds any explanatory 
power to data along these lines; the appearance of explanatory power rests on a 
potentially spurious demarcation between interpersonal psychology and 
intergroup psychology. 
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Overall then, although the theory of the relational self is advanced as an 
effort toward integration of the psychology of the self, from our perspective it 
achieves the opposite. By arguing that relational selves are a third type of self-
concept, in addition to personal selves and social identities, Andersen and Cole are 
actually introducing further schisms to a research space that is already overly 
divided. By looking at the theorising of Saribay and Andersen in relation to the 
data they seek to explain, we can see clearly that relational selves only serve to 
address a research challenge that they themselves created; that challenge being to 
bridge the purported gulf between interpersonal and intergroup cognitive 
processes. Unfortunately, this distracts from what would otherwise be a truly 
integrative approach. In line with the social identity approach, and as an extension 
specifically of our theoretical treatment of the transference phenomenon, sources 
of self-knowledge related to our SOs can be seen as equivalent to all other sources 
of self-knowledge, from a process perspective. A single social categorisation 
process, capable of handling multiple social categories, is available as a 
parsimonious and robust account of much of the observed psychology of the self.  
Transference in the clinical domain 
We began this thesis by touching upon the clinical origin of transference, 
and specifically to its roots in the psychoanalysis tradition. From there we 
observed that the social psychology of transference has inherited much from the 
clinical study of transference, but has also diverged from those origins in a number 
of substantial ways (see Chapter 2). Most critically for the present purposes, social 
psychologists interested in transference moved away from the focus on pathology 
and therapy and instead advocated an understanding of transference as a general 
perceptual process. This does not mean, however, that the social psychology of 
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transference has been blind to the potential implications of its research to the 
clinical domain. The opposite is instead the case. The social psychology of 
transference has often revisited the idea of transference as a clinical concern (e.g., 
Berenson & Andersen, 2006; Berk & Andersen, 2008; Brumbaugh & Fraley, 2006). 
Messages for clinical practice 
Of greatest interest to us, the social psychology of transference has explored 
possible implications for the management of transference and associated 
phenomena in a clinical setting. Andersen and Berk (1998), for instance, dedicated 
their paper to that topic. One key practical implication from their perspective was 
that clinicians should be hesitant to assess transference as pathology in 
therapeutic settings. This is similar to the suggestion from clinical psychologists 
that transference can be an ally in the therapeutic process, although Andersen and 
Berk provide a different rationale as to why clinicians should reserve judgement 
on transference. Here the ubiquity of transference, or in other words its status as 
an everyday perceptual phenomenon, is one reason why transference should not 
be thought of as inherently problematic. Andersen and Berk argue that because 
transference is essentially a “normal” (their quotes) social perceptual process it 
does not make sense to think of the phenomenon as always maladaptive; it is 
instead argued that transference can at times be of benefit to a perceiver. 
Transference therefore should only be considered as pathology under certain 
circumstances. The authors suggest that this will be when the extremity of 
transference creates enough of a departure from reality to create interpersonal 
problems for a perceiver, or when the content of transference is such that it leads 
to suffering. This approach to pathology is similar to that regularly found in 
versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, where 
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“impaired function” is included as a criterion (e.g., DSM–5; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  
Andersen and Berk go on to discuss the identification of transference in the 
clinical setting, as well as how one might attempt to attenuate transference, should 
it be decided that transference is something that needs to be attenuated. In terms 
of the former, identifying transference, the authors suggest that time in therapeutic 
settings be dedicated to discussing SOs in detail, such that transference may be 
more likely to be recognised should it be a factor in maladaptive interactions. Here 
the unconscious nature of transference is noted. Because transference is largely 
considered an unconscious process it is anticipated that identifying transference 
through client self-report may be very difficult. Nonetheless, efforts in that 
direction are still considered worthwhile. The authors also note the unconscious 
nature of transference in relation to attenuating transference. They suggest in the 
first instance that transference may be less likely to occur if a client can be 
encouraged to move toward more conscious impression formation; they suggest 
that therapists help “implement more deliberate information processing” (1998, p. 
94) on the part of clients, which is argued to be consistent with the psychodynamic 
theme of “making the unconscious conscious” (1998, p. 94). Finally, the authors 
make the case that identifying the possible triggering cues of transference may be 
of benefit to a client. This again concerns the attenuation of transference, and it is 
posited that if the triggering cues of transference are known to the perceiver then 
that perceiver may be better prepared to react differently in the face of those cues. 
The clinical implications of the social psychology of transference were 
revisited in earnest by Andersen and Przybylinski (2012), who echo much of what 
had been put forth by Andersen and Berk. They too make the case that 
 311 
transference should not necessarily be considered pathology, and that 
transference can be advantageous to a perceiver. For example, Andersen and 
Pryzbylinki suggest that transference that leads a perceiver to form a more 
positive impression, or “positive transference” (cf. Freud, 1912/1950), may help a 
perceiver give newly encountered people the “benefit of the doubt” and thus foster 
warm interpersonal interactions. It is also suggested that positive transference in a 
clinical setting may help generate the therapeutic alliance between a client and a 
therapist, echoing the views of a number of psychodynamic and clinical 
researchers (see Chapter 2). The authors go on to suggest, again in the same vein 
as Andersen and Berk, that clients be encouraged to be mindful of the cues that 
trigger transference in a way that may help them attenuate transference in their 
everyday lives. Moreover, through more deliberate impression formation 
approaches clients may be helped to “sort out what is real and what is based on 
automatic implicit processes” (2012, p. 379); the anticipation being that more 
secure relationships will be able to be formed where there is more accurate 
impression formation. 
In the above applications of the social psychology of transference to 
therapeutic contexts a particular tension is apparent. That tension is between 
transference as a natural, normal, everyday phenomenon, and transference as 
something to be eliminated or otherwise mitigated. As can be seen above, on the 
one hand emphasis is placed on moving away from transference as inherently 
pathology, and it is instead argued that transference should be assessed as 
adaptive or maladaptive on essentially a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, the 
vast majority of discussion of the practicalities of transference concerns how one 
might diminish or altogether eliminate the influence of transference in social 
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perception. Indeed, even on occasions where the possible positive implications of 
transference are considered, the discussion quickly returns that which is risky or 
problematic about the phenomenon. For instance, while Andersen and Pryzbylinki 
introduce the notion that positive transference involving the therapist may assist 
with the development of the therapeutic alliance, they spend more time 
elaborating on the ways in which transference involving the therapist may 
undermine that alliance. In fact, Andersen and Pryzbylinki describe transference in 
the therapeutic context as introducing something close to a paradox for the 
therapist: the therapist must choose between bringing the transference to the 
attention of the client, which may upset the client and thus erode the therapeutic 
alliance, or alternatively allow the transference to go on uncorrected and 
unchallenged, which is likely to erode the therapeutic alliance anyway. The authors 
in the end tentatively suggest that the former, carefully bringing the transference 
to the attention of the client, is more likely to lead to better outcomes. Similarly, 
when Andersen and Berk speak of the potential utility of transference in therapy, 
their observation is that if transference occurs during therapy then the therapist 
may use this opportunity to respond differently to that transference, thus 
demonstrating for the client that interpersonal interactions do not necessarily play 
out in accordance with their transference based expectations (cf. Weiss, 1986a; 
1986b). 
The influence of an objectivist metatheory 
The above tension follows naturally from the social cognitive model of 
transference. Specifically, it follows naturally from the metatheoretical 
underpinnings of that model. As discussed in Chapter 4, the social cognitive model 
of transference is firmly grounded in the social cognition metatheory of 
 313 
objectivism, where social reality is presumed to exist independent of human 
perception and accuracy can be achieved by perceiving stimuli for what they really 
are, without the biasing influence of perceiver expectations. It is through that lens 
that transference is understood to be an introduction of “biases, distortions, and 
erroneous inferences” (Andersen & Berk, 1998, p. 93). Indeed, in Chapter 4’s 
discussion we encountered Andersen and Berk’s assessment along these lines. 
They describe transference as “reality confusion” and “distortion of the real 
characteristics of the new person” (1998, p. 92). We also noted in that discussion 
that although Andersen and Pryzbylinki move some way toward a meaning making 
understanding of transference, they still retain the view that transference has a 
biasing influence on perception. In their assessment it is always true that 
responses driven by transference are “in a sense inappropriate, that is, in the sense 
of being biased” (2012, p. 372) and that identifying transference is a matter of 
identifying “what is real and what is based on automatic implicit processes from 
prior relationships” (p. 379). 
With an objectivist metatheoretical background it should be no surprise 
that transference researchers found it difficult to truly reserve judgement about 
whether particular instances of transference have a positive or negative impact. 
Because transference is always a departure from reality, and that an accurate 
appraisal of reality is a necessity for effective functioning, transference is, from this 
perspective, always a risky prospect; any benefits of an instance of transference 
must outweigh its inherent accuracy costs before it can be considered adaptive. 
Perhaps ironically, this understanding of transference may be said to carry risks 
for therapeutic management of transference. For example, Wallin (2007) suggests 
that when engaging with transference it is important for therapists to remain 
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agnostic as to whether it is appropriate social perception or inappropriate social 
perception. Here “rejecting the traditional belief that transference is distortion” (p. 
170) is encouraged so that conversations about transference do not begin with the 
client on the back foot; “the exploration of transference must always be grounded 
in the assumption that the patient’s views of the therapist have a plausible basis in 
the in here and now” (p. 174). 
A social constructionist alternative 
Fortuitously, the social categorisation model of transference brings with it 
an alternative metatheory, social constructionism. That metatheory allows 
therapists to be more open minded about the role of transference in the clinical 
setting, and in social perception more generally. To recap, social constructionism 
holds that the material world cannot be understood without engaging in some kind 
of perspective taking. What is accurate or factual is always influenced by the 
theories and beliefs that the perceiver brings with them into the perceptual 
process. Within social constructionism there is no objective, or sans theory, 
knowledge that can be accessed; what is “factual” is instead best understood as 
either a matter of individual belief, or alternatively as a matter of social consensus, 
depending on whether communication or shared belief is relevant to the analysis. 
Such an approach is, of course, highly counter intuitive to many. A common 
response to social constructionism, or rather rebuttal, is that while some 
assessments are subjective, others are clearly objective and can be verified 
through methods that do not rely on the knowledge or beliefs of the perceiver. 
McGarty and colleagues (1993), however, make the point that even those 
appraisals that would seem most objectifiable still require the application of prior 
knowledge and presumptions. Moreover, in order to garner agreement on what is 
 315 
objectively true, that prior knowledge and those presumptions must be shared by 
others. Following Moscivici (1976), they give the example of the Asch line length 
experiments (Asch, 1951, 1955), pointing out that while one might seek to 
objectively resolve any disagreement by picking up a ruler and measuring line 
lengths, implicit in that act is the social consensus that a ruler serves as an 
appropriate tool by which to determine length. This, of course, is not to question 
the enormous practical advantage of taking for granted the measurement utility of 
rulers and similar tools in almost all circumstances. Social constructivism is 
instead intended to reflect an ever present epistemological reality; one that is 
seldom attended to but has received much acceptance in modern philosophy (e.g 
Kant, 1783/1997; Nietzsche, 1888/2004). 
Social constructionism allows for an alternative conceptualisation of 
transference, one that is not intrinsically bound up in bias, distortion, and error. 
First, the salience of a SO and target category can be understood as capturing an 
observed social reality: from the perceiver’s perspective there actually is a 
comparative equivalence between the SO and the newly encountered target and 
the social category is representative of that equivalence. The accentuation of 
within class distances, or believing that SO characteristics are also present in the 
target, is then a logical implication of that equivalence. In terms of that logic, 
expecting SO characteristics to be present in the target is akin to any other 
occasions where instances of a category are anticipated to possess features of that 
category; it is the same as expecting knives to be sharp, chairs to have legs, and 
trees to have branches. This is not to say that others must accept that equivalence 
and the deductions that follow - it is a social reality only from a particular 
perspective - but the perceptual process at play only entails as much distortion as 
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any other categorical assessment, which is to say that it is only as distorting as all 
other assessments. 
Applying this to clinical contexts, a social constructionist approach to 
transference would allow a therapist to sincerely reserve judgement about the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of a particular instance of transference. 
Further, if a judgement is made, then that judgement is much more likely to be 
made on the basis of whether the transference is positively or negatively affecting 
the client, rather than assessing the alleged degree of departure from reality. Here 
the presence of the transference process is irrelevant to whether that transference 
needs to eliminated or mitigated. The process of transference is a perfectly 
legitimate manner in which to determine the social reality. A therapist may, of 
course, still disagree with that social reality, as agreeing that the process is 
legitimate does not require one to agree with the outcomes of that process. It does, 
however, mean that if the therapist does see reason to disagree, then the obvious 
next step is to investigate the inputs to that process. In other words, the natural 
response would be to begin a discussion with the client about the theories and 
beliefs that the client brings with them to social perception. Once again, this would 
not be to presume that those theories and beliefs are invalid, but instead to explore 
those beliefs together as client and therapist to determine their appropriateness. It 
may well be that, after exploring together the beliefs of the client, the equivalence 
of the SO and target becomes the decided upon “truth” of the situation. A social 
constructionist account of transference places the therapist and client on much 
more even footing when it comes to establishing consensus about social reality. 
The therapist here is forced to accept the limitations of their own social perceptual 
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tools; they must leave behind any claim to being the final arbiter of what is reality 
versus imagination. 
A social constructionist metatheory also has practical implications for the 
management of transference. In particular, if an instance of transference is in the 
end determined to be maladaptive for a client, and consequently in need of 
attenuation, a social constructionist metatheory may help therapists be more 
realistic about how that may be expected to play out. It is relevant here to note a 
certain shift on this topic between the papers of Andersen and Berk (1998) and 
Andersen and Przybylinski (2012). In the earlier paper Andersen and Berk are 
optimistic about the prospects for attenuating transference. Inspired by the social 
cognitive literature, and in particular Fiske and Neuberg (1990), they suggest that 
by encouraging more effortful and piecemeal information processing transference 
may be avoided. Fully embedded in objectivist metatheory, the solution is for 
clients to examine “the real characteristics encountered in the new person in a 
systematic way” (1998, p. 100, emphasis added). As we have seen above, this is 
connected to mindfulness of processing, where effortful and piecemeal processing 
brings information processing out of the unconscious and into the conscious 
domain. Andersen and Przybylinski, in contrast, are more cautious about the 
prospects of attenuating transference. While they too suggest mindfulness and 
effortful processing as a potential antidote to transference, they are cognisant of 
research that reportedly has shown transference to persist when perceivers’ are 
aware of the phenomenon (Liviatan & Andersen, 2008, February; Przybylinski & 
Andersen, 2011, May; cf. Huguet, Galvaing, Dumas, & Monteil, 2003), and when 
perceivers’ are aware of the phenomenon and have heightened accuracy 
motivation (Przybylinski & Andersen, 2011, May). Their message is therefore that 
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clinicians should be prepared for substantial persistence of transference in the face 
of management efforts, even when the client is ostensibly on board with a 
therapist’s transference diagnosis and is receptive to management suggestions. 
A social constructionist metatheory would suggest that therapists should 
shift further still. Rather than expecting effortful processing to always attenuate 
transference, albeit often weakly, therapists should expect effortful processing and 
attempts to identify the “real characteristics” encountered in a new person to at 
times exacerbate transference. This is because transference is underpinned by a 
social categorisation process that does not run in opposition to encountered 
stimuli. That social categorisation process is instead partly driven by the nature of 
encountered stimuli. The implication of a social constructionist metatheory is 
therefore that scrutinising encountered stimuli may, quite legitimately, lead a 
perceiver to become more confident that their SO and a newly encountered target 
are indeed equivalent. Or put in terms of the social categorisation model, based on 
the perceiver’s experience, present expectations, current motives, values, goals, 
and needs, a close investigation of what is comparably shared or not shared 
between a SO and target may lead to an increase the detected levels of comparative 
and normative fit, and therefore the salience of a SO and target social category. To 
give an example of this in action, a social constructionist metatheory can be 
applied to the studies reported by Andersen and Przybylinski, above. While 
Andersen and Przybylinski saw the persistence of transference in the face of 
awareness and accuracy motivation as evidence of the chronic accessibility of SO 
representations, which act as place holders for reality, those findings could equally 
be seen as reflecting the ability of participants to detect a real comparative 
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equivalence between their SO and a target in the face of distractions that were 
introduced by the experimenters into the environment. 
What does this mean then for therapists who have identified transference 
that is in need of elimination or mitigation? What are the appropriate courses of 
action if a therapist cannot expect appeals to “reality” and “evidence” to naturally 
instil in the perceiver the therapist’s own, transference free, account of social 
reality? A social categorisation account of transference suggests that there are two 
courses of action, and the first we have already mentioned. A social constructionist 
metatheory does not prohibit a therapist from trying to convince a client to 
understand social reality differently; to come to different conclusions about their 
social environment. What it does suggest is that if a therapist is to make efforts in 
that direction then it should be a consensus building exercise conducted on a far 
more level playing field. They instead must accept that their own preliminary 
conclusions about social reality are equally as subjective as their clients’. The 
therapist must be prepared to accept the subjective validity of their client’s beliefs, 
theories, and expectations, as well as their motives and goals. Moreover, the 
therapist must be prepared to have their own beliefs, theories, expectations, 
motives and goals, subjected to scrutiny, as well as accept the potential invalidity 
of these from the perspective of the client. Only once this has occurred in earnest 
may a therapist expect to fruitfully begin the process of developing a shared 
understanding of social reality. That process of building a shared understanding is 
itself then underpinned by social categorical influence processes, where we are 
receptive to the ideas and beliefs of those who we view as in some way equivalent 
to ourselves, or in other words those who we experience as “one of us” (Turner, 
1982, 1985, 1991). It is by exploring both the therapist’s and client’s beliefs, 
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theories, expectations, motives and goals that sources of equivalence may be 
identified. The antidote to the subjective relativity of social categorisation is also 
social categorisation. It is a psychological sense of ‘us’, which in a clinical setting is 
perhaps what the therapeutic alliance should most aim to be, that allows “human 
perception … to bootstrap itself out of its own relativity” (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 210; 
see also Oakes & Reynolds, 1997). 
The second pathway for eliminating or mitigating maladaptive transference 
pertains to the encountered stimuli directly. A social categorisation account of 
transference brings our attention to the possibility that the best course of action is 
to change the encountered stimuli themselves. The suggestion is that, if a client’s 
social environment is causing them distress, or is otherwise damaging to them, 
then it may be most useful to remove the client from that social environment, or 
intervene directly in the dynamics of that social environment. Changing the social 
environment is, of course, something therapists will naturally consider, perhaps in 
the form of avoiding confrontation or spending time with friends and allies. The 
difference, however, is that while a social cognitive and objectivist understanding 
of transference would lead a therapist to first look to “correct” the client’s social 
perception, here the client’s social perception is more likely to be appreciated as 
valid, leading to the conclusion that it is reality that must be changed. 
There is precedent for this type of shift in thinking in the clinical domain. It 
has been argued in relation to depression that researchers have been too quick to 
make attributions to the internal psychology of suffering individuals, which 
consequently has meant that therapy has been too focused on correcting that 
psychology (e.g., Beck, 1979; Ellis, 1962). Said otherwise, it has been too readily 
“assumed that “depressives” think in distorted ways and hence need to be taught 
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to think normally” (Westen, 1991, p. 188), where in actuality the opposite is true: 
individuals suffering depression are doing so because they are embroiled in 
depressing circumstances (Coyne, 1992; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). Here too the 
implication is that therapy shouldn’t merely aim to manage the way clients think 
about, or perceive, their social environment, but should seek to engage with the 
social environment itself. 
The cautionary tale of prejudice reduction 
The shift that is being described presently, from a focus on pathological 
thinking to recognition of a potentially pathological social environment, mirrors 
the same shift that has been advocated within the intergroup relations domain. 
Social identity theorists have observed that the social psychology of intergroup 
relations has been dominated by what has been described as a prejudice 
metatheory of intergroup conflict (Turner, 1997, 2001a). That prejudice 
metatheory, of which the highly influential work of Allport (1954) is archetypal, 
has largely sought to explain intergroup conflict and negative attitudes toward 
collections of people by way of personality types and individual motivational 
drives. In doing so, that metatheory has neglected the very real intergroup 
circumstances that are an important determinant of intergroup attitudes. This is 
described as the psychologization of social phenomenon (Turner, 2001b), which is 
a type of reductionism where explanations of social phenomena are attempted in 
terms of individual psychology only (see also Billig, 1976; Branscombe & Spears, 
2001). 
Social identity theorists have argued that this psychologization has 
pernicious effects on the management of intergroup relations and intergroup 
phenomenon more broadly. Viewing intergroup conflict as a matter of individual 
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psychology has led researchers and practitioners to attempt prejudice reduction in 
a way that is fundamentally disconnected from the social environment in which 
that prejudice emerges. Such interventions thus attempt to reduce antipathy and 
unfair stereotyping without considering the possibility that antipathy and certain 
stereotypes are psychologically valid responses to encountered social stimuli; like 
transference in the clinical domain, the focus is on “fixing” a broken social 
perceptual process1. The great hope of the prejudice approach to intergroup 
conflict, for example, is that changes to individual perceptions will gradually be 
followed by social change. That this will occur, however, is far from a certainty. In 
fact, if social perception in large part reflects the social environment, as the social 
identity approach suggests, then an unchanged social environment may well undo 
any achieved changes to individual perceptions (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993). 
The consequent critique of the prejudice approach is that it is frequently 
ineffective as a pathway to social change, or worse, it is an ally the status quo. In 
relation to the latter, it is argued that the prejudice approach may serve the 
purpose of delegitimising a necessary management of actual intergroup 
differences and conflict, all the while giving the appearance that social progress is 
underway (Billig, 1976; Dixon & Levine, 2012; Jussim & Eccles, 1995; Jussim et al., 
1995).  
It is the cautionary tale of prejudice metatheory that we have applied above 
to transference. Our concern is that a model of transference that centres around an 
irrational and inaccurate individual psychology may lead to ineffective 
management efforts because a) clients’ social realities will in time undo any 
attenuation of transference that has been achieved, and b) the opportunity will be 
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missed to use precious therapeutic time to fruitfully explore possible changes to 
that social reality. 
Drawing parallels with the intergroup relations literature in this way raises 
one more intriguing possibility for transference in clinical settings. The case has 
been made that something akin to prejudice may be advantageous if successful 
social change is to occur (Dixon et al., 2013). The argument here is that 
emphasising intergroup differences may help motivate attempts to eliminate those 
differences. Examples where a focus on intergroup difference has been arguably 
beneficial include the civil rights movement in the United States, the anti-apartheid 
moment in South Africa, and feminist movements world over. Might transference 
then at times have the same utility? That is, if a client’s social reality is in need of 
social change, perhaps in terms of the company they keep or the social circles they 
avoid, would it be appropriate for a therapist to create transference in an attempt 
to motivate change? Given an understanding of transference as fundamentally a 
departure from reality, we suspect that such a suggestion would jar with the 
current social psychology of transference; the idea of a therapist arguing for a 
perceived equivalence between SOs and newly encountered targets would appear 
highly counterintuitive. Nonetheless, we also suspect that transference as a 
therapeutic tool could have some attraction. In fact, it would not surprise us if 
therapists have on occasion instilled in a client something akin to transference in 
an attempt to guide them away from highly damaging social situations. 
Final comment 
In the present chapter we have described a number of implications of the 
social categorisation model of transference. In relation to transference and 
intergroup relations and the relational self, we identified areas where greater 
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theoretical parsimony is achievable. In relation to transference and cognitive 
resource availability, we brought into question the proposed linear negative 
relationship between the two. Finally, and most practically, we have introduced 
new ideas to the ongoing discussion how best to conceptualise and manage 
transference in clinical practise. Here we were able to draw heavily on the 
intergroup relations literature, and in particular the contributions of the social 
identity approach. All of this was achieved by more fully integrating the 
transference phenomenon into the broader theoretical field of social 
categorisation. 
It is the topic of integration within social psychology that we would like to 
touch on again here, at the close of this thesis. Specifically, we wish to make one 
more final comment on integration in social psychology as it pertains to 
transference. Our recurring message has been that for the social psychology of 
transference there exists an opportunity for far greater integration with other 
research streams than has been achieved thus far. In fact, we have suggested that 
the divide between transference research and other highly relevant social 
psychological research (i.e., research into cognitive and social categorisation more 
broadly) is a textbook case of the sort of particularisation of social psychology that 
is threatening to undermine the value of the field (see Chapter 4). The point we 
wish to make here, however, is that while this is true, in our view the study of 
transference that has occurred within social psychology over the last couple of 
decades has been of inordinate value. In particular, we believe that a great service 
has been performed for psychology by bringing transference out of the domain of 
pathology and maladaptation and giving it life as an everyday perceptual 
phenomenon. Further, we see the focus on transference as a distinct topic of social 
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psychological enquiry as entirely justified and part of a healthy diversity of 
research. Our emphasis on the integration of transference with the broader study 
of social perception should not be taken as a rebuke of the research work 
undertaken in this space, but instead should be viewed as an attempt to move 
transference forward in its journey as a social psychological topic. 
Here we would repeat the suggestion of cognitive categorisation 
researchers Love and Gureckis that in research “diversity is desirable if findings 
can be eventually placed in a common theoretical framework” (2005, p. 229; see 
also Andersen & Saribay, 2006). We see the social psychology of transference as 
exactly that kind of valuable diversity, and the social categorisation model of 
transference proposed in this thesis as the common theoretical framework that is 
the next logical step. Thus, in line with Love and Gureckis’ comment, that a 
common theoretical framework is now available must not overshadow the hard 
work that has come before. Nor should our advocacy for integration be taken to 
suggest that there is no place for future research conducted under the specific 
banner of transference. Instead, we anticipate that ongoing transference research 
will be a necessity if we are to obtain a practical descriptive understanding of 
where transference is likely to occur and what impact transference is likely to have 
within specified contexts. In short, research into content will always be needed to 
complement an understanding of process. 
 
Notes 
1. The most extreme example of this disconnection that we have encountered came 
from Cikara and Van Bavel (2014), whose interest in prejudice reduction led them 
to suggest pharmacological interventions for intergroup conflict. 
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